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SIDll'fARY 
Feud is a recurrent theme in Scottish history, but it is 
a subject which has received scant regard in its own right 
until fairly recently. Sources for an exarrlirwtion of the 
Scottish blood-feud are also voluminous and accessible, 
particularly in the early modern period, a period which 
coincided with the demise of the feud throughout most of 
the kingdom. The material evidence and course the feud 
itself took during the reign of James VI are the, principal 
reasons for concentrating on these years, though in omitting 
the civil war of 1567-73 one has not entirely covered that 
long reign. 
While the title of this thesis dra\-ls attention to the 
extent and nature of the feud, it is the latter 'lhich 
receives by far the greater emphasis. In the "Introduction" 
the place of the Scottish feud in the wider debate on the 
blood-feud is considered, a debate which involves historians 
of different centuries and societies" and those like 
anthropologists and sociologists who have approached the 
subject from the perspective of other disciplines. Here 
the extent of the feud in late sixteenth century Scotland 
is discussed, with questions of typology, origins, geographic 
and social distribution, length and incidence being included. 
Following this, the first chapter "Ideals, Violence and Peace" 
examines the pature of the feud in the context of these 
thr ee themes. 
ii. 
However, the political m. ture of the Scottish feud 
necessitated that considerable attention be paid to the 
relationship between politics and the feud. One chapter, 
therefore, looks at the many issues which caused feuding 
both in the rural community and in an urban environment. 
This is followed by a very detailed analysis of the course 
of one blood-feud in one relatively small locality throughout 
the entire period, from royal minority to the implementation 
of a crown policy which uprooted feuding. After discussing 
politics and the feud in a local context, the focus of 
attention then moves to the politics of the court ana central 
government, but without losing sight of the very real 
connection between events at the centre and in the localities. 
Again one chapter is devoted to a more general disc!JSsion of 
court politics and the impact of feuding there, before being 
followed by another in depth analysis of the major political 
feud of the reign between the earl of Huntly and his rivals 
in the north of Scotland. The highland nature of much of 
this feud, and the lowland envi~onment of the Cunningham-
Montgomery feud which forms the subject matter of chapter 
three, made it almost obligatory to also devote some time 
to a border feud. This is done, therefore, in chapter six, 
within the context of a discussion of the government of the 
west march and the international sensitivity of the region. 
The remaini.ng two chapters attempt to explain how the 
feud was uprooted from most of Scotland before the end of 
James' reign. In chapter seven the Jacobean legislation 
iii. 
against feuding and the violent environment in which it bred 
is the principal theme. Here the laws, their enforcernent 
and their success in reducing feuding, controlling the use 
of guns, restricting retinues, punishing outlaws, imrpoving 
the efficiency of the administration of law and order and 
other areas of related concern to James and his government 
are detailed and assessed. Finally, the last chapter turns 
to the question of who initiated and carried through this 
crack down on feuding and lawlessness. The king himself, 
the nobility, crown officials and the church are all 
evaluated and their individual contribution is analysed. 
A short conclusion simply suggests some possibilities for 
future research which might be taken up as a continuation 
of this thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In that famous book on kingcraft, "Basilikon Doron", 
James VI wrote of his subjects 
"and for anie displeasure, that they apprehend to 
be done unto them by their neighbours, to tak up 
a plaine feid against him, and (without respect to 
God, King or commonweale) to bang it out bravelY'l 
hee and all his kinne, against him and all his" • 
Feud was a subject in which James could consider himself 
something of an expert and his expert definition is as 
good a place as any to begin an analysis of the Scottish 
feud in the years of his reign. To-day the wo~d is 
liberally used to describe rivalries in sport, in 
politics, in academic competition and in any area of 
human occupation where confrontation has replaced 
co-operation. Such a wide application of the word is 
by no means a modern phenomena and even in the sixteenth 
century One finds it in contexts not entirely expected. 
1. 
Yet it was not simply a heightened sense of rivalry which 
King James was bemoaning when he wrote his book. The feud 
he had in mind was a relationship be,tween men which was 
deeper and more complex than any of our modern usages 
of the word. 
James further wrote of feud that 11 ••• if this Treatise 
were written in French or Latin, I could not get them 
named unto you but by circomlocutionll , because "their 
barbarous name is unknawen to anie other nation". 2 
,~ 
1. "Basilikon Doron" in The Political Works of James I 
(ed.) C.H.Mcl1waine (New-York, 1965), p 24. 
2. ibid., P 25. 
2. 
For once,however,the king's scholarship had let him down 
and only a few years before,an Elizabethan Border official 
had suggested of the et.ymo1ogy of the word that "1 knowe 
not where better to fetch t.hen from Spicgelius in his 
Lexicon Juris, in verbo "feydam": he saith it is an old 
Teutch word wherof is derived by Herman~~ Niroranus, 
faydos!ll!!J Hostis publicus: "foed" enim, Bel1um significatll • 3 
However,whi1e the word did have an etymological history 
of some antiquity, there being variants of the spelling 
in late Latin "faida", old French "fa:ldell , old High German 
"fechida" and Middle English "fede", its survival in the 
English language is due largely to its Scottish usage. 4 
That "feudrt was written and written about in Scotland 
at a time when feuding was a contemporary issue is of 
enormous importance. Much of the work which has been 
done on the feud has been in societies which have not 
written about their feuds and their ideas about feud or, 
if they have written about them, such records have not 
survived in any abundance. The richness of material on 
the feud in Scotland is probably not unique, B.S.Philpotts 
certainly unearthed a considerable volume of records about 
feuding in early modern Denmark and other medieval 
3. C~lendar of Letters and Pa ers Relatin 
of the Borders of Ey:1and and Scotland, 
(Edinburgh, 1894-96 , vo1 ii, p 163. 
4. For a much fuller etymological history I found A New 
English Dictionary (ed.) J.A.H. Murray (London, 1901) 
very comprehensive. 
European societies. However, there can be few feu.ding societies 
which have allowed the historian sllch an insight into the 
extent and nature of feud in the days before anthropologists 
arrived on the scene. 5 
,-
It is of course for that very reason that the study of 
feud has to such an extent been dominated by other 
disciplines like anthropology and sociology and why more 
is known about the feuds of remote tribes in the Sudan 
than about fe~ding in pre-modern Europe. The integration 
of these disciplines has been demonstrated in such works 
as "History and Social Anthropology" edited by I.M.Lewis6 
and more specifically by E.E. Evans-P~itchard in an 
7 important pamphlet "Anthropology and History" where he 
argued strongly for anthropologist~ to turn to history 
for their 'study of hl~an behaviour. Conversely historians 
have, with more enthusiasm one feels, turned to the 
social sciences for direction and in the feud this has 
certainly been the case. 
A great deal of current thinking about feud has been 
dominated by the work of Evans-Pritchard and Max Gluckman 
5. An excellent survey of the sources available for the 
Scottish feud throughout the middle ages and early 
modern period as well as a wider discassion of other 
works associated with the blood-feud can be found in 
"Bloodfeud, Kindred and Government In Early Modern 
Scotland" ~ by Jenny Wormald, Past and Present, no 87 
(Nay 1980). 
6. Histor a~ Social Anthro 010 (ed.) I.M. Lewis 
A.S.A. Monographs, vii"London 1968). 
7. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Anthropology and History, 
(Manchester U.P., 1971). 
who both studied the Nuer tribe and their neighbours in 
8 
southern Sudan. The major conclusion of this has been 
what Gluckman called the "Peace in the feud". In essence 
what Gluckman and Evans-Pritchard have said is that the 
feud is a legal sanction, recognised as such by the 
communi ty, and thus a means of enforcing justice and 
minimising any violence which might follow the committing 
of a crime. Customary principles defining who has the 
right to vengeance and on whom it should be inflicted, 
clearly recognised procedures for pacifying the parties 
I 
involved, and the multiplicity of social relationships 
within the locality inhabited by these parties; all operate 
in such a way as to bring peace and not war. This is not 
to say that violence never occurs. As Evans-Pritchard 
argued, "The larger the segment involved the greater the 
anarchy that prevails".9 Thus violent feuds between tribes 
are more likely than feuds within a tribe. Furthermore, 
even within fairly intimate corporate groups the acceptance 
of compensation and the acceptance of a settlement does 
not put an end to the feud for the dead man's kin never 
cease "to have war in their hearts". lO In practice though, 
peace within the feud had been established and, according 
8. M. Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa, (Oxford, 1956) 
and Politics Law and Ritual in Tribal Societ (Oxford, 
1971)i'E.E.Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer Oxford, 1979). 
9. E.E.Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, (Oxford, 1979), p 157. 
10. ibid., P 154. 
to Gluckman, custom had triumphed over conflict. 
Questions have,howeve~ already been raised about the 
application of these findings and as Jacob Black-Michaud 
has pointed out, not all villages are Nuer villages, an 
observation which one must take further by stating the 
equally obvious point that not all feuding societies are 
village based.ll Clearly Jacobean Scotland was not the 
same as twentieth century Sudan, however much one modifies 
one's models. The same distinction has to be made for the 
Mediterranean feud which has received even more attention 
with specific studies of Albania, Greece, the Middle East 
and the North African bedouin having been cond~cted.12 
A great deal of this has been brought together by Black-
Michaud in "Cohesive Force; Feud in the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East". In his introduction to the book 
E.L.Peters basically defines feud as the presence of 
discrete corporate groups who are unable to compromise. 
11. J.Black~ichaud, Cohesive Force; Feud in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East (Oxford, 1975), 
p 63-64. 
12. For Albania see M. Has1uck The Unwritten Law in 
Albania (Cambridge, 1954) and I.Whitaker "Tribal 
structure and National Politics in Albania, 1910-1950" 
in Lewis (ed.), History and Social Anthropology; for 
Greece J.K. Campbe11 Honour, Family and Patronage: 
A Stud of Institutions and Noral Values in a Greek 
Mountain Community, Oxford, 1979); for the Middle 
East M.J.L. Hardy, Blood Feuds and the Pa ent of 
Blood Mone in the Middle East, E.J. Brill: Leiden, 
·1963 ; and for the bedouin see E.L.Peters, "Some 
strQctural aspects of feud among the camel-herding 
Bedouin of Cyrenaica", in Africa, vol XXlCVii, no 3 
(1967). For an even wider survey of feud in these 
regions see the bibliography in Black-Michaud, 
Cohesive Force. 
6. 
By discrete he means that the corporate group must have 
recognisable territorial rights, a common name, collective 
ownership of the natural resources of the territory by the 
agnates of the group and marriage within the corporate 
group or within a select and limited number of neighbours. • 
However he does specify that these are the indices required 
for his own area of study, which is the bedouin. Certainly 
in the Scottish instance, while the first two would be 
appropriate, the third would only be relevant to the 
extent that tenants and dependants had a collect.ive interest 
in, if not ownership, of natural resources and the last 
would be irrelevant. Black-Michaud agrees with Peters 
that feuds are interminable and "by definition eternal" ,13 't.t 
a point which Evans-Pritchard also raised,but which has 
been glazed over somewhat by the 'peace in the feud' school. 
In fact Black~Michaud largely demolishes this line of 
thought which was leading towards an understanding of 
feud as essentially non-violent; violent feud not being 
feud at al~ but warfare or vendetta or something else. 
Taking Peter's conclusion that feuds in Cyrenicia were 
eternal he shows this to be the case for the entire 
Mediterranean feud and for feud generally. 
While this model for feud is certainl7 much more 
convincing than that of Gluckman and the 'peace in the 
feud' school,there remain problems when trying to impose 
13. B1ack-Michaud, Cohesive Force, p.16. 
7. 
it on the Scottish situation. His stress on "total scarcity' 
as the economic condition necessary for feud to function and 
on an egalitarian social structure headed by leaders who 
spontaneously emerge to shape the corporate groupto ambitions, 
quite obviously do not apply to sixteenth century Scotland. 14 
The fault, however, does not lie in his analysis, but in its 
relevance to cultures and times other than those he has 
under study. One could quite easily construct a model or 
feud from among some of those suggested by scholars in the 
field and find that the Scottish feuu was not a feud at all. 
However,to return to where we began, the people who lived 
in sixteenth century Scotland knew what they meant by feud 
and called it 'by that name and they will remain feuds 
whatever the latest typology. Such models have a tendency 
to be ei~her so vague as to be meaningless or, if specific, 
too exclusive. Therefore a study of feud in early modern 
Scotland is best conducted within its own time-space 
dimensions and should not be prejudged by tbe conclusions 
made about quite distinct societies in different times. 15 
14. Black-Michaud, ~~hesive Force. Not only is the book 
importa nt in developing Black-Micbaud' s own ideas, 
but he devotes a considerable amount of space to 
discussing the ideas of other scholars of the feud. 
15. For example James VI himself would have disagreed 
with Peter's view that feuds were eternal, arguing 
that "the mater of feadis is not eternall1 , 
The Register 9f the Privy Council of Scotland, 
(ed.) J.H. Burton and others (Edinb:xrgh, 1877-98), 
xiii, p 261. 
8. 
What is a fairly fLlndamental basis for the study of feud 
is that it is a relations~ip between two corporate groups, 
occasioned by some grievance or competition between them, 
and conducted through the exchange of violence, or by 
. 16 
mediation, or both together. 'rhe corporate group 
itself must, therefore, be the starting point for an 
analysis of any feud, including the Scottish one. In the 
case of the Nuer the village community was the most 
easily recognisable group,though depending upon the 
16. Other feud literature which I have found useful has 
been Bertha S. Philpotts, Kindred and Clan in the 
Middle Ages and after, (Cambridge, 1913) which is 
particularly good on feud settlements and though 
most of it is concerned with an earlier period 
there is a considerable amo~nt of material on early 
modern Denmark, Schleswig-Ho1stein and parts of 
north Germany. B.C.Caudill Pioneers of Eastern 
Kentacky, their Feuds and Settlements, (Cincinnati, 
1969) contains no analysis at all and is of limited 
USef\llness, b:.lt it contains some interesting material 
on nineteenth century American fe'lding. R.R. Davies, 
liThe Survival of the Bloodfeud in Nedieval 10/ales" , 
History, liv (1969) traces the feud in ~lales 1.1P to 
early modern Europe. E.Leach, Custom, Law and 
Terrorist Violence, (Edinburgh, U.P. 1977), makes 
the debatable point that there is a great deal of 
similarity between the corporate groups of fe'lding 
societies and modern terrorist sects. R. Karsten, 
"Blood, Revenge and War amon5 the Gibaro Indians" 
in P. Bohannan ed., Law and Warfare, (New York, 1967), 
describes feud in a society with very little concept 
of peace in the feud at all. J .M. l-lallace-Hadrill, 
liThe Boodfeud of the Franks ll , in rhe Long-.Haired KinO's 
and Other Studies in Frankish History, (Oxford, 1971), 
is a valuable contribution to the peace side of the 
feud argument. For some good narratives of feuds with 
insight lnto the attitudes of a feuding society 
N aI's Sa a (Ponguin, 1980), is by far the best while 
BeoWl.11f Penguin, 1979), and The Nibelun1enlied 
·(Penguin, 1979), are also both useful and entertaining. 
9. 
particular feud, it could be individual families within 
the village, or the entire tribe, which fo~ned the 
corporate group. In sixteenth century Scotland the 
village vIas less important, but the same factors of 
kinship and locality were at work to form the basic 
social organisms capable of sustaining a feud. In 
addition to this, lordship was the focal point of the 
group, imposing upon it a political and economic order 
which clarified the lines of division of each group. 
The net result was not a single homogeneous unit which 
acted and thought as one, for fluidity and a multiplicity 
of interests brought diversity to the group and prevented 
this. However, there was sufficient loyalty and 
obedience within these factions of kinsmen, clients, 
depe~ants, tenants and servants to give them a 
recognisable coherence and vitality. 
Clearly then, one needs to know something about 
these social relationships in early modern Scotland 
as a basis to understanding the feud. This in itself 
would involve another thesis and fortunately the work 
has already been done by Dr. Jenny Wormald whose research 
into the social and political relationships of fifteenth 
and sixteenth century Scotland has had a revolutionary 
impact upon our understanding of Scotland during this 
period. Wormald has by no means answered, or presumed 
to answer, all the questions about kinship, lordship 
10. 
and local society, and in comparison with England and France 
such research is still at a very early stage. However, 
much of what follows is founded upon what she has to say 
about these subjects and while differences exist with some 
of her specific interpretations, and these are outlined 
below, one is persuaded into accepting her basic analysi.s 
of the bonds of society, and for a more complete understanding 
of kinship, lordship and local society can do no better than 
refer to her work.17 
In essence Wormald has found the ideal of kinship in 
Scotland to have been strong, but its practical use ,of 
less value than the rhetoric often suggests. Such 
demythologising of the kin is consistant with the general 
findings of English historians like Alan Macfarlane, 
Wrightson and Laslett who adop~ a more extreme position 
and Stone, James, Watt, and Penry vlilliams who believe, 
with various degrees of qualification, that the extended 
family and ties of kinship retained.a more significant 
vitality in the peripheral regions or among the 
17. J .M. Brown, "Bonds of Manrent in Scotland before 160311 , 
(University of Glassow Ph.D. thesis, 1974); "The 
Exercise of Pm/er", in J.M. Brown (ed.), Scottish 
Societx in the Fifte~~~h Centurz, (London, 1977); 
J.M. Brown, "Scottish Politics 1567-1625", in 
A.G.R. Smith (ed.), Tqe Reign gf James VI and I 
(London, 1973); J .H. Brown, IITaming the I1Bgnates?" , 
in G. Menzies (ed.), The Scottish Natioq (B.B.C., 1972); 
, J .M. Wormald Court, Kirk and COI!iD1uni tx, (London, 1981); 
J .M. l~Tormald, "Bloodfeud, Kindred B nd Government in 
Early Modern Scotland" • 
11. 
nobility.18 However the tendency to look south to England 
has on other occasions distorted thinking about Scotland 
and the French historian Jean-Louis Flandrin is very 
critical of English and Parisian based scholars who have, 
in his opinion, prematurely dismissed the importance of 
kinship, and he has demonstrated its continued effectiveness 
19 . 
well into the seventeenth century. . One suspects that when 
more detailed analysis of Scottish kinship is avialable, . 
that Macfarlane's thesis of English Individualism will be 
true at least in that England will be distinct from Scotland. 
Certainly liThe 'whole kindred' was something of' a mythll , 
and had been for some time, but the evidence of the bloodfeud 
13. A. Macfarlane, The Origins of English Individualism, 
(Oxford, 1978) is the most extreme case against the 
kin; K. \~rightson, ~n~lish Society, 1580-1680, 
(London, 1982); P. Laslett (ed.), Household and Famill 
in Past Times, (Cambridge, 1972); L. stone, The Family, 
§.ex ~llii Harri(ge, (Pelican, 1979) and The Crisis of the 
AristocrRcy, Oxford, 1977); M.E. James, Fa~ily, 
Linea~e and Civil S09iety, (Oxford, 1974); S.J. Watts, 
From Border to }~iddle Shire: R~rth~berlanqL-1286-l622' 
\Leicester U.P. 1975); P. Williams, The Tudor Re~ime 
(Oxford, 1979). See also G.Bossy, "Blood and Baptism: 
Kinship , Community and Christianity in Hestern Europe 
from the Fourteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries" in 
D. Baker (ed.), Sanctity and Sec'llarity: The Church and 
The World, The Ecclesiastical History Society, vol 10, 
TOxford, 1973), p 136, where he makes the fascinating 
observation that a man's obligations to kinsmen did 
not end with death "since the bond of kinship ie the 
most effectual means of securing ml.ltual support in 
salvation", that is by praying for the souls of those 
in purgatory. 
19. J.L. Flandrin, ~milies in Former Times' Kinshi , 
Household arp Sexuality, Cambridge, 1979 • 
12. 
suggests that men certainly were doing something more than 
11 invoking an ancient conceptll20 in appealing to their own 
kinsmen to help them, and in slaughtering the kinsmen of 
their enemies. There was more than rhetoric at work when 
Sir James MacDonald said of his lands that "this is 
certane, I will die befoir I see a Campbell possess itll.2l 
Sir Robert Gordon had similar concepts in mind when he 
wrote of the MacDonald-HacLean feud. "This warr, whi1k 
fell furth at this tyme between those two races of people 
was prosecuted to the destruction almost of both their 
families. 1I22 However, the extent and effective~ess of the 
kindred cannot be argued here, and in relation to the feud 
they are dealt with more fully elsewhere. A little more 
emphasis should,howeve~ be given to the breadth of kinsmen 
involved in a feud, and one would want to include at least 
uncles, nephews and cousins of first degree as fairly 
regular participants in the feuds of their relatives. 
Even more doubt has been cast on the importance of the 
••• 
marriage alliance in strengthening the kin. That "Marriage 
brought two kindreds into juXtaposition; it did not impose 
mutual obligations of kinship on the husband and the male 
relatives of the wife" is on the whole true, has largely 
20. J.M. Worma1d, "B100dfeud, Kindred and Government in 
Early Modern Scotland", p 71. 
21. Ancient Criminal Trials in Sco~land from 1488 to 1624 
.(ed.) R.Pitcairn, (London, 1833), vo1 iii, p 21. 
22. Sir Robert Gordon, A Geneolo~ica1 Hist0f: of the 
EarldoDJ. of Sutherland, (Edinburgh, 1813 , p 187. 
13. 
been proven. 23 Certainly marriage in sixteenth century 
Scotland did not work as it did among the Nuer, where 
Gluckman observed that the obligations it imposed I~pon 
a man to his wife's or mother's kin "strikes into t.he 
unity of each vengeance group" an:! greatly reduced the 
likelihood of feud in society as a whole. 24 Nor 
was it at the other extreme as found in Albania where a 
wife was neglected by her husband's kin and her own 
father's kinsmen retained the duty of avenging her.25 
As Philpotts has pointed out, "A clan system, however, 
" is impossible where kinship is reckoned through both 
t " 26 paren s •••• In Scotland the agnatic ties did remain 
dominant, but one should be careful not to devalue the 
marriage alliance completely. Thus in 1580 Forster 
23. J.M. Wormald, "Bloodfeud, Kindred and Government", 
p 67. 
24. 1-1. Gluckman, Custom and Con~, p 14 and p 22. 
25. l.J'hitaker, "Tribal Solidarity and National Politics", 
p 270. 
26. Philpotts, Kin~red and Clan, p 2. For further 
disc~sion see comments about the marriage alliance 
by N.Bloch, Feudal Societr (London, 1978), p 134-142 
and G. Duby, The CQiyalrous Soqiety (London, 1977), 
p 134-148. Duby has found maternal kinship to be 
at least as important until the tenth-eleventh century 
and Bloch has argued that it was because of the . 
weakness of not having an exclusively agnatic kinship 
that feudal ties became necessary. He does, however, 
make exceptions which appear to include Scotland. Also 
K. Leyser, "The Women of the Saxon Aristocracy' in his 
book "R!~le and Conflict ill-an Early Medieval Societr, 
(Oxford, 1979) and D. Sabean, "Aspects of kinship 
behaviour and property in Rural l~1estern Europe before 
1800" in J. Goody, J. Thirsk and E.P. Thomson (eds.), 
FamilY: and Inheritance in \\'estern E:J.I'oEe, l222-1800, 
(Cambridge, 1976). 
conunented that the Kerrs were making themselves strong, 
citing as evidence that a marriage had been arranged 
between lord Hume's daughter, "beinge the Larde of 
Cesford's sister dowghterlf and the earl Marischal's son.27 
Contemporaries could perceive the marriage alliance to 
be significant even when it was this far removed from 
the principal. Marriage may not hav~ brought much 
military support in a feud, but it did bring other forms 
of power by way of connections, advice, attendance at 
trysts etc. and reduce the likelihood of one's in-laws 
themselves being at feud with their affinal kinsmen. 
The complimentary relationship between lordship and 
kinship has also been well documented by Wormald. The 
Scottish lords were not simply the "robber barons" of 
less sophisticated histories, but leaders of their 
society who were capable of reasonable and just behaviour. 
They represented law and order in their localities and 
their networks of alliances were as much designed to 
stop the spread of feud and violence as to strengthen 
their own potential for violence in a feud. Thus the 
bonds between men, bonds of friendship, maintenance and 
manrent, "show a strong awareness of their responsibility, 
not to keep their men free from the consequencies of their 
crimes, but to involve themselves personally in, and 
provide a solution to, disputes between their followers". 28 
27. C.B.P., ii, P 29. 
28. Wormald, "Bloodfeud, Kindred and Government", p 72. 
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One has the evidence of men like the earl of Argyll in 1574 
who travelled around his vast domains pacifying feuds, 
tlnot omitting to 'sedat' and mitigate the privy grudges 
and 'particularis' among his own friends in the inner 
parts of Argy1l".29 Good lordship was what was expected 
of a nobleman. Hence the privy council's rough handling 
of the weak earl,of Atho1l in 1607 for "what the want of 
suche a man dOis, the miserable estate of the cuntrey 
of Athoill and all the bordouring boundis to it, dois 
declair".30 These are two ends, of the spectrum, but 
in the grey area in between most noblemen mixed the good, 
the bad and the ugly side to lordship. lihen writing about 
these Scottish lords Sir Henry Lee asked Burghley, "In what 
place in the world will kin, friends and servants adventure 
more for their lords?".31 Similarly Sir Robert Gordon 
wrote of the highlanders and islanders that they are 
"by nature, 'most bent and prone to adventure themselves, 
their lyffs, and all they have, for their mesters and lords, 
yea beyond all other people".32 Such loyalty wes not 
without its exceptions, but s~ch a powerful bond between 
lord end man had its temptations and even obligations 
which could, and did, by-pass other obligations to the 
29. Q.l!,lendar of StateI:~~ relattn'i tc! ScotlancLt:!.nd MarI, 
~een of Scots, l24t-1603 (ed. J. Bain and others 
(Edinburgh, 1898-l969),vol v, P 34. 
30. St~aEe~d Miscella!:!eous qo~~sponc!e!:!Q.ELof ..!h9.!!!.~lb 
Earl of Melrose lAbbotsford Club) vol ix [Edinburgh, 
1837), vol i, p 30-31. 
31. C.S.P. Scat., iv, p 561. 
32. Gordon, Sutherland, p 267. 
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crown and the law. Control of great numbers of men and a 
fabric of bonds, formal and informal, which dragged men, 
for a variety of reasons, into feuds and confrontations which 
were not their own, was a potentially explosive situation. 
In the feud such explosions all too often took place. 
It was certainly not anarchy and it was probably the best 
that such a society could do, but it was less than order 
and its effects were often less harmonious than has perhaps 
been suggested.33 
The power of the nobility with itn centrifugal 
tendencies was thus another factor on which the feud 
rested. The picture of over-mighty magnates overawing 
a weak crown has, one hopes, been buried for ever and 
in its place one has a powerful crown and a largely 
co-operative nobility.34 Comments such as those by 
M. Lee that !tThe root of the problem of criminal justice 
33. See Brown, !tBonds of Manrent ll • Just to show that 
such bonds were not always concerned with plotting 
and counter-plotting see Erskine-Murray M.S., 
Re ort of the Ro al Con:mission on Historial 
Y~nuscripts, London, 1870- ,iv, p 527, 
for a bond among a number of the Scottish nobility 
in which they agreed not to wear clothes inlaid 
with fake gold, silver and jewelry as it is 
"uncumly and unhonest!t. Whoever broke the bond 
was to take the others out to dinner and forfeit 
the offending clothes to the first fiddler they 
came across. 
34. See especially Brown, !tScottish Politics l567-l625!t, 
in The Reign of James VI and I, p 22-39; Brown, 
!tTaming the Magnates?", p 46-59; t.J'ormald, Court t 
·Kirk end Communitl, P 12-13, P 151. 
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lay in the fact that the aristocracy, the holders of the 
heritable jurisdictions, had a bas ic contempt for the law"? 5 
reveal a somewhat black and white understanding of what is 
a much more complex issue. Contempt is quite obvioLwly 
too strong a word, were it true then anarchy would have 
prevailed since the entire policing system of t~e kingdom 
would have been on the side of the criminals, b~t it would 
be true to say that the nobility, a nd indeed anyone with a 
degree of personal influence, had a certain lack of respect 
for the more formal organs of justice. Not only did this 
affect crime, but it also had political implications. 
Thus a crown official who submitted a report on the 1589 
rebellion advised that the barons of the north-east be 
disciplined as they " ••• fering to offend a ErIe of 
Huntley, hes forget their dewtie to thair naturale 
Prince ••• ".36 Loyalty to lords and the local power 
of the Scottish nobility never challenged the Stewart 
dynasty, but it did inhibit its sphere of activity and 
did prevent Scottish kings from being as independent as 
they would often have wished. The opinion that the 
nobles were "too hard for the prince, partly whilst 
they hold dissensions and feuds among themselves about 
their lands, honours, jurisdictions, etc. wherein the 
whole number of their tenants, clients, vassals and 
35. M. Lee, ~hn Maitland of Thirlstane and the 
F2undatfon £f stewart DesEoti~m in Scotland, 
(Princeton, 1959), p 123. 
36. R.P.C. iv, p 825. 
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servants go with them \.Jithout regard of the prince, law or 
equity, etc., especially among the Highlanders",37 is one 
which the evidence of the feud does a great deal to 
reinforce. 
The late sixteenth century Scottish crown may have been • 
more powerful than has often been assumed, but it was 
certainly less effectively so than James VI and his regents 
and ministers often wished it to be~ Thus, during the 1589 
rebellion, the king was restricted in his political options 
as he had no force of his own to command and even those loyal 
to him were reluctant to become involved, being "afraid of 
. 38 
a feud hereafter if they touch any great man". One of 
James's councillors, Melville of Halhill, identified this 
problem in dealing with noblemen and complained that lithe 
way taking of the lyf of a nobleman or barroun, bredis 
ane hundreth enemys ma or les, according to the gretnes 
of the clan or surname of the quhilk nomber some will ly 
at the wait to be revengit, albeit lang efter, when they 
se ther turrr,.39 The full implications of this for 
37. 
38. 
39. 
C.S.P. Scot. xiii, part 2, p 1118. Though one must 
equally avoid over-stating the case as the writer 
of this letter was in fact doing, his analysis being 
a gross over-simplification. 
C.S.P. Scot., p 46, and see also C.~.P. Scot. v, 
p 370 for a similar comment in 1579. 
MeI!!oj.rs of His Own ~ife, Sir James Melville of Halhill 
tBannatyne and ~~itland Clubs; Edinbl~gh, 1827), p 385 
and see also his more general discussion of the crown, 
'p 383-85. 
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political life are discussed below,but there is little 
doubt that it reduced royal power, and as long as the crown 
remained weakened it was unable to do very much about it. 
Feud is possible in centralised states,40 but it is less 
likely, and the decentralised nature of the Scottish 
state, and the diffusion of power within it, were contributory 
to the social structure within which feud thrived. 
Strong kinship, lordship, powerful local interests 
and a severly limited central government were the socio-
political framework upon which an understanding of the 
feud has to be established. To this point any differences 
with Wormald have largely been ones of degree, particularly 
in the practical workings of lordship and in the balance 
of power between crown and nobility, but on the feud itself 
one has to disagree more fundamentally. Thus she has 
written, 
"Gluckman's concept of the 'Peace in the Feud' has 
been revolutionary. Condemnation has been stilled, 
if not entirely silenced. Feud can no longer be 
regarded as a matter of rival groups slogging it 
out to the death of themselves and their decendants, 
until time, exhaustion or a more powerful authority 
brought it to an endjll and 
"Bloodfeud is a misleading word. The point of course, 
was not that the feud was bloody, but that the 
escalation of bloodshed was settled by settlement 
and compensation. 11 41 
Yet if one can return to where we began, with James VI, 
one finds that his concept of the feud was "to bang it 
. 
40. Black-Michaud, Cohesive Force, p 150. 
41. Wormald, IIBloodfeud, Kindred and Government", p 55, 
and Brown liThe Exercise of Power", p 62. 
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out bravely', by which one assume~ he did not mean a form 
of peaceful settlement? To an English border official 
"Deadly foed" was "the "lord of enmitye in the Borders, 
implacable without. the blood and whole family distroied ••• 
Perhaps a Tudor civil servant is not the best authority 
for a definition of the feud, and one can detect in hls 
comment a contempt for a regional peculiarity, bu.t as one 
will later see his description was not entirely based on 
prejudice. At other times though the ~cottish crown 
wrote less specifically of "the deidlie feidis and 
contraverseis standing amangis his Hienes subjectis 
of all degreis, and thairwithall calling to mynd quhat 
unnaturall slauchtaris, bludeshed, barbarous cruelteis 
and inconvenientia hes occurrit and is liklie to occur 
and fall oute, to the forder trouble and inquietatioun 
gif the same feidis saIl not be removit".43 Rhetoric 
and propaganda one might argue, but if so, why? 
Somewhere in between the modern historian and these 
... 
contemporary descriptions in the 1598 "Act Anent Feuding" 
which is more refined in its definition. Thus "all 
feidia ar ane of thir thrie natures name lie that thair 
is ather na slauchter upoun nather syde or flauchter 
1IL.2 
upoun ane syde oulie or ells slauchter upoun bath sydis".44 
42. C.B.f., ii, p 167. 
43. R.P.C.,.v, p 248. 
44. Acts of· the Parliaments of Scotland (ed.) T.Thomson 
and a.lunes, (Edinburgh, 1814-75), iv, p 158. 
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The great significance of this is that it is including both 
the violence' of the feud and its peace, it is not exclusive 
to either,but recognises the enormous range and complexity 
of what feud is. Feud would t.hen appear to be a fairly 
wide ranging term describing anything from a relationship 
in which no one was killed to bloody genocide, but if the 
comments of contemporaries still leave a more exact 
definition of feud out of reach perhaps the feuds themselves 
can be more revealing. 
The uncertainty of what constitutes a feud has obvious 
implication when one tries to quantity them. Contemporaries 
wrote of the feud between the earl of Huntly and the 
earl of Moray which virtually threw the entire kingdom 
into a state of unrest and set the north-east alight, and 
then use the same terminology to caution a William Burnett 
of the Bairns "tuicheing sic deidlie feidis as he hes 
interesse in", 45 but of whose feuds one knows nothing. 
There are, to my knowledge so far, only 139 cases of feuds 
so defined by contemporaries for the period 1573-1625.46 
These 139 embrace the entire gamut from individual conflicts 
where no violence took place to local wars, and it is from 
an initial examination of these that one can draw closer 
45. R.P.C. iv, p 704. 
46. This period has been chosen because 1573 marks the end 
,of the Civil War during which it would have been difficult 
to eval~1te private fe~ding while 1625 is the year of 
Jamea VI's death by which time feuding was lsrgely on 
the wane. 
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to knowing what it is that a feud actually was. From there 
one can then take the characteristics identified and apply 
them to other conflicts, confrontations and settlements 
and ask whether they were feuds, even though contemporaries 
may have left no \~ri tten record naming them as such. 
This can be done largely by analysing the conduct and 
settlement procedures of the 139 feuds already identified. 
These two factors are not themselves discussed here, but 
one can see in what shall be called the "A" Class feuds, 
those defined as such by contemporaries, an exchange of 
violence or hostility over a period of time and, or, 
pacification procedures which contain one, or a number of 
mediations, assurances, submissions, decrees etc. usually 
used to settle feuds. By doing this one finds a further 
119 "B" Class feuds which display both the sort of conduct 
found in feuds and which were settled, or attempts were 
made to settle them, as would be feuds. Another 79 show 
only the conduct characteristics and are called "C" Class 
feuds, and 56 "DII Class fe~ds can only be identified by 
their settlement procedures. The total number of feuds 
may then be put at 390, and if one allows for errors 
then there appear to have been at least 350-400 feuds 
in early modern Scotland, a number which though large 
is by no means staggering. Checks on the validity of 
this method can be made by analysing the "A" Class 
feuds separately from all the other feuds and comparing 
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these with the larger sample and, as one shall see, there 
are no glaring inconsistencies which would suggest that 
the majority of these unnamed feuds are not genuine. 
That so many feuds should not be named is not particularly 
surprising since one is dealing with a phenomena which was 
so common as not to require overt recognition every time 
it was reported. 
The origins of the feuds are among the most inaccessible 
aspect of the feud. One may find a killing has taken place, 
but was the killing the origin of the feud or was ~t the 
quarrel which was the cause of the killing? In another 
instance one finds two families fighting over some march 
lands, but are the march lands the issue or is there an 
outstanding fe'm between them which causes them to take up 
any issue likely to cause a dispute between them? 
Table 1: Ori~ins of Feuds 
11 A" Class {contemE.} Feuds All Feuds 
Honour 4 3% 25 6% (13%) 
Politics 8 6% 13 3% ( ~) 
Material 27 19% 77 20% (40%) 
Jurisdict.ions 18 13% 33 8% (17%) 
Blood 12 9% J.,3 11% (23%) 
Unknown 70 50% 199 51% 
47. The figures shown in column five are the percentage of 
. known cases. The value of the statistics shown is somewhat 
limited by the impressionistic nature of some of the 
distinctions made and the high. percentage of unknowns 
in most cases. HO\.lever, I believe that they are of some 
value in tracing broad trends, especially as other data 
largely reinforces their findings. 
In fact exactly half of these feuds' origins remain unknown. 
Of the others, 19% were over issues of local material and 
economic significance, land, teinds, water rights, peats etc., 
13% were about jurisdictions from lieutenantries and wardenries 
to bailieships, sheriffdoms and rights of lordship, while the. 
others, honour, politics and blood debts, account for less 
than 10% each. A comparison with the total number of feuds 
shows only minor shifts in these figures. When one excludes 
the unknown cases the importance of local disputes over 
material objectives becomes even more emphasised. One has 
to remain a little sceptical of the blood origins for 
reasons already explained and it may be of some significance 
that honour feuds were fairly uncommon, the majority of these 
being persor~l affairs which rarely widened to include kinsmen 
and lords or dependants. 
The significance of the feuds, by which one means the 
extent of their effect, confirms this picture of local 
relevance. 
Table 2: Significance of Feuds 
~A" Glass (contemp. ) Feuds All Feuds 
Personal 8 66"/0 77 20% 
Local 113 81% 278 71% 
Regional 18 13% 35 ~ or Court 
81"/0 of "A" Class feuds and 71% of all feuds were only of 
relevance to their own immediate locality. A figure of 
one in ten for feuds of greater importance is still, 
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however, a high percentage when one considers that these 
were the feuds 1rJhich were dislocating entire regions and 
dominating the politics of the court. The personal feuds 
are a slight problem because one tends not to think of feuds 
between individuals, but clearly contemporaries did, if even 
on only eight specific occasions. The figure of 20% for all 
feuds is probably excessive and may reflect some error in 
definition, but well over half of them are conducted as 
feuds by the part.icipants and treated as such by the 
government, so that one has to recognise perso~l feuds as 
an important aspect of feuding. 
The geographic distribution of feuding is perhaps 
more surprising. 
Table 2: Geogra2hic Distribution 
~AII Class (contemp.) Feuns All Feuds 
Hiehlands 15 11% 59 18% 
Borders 29 22% 68 20% 
Lowlands !I> 35% 107 32% S of 'fay 
Lowlands 42 32% 100 30% 
N of Ta! 
Burghs 22 (16%) 46 (12%) 
Feuds in the highlands account for a low number of less 
than 20%, and the borders, though slightly higher, are 
of a similar figure. This seems quite contrar,y to 
expectations as it is these regions one usually associates 
with feuding,· not the supposedly more peaceful lowlands. 
One factor which may have caused some distortion here is 
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the better records for lowland feuds ~hich received more 
attention from the cro~n. Furthermore, the feuds of the 
highlands and borders tended to be more violent and ~ide-
spread than most lo~land feuds and it ~ould be wrong to 
imagine that the 10~lands ~ere less ~ell governed than 
these regions, but even so, the amount of feuding in the 
10~lands remains highly significant. The division of the 
lowlands into the area south of a Forth-Stirling line is 
fairly arbitrary, but is only intended to sho~ that it was 
not the northern lo~lands ~hich had caused this feuding. 
In fact the division is about equal, though ~ithin these 
regions one ~ould have to point to Ayrshire and the west 
being worse for the south, and Aneus and Aberdeenshire 
having more feuding in the north. As one can see from 
the table, feuds ~ere 8.1so found in burghs, between 10-15% 
of all feuds either involving burghs or participants or 
being conducted within the precincts of the burgh. 48 
Feud was therefore spread throughout the kingdom, but 
48. In making these distinctions I have combined 
geographic and cultural considerations so that 
for example the borders extend as far as the Dee 
river on the west ~hile the highlands does not 
include the eastern sea board as far as Inverness. 
Furthermore some difficulty arose in deciding 
~hether to apportion personal feuds to a region 
and where these were clearly personal feuds confined 
to the court I have not included them in any 
reckoning. To some extent this is perhaps the 
least reliable of the tables but ,,,,hi1e the margin 
of error is high, it will not be high enough to 
affect the picture of feuding being spread through-
out Scotland. 
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was Scotland a feuding society? 
Table 4: Status 
"AnClass (contemp. ) Feuds All Feuds 
Noble v 22 16% 50 13% Noble (28%) 
Noble v 
Laird 17 12% 81 21% 
Laird v 95 68% 228 59% Laird/less 
Lesser 3' 2%' 20 5% . 
Burgh 2 2% 11 2% 
Intra 15 (11%) 53 (11$) Family 
Some 16% of "All Class feuds and 13% of ali feuds were 
between noblemen or groups of noblemen, while another 
12% and 21% respectively involved noblemen and those of 
a lower class. In total one is talking about a third of 
the feuds involving noblemen which is obviously far in 
excess of their numbers in society, but still lower than 
their reputation might have led one to expect. Most of 
the remaining two-thirds were between men who would be 
classed as lairds, sons of lairds or gentlemen. Only 
a fraction of feuds, most of which have no evidence of 
violence beyond an initial killing, involved lesser 
men on both sides. A first impression would be that one 
is not dealing with a feuding society, but with a 
relationship which was largely the preserve of the 
privileged classes within that society. However, this 
(3~) 
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is only true in so far as these men initiated and led their 
families and men in feuds, for from what is known of 
lordship and kinship, the level of participation was much 
higher. To say that feuding was a class privilege is 
rather like the inane comments sometimes heard that only 
politicians wage wars while the people only tag along 
because they have to. The corporate nature of society in 
the sixteenth century does not really allow for that sort 
of exclusive analysis. The lords certainly led their men 
into feuds and bore most of the responsibility for it, 
but their men understood what feud was and why they were 
feuding, and it was often they, and not the lords, who 
began the violence. Feuds, therefore, were an issue of 
wide social significance, involving the total corporate 
group, with varying exceptions of lord, kinsmen, 
dependants and community. 
The extent and depth of feuding is not, however, really 
made by a statistic like 390 feuds .in fifty-two years. 
To make this more meaningful one has to know more about 
the number of feuds per year and the length of the feuds. 
Tabl;e 2: Length of Feuds 
11 An Class Feuds All Feuds 
One year 3/$ 51$ and less 
2 - 5 years 23% 19% 
6 - 10 years 9% 7£ 
11 - 20 years l~ ~ 
20+ years 20% 12% . 
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On this latter point some feuds appear, and one must stress 
the lIappear", to have lasted for only a year or less, others 
can definitely be traced over the decades, and some can be 
recorded by a number of linked incidents separated by years 
of silence during which one must assume the feud was in a 
state of cold war. An average length of feuds would be a 
meanin~less figure, but one is able to reach some rough 
indication of the duration of most feuds. Feuds of a year 
or less account for 31$ of "All Class feuds and 51$ of all 
feuds. This is the most serious difference between the two 
categories so far, and, along with the greater number of 
personal feuds in the latter group, suggests that the terms 
for inclusion are not quite exclusive enough. However, one 
still has at least a third of all feuds being affairs which 
flair up anj disappear from the records at least within one 
year. Feuds lasting between 2-5 years account for a 
similar figure of around 20% in both categories, as do those 
of 6-10 years at just less than 10%. Among the "All Class 
feuds there is, however, a greater percentage of long re~ds, 
with 14% for 11-20 year feuds, and 20% for those longer than 
twenty years as compared to 8% and 12%. Whether one accepts 
a figure of one in eight or one in five for feuds of longer 
than two decades, that is long enough to bring in ~ change 
of generation, the picture of feuds spanning the centuries 
looks to be something of 8 myth. In n~bers this represents 
44 of the 390 feuds which is still a sizable problem, but not 
an intolerable one if one remembers that of these 44 all 
." . 
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experienced varying levels of intensity during this period. 
HO\o1ever, one must allo\o1 for some dist.ortion of the picture 
as one is dealing \o1ith a period in which government 
interference probably res~llted in many feuds being settled 
before they \o1ould normally have been had the crO\o1n chosen 
to ignore them. 
Until one knows a little more about feuding in an 
earlier period, one cannot be too dogmatic about the length 
of feuding. Yet it is probably safe to say that feuds had 
a very good chance of being snuffed out almost immediately, 
but that if they lasted any longer they w,ere more likely 
to be prolonged for more than ten years than be settled 
within a decade. The implication to be drawn from this 
evidence is that the feuds' own peace mechanism did stand 
a fairly high chance of S'lccess. Peace in the feud was 
attainable, and one's disagreement with the "peace in the 
feud" school is over their tendency to play down the 
violence that could occur d'lring the duration of even a 
very short feud. 
Turning to the graph which shows the incidence of feuding 
in each year of the period one again finds one's expectations 
thwarted. Only 16 feuds are known to have been in existence 
in 1573, at the end of the \-lar, but just hO\-l meaningful this 
is \-lithout figures for the years before the mid-century 
upheavals remains uncertain. 49 D'~ring J.forton' 5 dominance 
49. Though Hay reported in 1573 that "There are no public 
troubles" except for two minor feuds, C.S.P.' Scot. iv., 
p 610. 
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of the government the numbers rose to around fifty a year, 
a fact which throws some doubt on Hewitt's belief in a 
period of "greater tranqili tit and "},1orton' s achievement 
in enforcing law and order". 50 From 1583 there is another 
upturn which rises to 66 a year in 1591 and remains between' 
the upper 50's and a peak of 67 in 1602 before dropping 
back to the level of the 1580's and. not reaching the 
1573 level until 1622. In 1625 there were by then a mere 
5 feuds that year. One major problem with such figures 
is that what one may be measuring is the level· of 
government interest in feQding rather than actual feuding. 
Thus in 1573 there were far more pressing problems than 
local feQds to be dealt with and so government records 
may be reflecting lack of interest in them,not a low 
level of feuding, and it is from government records that 
most of the evidence for feuding comes. Similarly, the 
dip in 1603 may reflect not a drop in feuding, but part of 
the dislocation in government circles as Scotland became 
used to an absentee crown. If gO then a graph such as this 
is relatively meaningless. 
The second line on the graph therefore records the 
number of feuds - taking each feud only once per year -
handled by the crown, that is the king personally, the 
privy council, parliament or the justice court, in each 
year. Comparing the two graphs one can quite clearly see 
50. G. Hewitt, §.ClQtla!!d Under l-'lorton1..!272-80, 
(Edinburgh, 1982), p 141 and 143. 
r 
I 
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a discernable similarity between them. With some 25% of 
all feuds never being handled by the government, a further 
42% only ever being dealt with in one year (mostly one 
year feuds), and no more than half the feuds in existence 
in one year being handled by the crown that year, the 
trends of the first graph would appear to be real ones 
rather than artificial ones caused by government activity. 
There are obvious exceptions to this. Years such as 1579· 
and 1608 peaked largely because of the crown's interest at 
that time and the 1603 drop was clearly a case of other 
matters on hand,but on the whole the rise to the high 
levels of the late l5?O I s to the end of the first decade 
of the seventeenth century reflect deeper issues than 
government interference and concern. 5l 
The explanations must lie in the wider historical 
context of the last quarter of the sixteenth century. 
With the big political issues of the 1560 I s largely 
settled by the end of the Civil War, men returned to their 
local, private quarrels and with both Morton and the 
factions which followed him being unable, or unwilling 
for political reasons, to act decisively in the localities, 
they were by 1585 when the king took over genuine personal 
government, out of control. The factional nature of 
51. For a discussion of a similar problem see a.Larner, 
. En~mies of qod; Th~tch Hunt in Scoi~ (London, 1981) 
ch 5 esp. p 64. I have also benefitted greatly from 
discussing this with Dr. Larner. 
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political parties at court made it imperative that court 
politicians had local backing, and that meant letting men 
in the localities have their own way if they were on onels 
side or, alternatively, backing their enemies in their feuds 
against them if they were not. Court and country were thus 
locked into a multi-faceted struggle for power in which 
the localities gained ground against the centre and local 
politics were allowed to develop their own impetus and 
vitality for the sake of particularist interests at court. 
On top of this one had a depressed economy; a volatile 
land market with many questions of land ownership, and 
in particular the right to teinds, remaining !.l.nsettled 
from the upheavals of the Reformation; the impact of 
religious tensions in the localities, the almost total 
neglect of the government of the western isles and the 
highlands; the effect of Tudor weakness on the borders and 
intentional laxity about them in Edinburgh; a royal minority 
with the attendant struggle for power at court; a more 
refined code of honour; the spread of handguns; and 
over-population in the highlands being only the more 
immediate problems which spring to mind and which served 
further the diff~sion of authority and the spread of 
lawlessness. Why it was the feud which thrived in this 
context is, however, not just explained by the social 
background, but also by the ideals and values of that 
society. Th.ose ideals and t.he violence and peace of the 
feud which they upheld were fundamental to the very 
nature of the bloodfeud. 
IDEALS, VIOL~NCE AND PEACE IN THE FEUD 
35. 
J o11n Ers kine , earl of Har, the king's life long friend 
and servant, was described as a man who in "honour, honesty 
and wisdom may well be accounted with the first courtiers 
of all", a man who was "so far interested in honour as he 
will put all in peril ra"ther than be 'set' with the shame 
1 he has gotten". The comments were made in the context of 
an important feud in which Mar was involved during the 
later 1590's, a feud which cost him the chancellorship and 
a good deal of the king's favour. Mar was considered an 
honourable man, but his was not necessarily the honour of a 
Brutus; honour means different things to different men and 
to different societies. It can be highly structured but 
brutally callous, as in Greece where Campbel1 thinks it is 
essentially about "the manliness of the man and the shame 
of the women", but where its main concern is "strength or 
prepotency rather than justicell • 2 Among the Jibaro Indians 
and in Black-Hichaud' s Mediterranean survey there is the 
same lack of concern for any sense of decency in the conduct 
of avenging honour, and what appears to be an exaggerated 
sensitivity to acts which can bring one's own honour into 
question. 3 On the other hand R.H. Harding has found a 
close identity between honour and royal service in early 
1. ~~. Scot. xii, P 92 and C.S.P. Sco~., xiii, part 1, 
p 398. 
2. HonQ:..1.!:..s...l:amily {ij,ng Patronage, p 193. Campbe11 has 8 
"wide ranging disc~ssion of honour which is one of the 
main themes of his book. 
3. Bohannan, Law and Warfare, p 316; B1ack-Michaud, 
Coh~sive F~, p 178-184 and see chapter five "Feud 
and Ritual". 
-
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modern France,4 while in both L.Stone's "Crisis of the 
Aristocracy' and M.E • James I s fascinating essay, "English 
Politics and the Concept of Honour, 1485-1642", the 
English noblemen and gentlemen shov "a stress on 
competitive avareness" in which violence is both natural 
and justifiable, but quite distinct from the cool planning 
of the Jibaro. 5 To-day in our ovn society we would probably 
call men who followed the obligations which such an honour 
code put upon them thugs or psycopaths. Honour can thus 
have certain basic principles, but each society's sense of 
honour has to be looked at in its own light, and while 
there was to some extent a European sense of honour in 
the early modern period which pervaded at least the ruling 
classes, the relationship between feud and honour was very 
much a Scottish experience.6 
In 1600 the newly promoted marquis of Huntly turned 
up at parliament and demanded precedence over the earl of 
Angus who had previously ranked at the head of the earls 
4. J.B. Harding, Anatomy of!:l Power Elite;" The Provincial 
GoverU2rs of Early l'10dern France, (Yale, 1978), p 68-71. 
5. stone, Crisis of the Aristocracx, p 107-113; M.E.James, 
"English Politics and the Concept of Honour", 1485-1642", 
P and P S~ppl 3, (1978), ref to p 1. 
6. See also F.R.Bryson, The Point of Honour in Sixteenth 
Century Italy, (New York, 1935); J.Cooper (ed.), The New 
Cambriq~~ ~ern History, vol iii, The Decline of Spain 
and the Thirty Years Vi!!!:" "Introduction" by J .Cooper, 
p 23-27; M.E. Wolfgang and F.Ferracuti, The Subculture 
of Violence, (London, 1967) p 271ff • 
• 
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in the order of precedence laid down by parliament.7 
Something of a row broke out, but Angus was 11 in the 
facillitie of his owne nature, and by the king's authoritie" 
wjlling to back down and a way out looked possible. However, 
his Douglas kinsmen then approached him and "protested never· 
to acknowledge him herefter, gif he did yeild that honor 
which was purchased by the blood and·b1.lrialls of their 
ancestorsll , 8 so forcing him to oppose both Huntly and the' 
king. The result was to upset the parliament completely 
and leave the two noblemen at feud with one another. Angus 
had been taught a lesson in honour by his kinsmen and 
depetldants and in the end even the king accepted the logic 
of the situation, holding two parliaments, one in Edinburgh 
and one at the Douglas stronghold at Dalkeith. 
What the issue was here was clearly not manners but 
power. Angus had t.o be reminded of the corporate interest 
he represented, an interest which not only embraced his 
living kinsmen and dependants, but a~o his ancestors and 
those who would inherit the power he bequeathed them. Had 
he backed down before Huntly and the Gordon interest he 
would have been signalling to others that the Douglases 
7. Precedence disputes were fairly common even though the 
whole point of precedence was to avoid them, e.g., 
Lords Hume and Fleming in the 1587 parliament, C.B.P. 
i, P 263. In Russia a point system was used to try and 
avoid s~ch happenings but there too violence often 
occurred. D.H.Pennington, Seventeel1th century Eilrope, 
(Singapore, 1980), p 95, on the R:J.ssian "mestnichestolt. 
8. C.B.P., ii, P 712. 
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were easy game and that Angus was unable to protect his 
friends and defend the interests of the family and the 
earldom. Hence their threat to go and seek another lord 
who could guarantee to defend them and the honour of the 
corporate group to which they all belonged. Loss of 
honour and prestige meant loss of power, and seen at this 
level such affairs over matters like precedence seem less 
9' idiosyncratic than they at first appear. 
Frand_s Stewart, earl of Bothwe1l, had a mqre secure 
grasp of what the issues were on such occasions. After 
his capture of lord Maxwe1l in 1587, Sir Wi1liam Stewart, 
brother to the deposed chancellor Arran, was very much in 
the king's favour, which "made the man so swell" that he 
began to push himself about at court. One day he quarreled 
with Bothwe11 before the king and Sir Wi11iam, 
"bad the Ear1l kis his ••• ; the Ear1l heiring that 
base and despytful ansuer, ther made a voue to God, 
that he should kis his ••• to hes grete pleasour: 
sua therafter rancountering the said Sir Hilliam 
in the Black Friar vynde by chance, told he 
voId now kis his ••• , and with that drew his sword; 
Sir Wi11iam standing at his defence, and having his 
back at the wall, the Earll made a thruste at him 
with his rapier, and strake him in at the back and 
9. stone is thus perhaps showing a degree of anachronistic 
thinking when he says that such behaviour is "intangible" 
unless the English situation was completely distinct: 
Crisis of the Aristocra~, p 107-08. See also Black-
Michaud, Cohesive Force, p 178, "a man's prestige 
ultimately S'llD1narizes all those qualities which 
differentiate him from other members of the same 
society a~ together constitute his qualifications 
for leadership". 
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out at the belley, and. killed him. IIIO 
Bothwell thus made it very clear that he was not a man to 
be tampered lightly with and in both the defence of his 
personal honour, and in the defence of his friends, 
Bothwell was always a man of action. In fact it was 
Sir William who was in the wrong since he knew the limits 
of acceptable behaviour and the touchy response which 
would follow if he overstepped it. Such anarchic 
infringements of social order demanded a response 
which would restore the social harmony and Bothwell 
h ' 't 11 gave :un l. • 
At a less complex level honour could also be a simple 
matter of male bravado and concern for personal reputation. 
Thus when lord Sanquhar was taunted by Louis XI!! about 
the eye he had lost in a fight, "V'it-il encore? Is the 
man still alive that did it?", the king is supposed to 
have asked, and, spurred by this taunt, Sanquhar went 
home and had. the man assassinated.l~ Such behaviour 
10. R.Birrel, "The Diary of Robert Birrel", in :[ra;:;ments of 
Scottish Histor~, (ed.), J.G.Dalyell, (Edinburgh, 1798), 
p 24. There were no reperc'lssions for this killing and 
Bothwell appeared at court within days of it, men having 
accepted that Sir William had got his just deserts both 
for his behaviour at court and his treacherous treatment 
of some of lord Maxwell's men earlier in the year! see 
The Histori~_~nd Life of King James the ~ext (ed.) 
T.Thomson (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1825>; p 237; 
Calderwood, D., The Historl of the Kirk of Scotland, 
. (Edinburgh, 18421, vol iv, p 679, Spottiswoode, J., 
History of the Church of Sco+-l~, (Edinburgh, 1820), 
iii, P 384. 
11. L. Mair, Primitive Government, (Harmondsworth,19?O),p 40. 
12. R.P.C., ix, p 371, note. 
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lacks the same political implications and is not so very 
different from behaviour common among young males in most 
societies. Thus a New York gang member boasts, "I'm not 
going to let anyone steal my 'rep' (reputation)", and in a 
Glasgow gang young men and boys express the desire to be a 
"gemmie", someone who will make the maximum response to 
the minimum of provocation.13 This.is basic ~a1e machismo 
and was on the whole more tied up with d1.le11ing than the' 
feud where honour and the response to its infringement is 
essentially political. 
A concept of honour which was pragmatic and amoral had 
very little in common with the stylised version of honour 
often portrayed in literature like "Ivanhoe" or liThe Three 
Musketeers". Thus at his trial lord Sanquhar defended 
himself by saying "I considered not my wrongs upon terms 
of Christiani.ty ••• but being trained up in the courts of 
princes and in arms, I stood upon the terms of honour.,,14 
When John Muir of Auchindrain and his son wanted to avoid 
criminal investigation for murder they thought it would 
be dishonourable to pass to the horn15 and so they caused 
13. L. Yablonsky, "The Violent Gang" J in S.Endleman (ed.) 
Violence in the streets, (London, 1969), p 236; 
J.Patrick, A-Qlasgow Gang Observed, (London, 1973). 
14. Quoted in James, English Politics and the Concept of 
HonoY:tJ p 14. 
15. The process by which men were "horned", that is 
outlJ:iwed. 
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a street fight in Ayr and were then able to become outlaws 
with their honour intact.16 Magregor of Glenstray gave 
himself up to the earl of Argyll in the belief that he 
would be conveyed into safe exile, but Argyll sent him 
to Berwick IIfor he promes to put him out of Scottis grund. 
Sua he keipit ane Hielandmants promes, in respect he sent 
the gaird to convoy him out of Scottis gr~; bot thai wer 
not directit to pairt with him bot to fetche him back 
againell .17 Magregor was thus brought to Edinburgh and 
executed and Argyll was able to keep his honour intact by 
keeping his word. Such thinking seems a perverse inter-
pretation of bishop Lesliets observation that the borderers 
thought nothing II more heinous than violated fidelittt, IS 
but when the fifth earl of Huntly wrote to Menzies of that 
Ilk that "mony falsattis and desuitis (are) now usit in 
this warldl119 he was idealising the past. Honour was too 
closely tied up with power for there to be any room for 
moralising about it. It propelled men into feuds because 
it was imperative that honour, and he.nce power, be deffmded, 
and it allowed that the feud be contested without restraint 
16. Historica~ Account of the PrinciQal Families of the Name 
of Kennedy, (ed.) R.Pitcairn, (Edinburgh, IS30) , p 125. 
17. "Diary", Birrel, p 60. The Earl of Caithness played 
almost exactly the same trick on his cousin lord Maxwell 
in 1612, see Gordon, ~~iherland, p 287-89. 
IS. Quoted in G.M.Fraser, TQe Steel Bonnets (London, 1971), 
.p 30. 
19. Menzies, M.S., H.M.S., vi, p 697, no 83. 
1;2.. 
because the only really recognisable law within it was 
suc·cess. 
Closely bound up with honour was the concept of revenge. 
In 1593 the duke of Lennox and lord Spynie fell out and as 
a consequence the duke's court position was shaken a little. 
Lennox wrote to Spynie telling him that he had "so far 
wronged him that he could not with any honour abide the 
20 
sight of him without revenge". The response to an 
attack on one's honour was revenge and failure to att.empt 
it meant further loss of honour and with it suppor~ers, 
clients and friends. The taking of revenge was,however, 
a group issue for as Bloch wrote "The primary duty of the 
kinsmen was vengeance,,~l Here the corporate group of 
lord, kinsmen, dependants anl friends acted as a sort of 
mutual insurance company, protecting one another and 
extracting vengeance for any of the group who was attacked 
by outsiders. It was a response, like that of Bothwell's, 
which was both expected and necessary.22 
20. C.S.P. Scot., xi, p 35. 
21. Bloch, Feudal Society, p 225. For a specific discussion 
of which kinsmen have obligations of vengeance see Campbell, 
Honour, Family and Patronage, p 193ff. Here and elsewhere 
in the Mediterranean there are clear customs laid down for 
who should take revenge and on whom. 
22. As among the Jibaro Indians where "If one reprehends a 
Jibaro because he has killed an enemy,his answer is 
generally: 'He has killed himself''', because he has by 
his own actions invited revenge. R.Karesten, from 
. Bohannan, Law and Warfare, p 310. 
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There is no real pattern of revenge in the ~cottish 
feud. Obviously it 'Was better if one could get the man 
who committed the deed against one in the first place or 
the leader of the kin, but, unlike the classic vendettas 
of the Mediterranean, there 'Was no social pressure to do 
so. Revenge was often indiscriminate in that anyone 
connected to one's enemy was fair game for vengeance. 
Of the highlanders it was said that they "wer bent and 
eager in taking revenge, that neither have they regaird 
to persone, tyme, aige, nor course: and ar generallie so 
addicted that way (as lykewise are the most pairt of all 
the Highlanders) that therein they surpasse all other 
people whatsoever" and that "they ar sa crewell in taking 
23 
of revengel' • However such revenge 'Was not restricted 
to the highlands, though, it was more corr~on there, Thus 
when the earl of Cassillis judiciously murdered the young 
laird of Stair, Stair's kinsman, WaIter Muir of Concaid 
and his page rode do'Wn into Galloway an1 slaughtered a 
David Girvan whose only crime 'Was to have been Cassillis' 
master of works. 24 However ~evenge could also be specific, 
23. Gordon, Sutherland, p 188-89 and Historie, p 217; for 
a close comparison the comments of some Catholic 
missionaries who went to Corsica some time during the 
sixteenth century are of interest. They observed that 
the natives, "kill one another like Barbarians and are 
not willing to pardon nor even to discuss a~ arrangements 
until they are avenged. And not only do they make war on 
him who has done the injury, but also, in general, on all 
. his kinsfolk, as far as the third degree of relationship." 
from Flandrin, Kami1ies in Former Times, p 16. 
24. Pitcairn, Kennedy, p 64. 
and when Kennedy of Culzean was murdered by the Bargany 
Kennedies, Cassillis agreed a contract with his brother 
by \.Jhich he would pay him 1200 merks annually, provide 
corn for the upkeep of six horses and the maintenance of 
two servnnts if he could kill or capture one of the 
principals of the murder. 25 
As has been seen, feuds were more commonly short 
affairs, but where they were long it was revenge which 
44. 
was feeding their fury. Thus when in 1621 captain Henry Bruce 
returned to Scotland he found himself being pursued 'by the 
kinsmen of a captain John Hamilton who he had killed in a 
26 duel in Flanders in 1604, seventeen years before. In 
the Douglas-Stewart feud captain James stevJsrt was 
slaughtered fifteen years after he had had Horton executed, 
and his killer was himself cut down in Edinburgh by Stewart's 
27 
nephew a further twelve years after that. When the council 
said of the feud between the Kerrs and Turnbulls that it was 
as "violent and resolut in tha~r humouris of revenge" as 
when it began, they were describing something which was 
28 
common to a great many feuds. 
25. Pitcairn, Kennedy, p 59. 
26. R.P.C., xii, p 588-89. 
27. See below vol i, p 296-97. 
28. R.P.C., ix, p 352-53. Though one has to remember that 
the majority of fe~s were short affairs. 
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Revenge was both a political and social tool and an 
emotional response. When Spottist.Jood wrote that 
Andrew Xelville wanted "to be revenged" on Archbishop Adamson 
he was using revenge in this second sense of gut feeling. 29 
Even when the convention of the nobility met in 1587 and 
expressed a willingness to assist the king in "the revenge 
of his mother" it was closer to this meaning for the great 
majority had no obligation to revenge her.30 Only in the 
context of feud did revenge take on this deeper meaning and 
become an almost immovable objective. As such it became 
a social obligation binding a man and his kin and dependants 
to enforce blood justice and, depending upon his status, 
a political ambition of local or national significance. 
Why revenge worked this way has a lot to do with 
attitudes to blood. A frustrated Tudor administrator 
once exclaimed, "! see none other than revenge for revenge 
and blood for blood" .31 An eye for an eye is of course a . 
very old concept and the basis of most primitive justice, 
but while such specific retribution was no longer recognised, 
the idea of blood paying for blood retained a strong hold 
in a society which invested in blood all sorts of important 
properties. Medical thinking was dominated by the idea 
.that life itself was held in a man's blood. Honour and 
29. Spottiswoode, HistorI, ii, p 337. 
30. ibid., P 371. 
31. Quoted in Fraser, The Steel Bonnets, p 167. 
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nobility were transferred through the blood; thus the king 
wrote, "it is most certaine that vertue or vice will often-' 
times with the heritage, be transferred from the parents to 
the posteritie; and runne on a blood (as the Proverbe is) 
the sicknesse of the mind becomming as kindly to some 
races, as these sicknesses of the body that infect the 
seede" • .32 Hence the king's refusal to reinstate Bothl4ell' s 
heirs, and in England the more severe law of attainder which 
was probably not used in Scotland because of its implications 
for a feuding society. This sharing of a common blood has 
obvious implications for the feud. Revenge dictates that 
blood be shed in recompense and ideally the blood of the 
killer himself l4as desirable, but if he was out of reach 
then his blood might st.ill be spilled by killing those who 
share his blood • .33 The blood itself takes on an almost 
mystical importance so that when John Gordon of Gight 
l4as tried for murder in 1617 his lawyers pled that he 
was the legitimate "avenger of blood" for a dead kinsman 
slain by the man he himself had killed • .34 
The belief that "it is certane that sanguis clamat, 
blood cryeth" was fundamental to the feud • .35 Even the 
32. HacIIl4aine, Political Works, p 30. 
33. In the Albanian blood-feud Whitaker has pointed out that 
the feud was "not merely vengeance, but an offering to 
the soul of a dead man". vlhitaker "Tribal structure and 
National Politics", in Lewis (ed.), !{istorx and Social 
Anthropology, p 266 • 
. 
34. Pitcairn; Criminal Trials, iii, p 419. 
35. Gordon, ~utherland, p 194. 
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crown gave some recognition to this idea as when it 
disciplined two Lindsay lairds in 1616 for seeking revenge 
"notwithstanding the blood is now coldlr ; the implication 
being that were it hot, that is recently shed, then their 
behaviour would be understandable. 36 Blood was even thought. 
capable of itself accusing a murderer. In "Daemonologie" 
the king wrote "In a secret Murther, iff the dead carkasse 
be at any time thereafter handled by the Murtherer, it will 
gush out of blood; as if the blood were crying to heaven 
for revenge of the Murtherer.1I37 So terrified were 
Muir of Auchindrain and his son at being put to this test 
that they chose to become outlaws instead.38 Even when men 
turned from the feud and looked to the king or God for justice 
their thinking about blood justice did not actually change, 
for as Sir Robert Gordon observed, "we sie that the Lord 
punisheth blood by blood, at such tymes and by such meenes 
as he thinketh expedient.,,39 Others were more fatalistic 
however, "thai "that slayis will be slaine" wrote Birrel.40 
36. R.P.C., ix, p 639. In March Law this was certainly 
recognised and was known as 'hot trod'. 
37. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 190. 
38. ibid., p 182-99 where there is a much fuller discussion of 
this and some amusing attempts by later writers to 
rationalise the phenomena. The idea of blood convicting 
a murderer is of course much older than the sixteenth 
century and is not exclusively a Scottish affair, see 
e.g. The Nibelungenlied, p 137, "Now it is a great 
marvel and frequently happens to-day that whenever a 
blood-guilty murderer is seen beside the corpse the 
" wounds begin to bleed." 
39. Gordon, Sutherland, p 28). 
40. Birrel "Diary", p 46. 
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Blood also had a highly effective visual impact in a 
society where symbol and ritual were important means of 
communication. In 1593 some poor women from Nithsda1e 
travelled up to Edinburgh with the bloody shirts of their 
husbands, sons and servants who had been slain by the 
Johnstones in a recent raid. Carrying these gory 
objects they paraded through the burgh exposing the king's 
inadequacy in protecting them and demanding justice from 
him.41 Others could be a little more cynical in their 
use of such propaganda as in 15BB when some Aberdeen 
merchants were attacked by members of the local Leslie 
family with whom they were feuding. The town council 
wrote to their agents in Edinburgh telling them that 
"we micht not haiff the b1udie sarks to send to you thair 
for ye rr.en do the best ye can thairin and furnes sarks 
and putt bluid thairon1t • 42 In 159B the laird of Johnstone 
was judged to be guilty of breaking an assurance with 
Douglas of Drumlangrig and was declared a IImansworne man" . 
and "defamed and perjured". To emphasise this "his picture 
was drawn in blood, to signifye a murtherer and hung with 
his heels upwards with the name sett under his head, and 
INFAMY and PERJURYE written thwart his leggs". 43 The 
41. Historie, p 296-97, Spottiswoode, Historx, vol iii, 
p 445-46, Ca1derwood, History, vo1 v, P 256. One can 
see similar thinking at \-Jork in C.N.D. marches where 
coffins are carried and skeletons etc. portrayed. 
42.·Ab~rdeen Council Letters vol I 1 2-16 ,(ed.), 
L.B. Taylor, O.U.P. 1942 , p 31-34. 
43. h B•P., ii, p53B and Birrel, "Diary", p 46. 
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same mixture of symbol and graffit.i was at work when the 
murdered earl of Moray was drawn with all his wounds 
graphically displayed so that the picture could be 
presented to the king as a plea for justice.44 
Similarly the earl of Mar paraded a picture of a murdered 
servant of his through the lands of the family who had 
killed him45 and at the funeral of the laird of Bargany 
a "Banner of Rewendge" was carried "quhairin was payntitt. 
his portratour with all his wondis, with his sone sittand 
at his kneyis, and this deattone writtene betuix his 
hand is , ; JUDGE AND REvIENDGE NY CAUS, 0 LORD' 11 .46 Media 
exploitation is by no means a modern concept. 
This visual reinforcement of the feud ideology took 
other forms. The corpses of the slaughtered earl of Moray 
and lord Maxwell were left unburied for years by their 
kinsmen as a reminder to them that vengeance must first 
be sought;47 the burial of the son of Macdonald of 
Glengarry at the door of Kintail church so that his enemies 
and killers might step on his corpse as they went to 
44. Q.S.P. Scot., x, p 641. 
45. ibid., xi, p 631 and p 636, Historie, p 346-47. 
46. Pitcairn, Kennedy, p 68. 
47. R.P.C., v, p 444-45, Moray was killed in 1592 and 
Y~xwell a year later but both their corpses were 
still unburied in 1598. See also M.Bloch, Feudal 
SOCiety, vol i, p 126, where 'the very corpse cried 
our for vengeance" and was left unburied. 
_0 
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worshiP;48 the almost ritual dismemberment of corpses of 
men killed in feuds as though revenge could not be satisfi~d 
with death,but must further humiliate the memory of the man19 
all were part of the ideological environment of feud. The 
scene at Kintail with the juxtaposition of feud and 
Christianity is a potent one. Savagery and primitive 
values existed side by side with ideals in religion and 
increasingly in political and legal thinking which were 
diametrically opposed to them. It was a society in which 
men extolled the merits of law and order and f0ught 
private wars to enforce their version of it, where men 
preached forgiveness and prayed for revenge, where honour 
could lead to a sense of fair play,but where in honour's 
name men were brutally done to death in an Edinburgh back 
street, in which allegiance to the crown was growing,but 
where allegiance to the dead demanded vengeance and the 
pursuit of the blood-feud. The feud was deeply entrenched 
in the minds of this society, a position which was 
essentially one which rested on the ,local and national 
realpolitik of its leaders, but which was reinforced 
by the militant defence of honour, the obligations of 
vengeance and a widespread belief in the qualities of blood, 
all of which were kept alive and nursed by the visual 
4S. R. Chambers, Domestic Annals of Scotland, (Edinburgh, 
lS59), p 368-72. 
49.' Many examples of this will follow, e.g. R.P.C., iv, 
p 453. " 
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propaganda \-lhich called men on to nelH deeds of violence 
and bloodshed. 
Yet before turning to the violence of the feud one has 
to put it into a context of a society lHhich was violent 
anyway, even by its own standards. How one measures 
violence is of course an enormously difficult problem 
and given the violence of our OlHn century one has to 
beware of moralising about the past. However, one can 
be fairly certain in saying that people had a less 
sensitive attitude to violence and were much quicker 
to resort to violent solutions for the smallest or· 
problems. Thus stone's point that "in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries tempers were short and weapons 
to hand" 50 was as relevant to a Scotland where "six 
heralds (were) sitting drinking, tua or thame fell in 
words, ••• The said Johne Gledstanis strikit Johne Purdie 
at the table; and the said Gledstanis being apprehendit, 
he was beheadit ••• tt • 51 Keith Wrightson has raised some 
serious questions about our perceptions of violence 
in early modern society and while agreeing that riots 
and crime were common he is doubtful of the extent of 
armed clashes, believing that the licencing of ale houses 
was a greater police problem in Tudor England. 52 1·1hether 
50. Stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, p 108. 
51. Birrel, "Diary', p 35. 
52. Wrightson, English Societx, this is one of the general 
themes discussed throughout by Wrightson, e.g. "violence 
was to a considerable degree constrained by law", p 162 
and also p 55, 62-65. See Stone, chapter v, for a 
fuller development of his ideas and Williams, The Tudor 
Regime, p 219-20, 236-43. 
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the average English yeoman was quite so reasonable must 
remain debatable, though certairuy Scottish peasants shared 
his unwillingness to become involved in class violence. 53 
Elsewhere, h01,.lever, the picture of violence is largely 
:mchal1enged. In !t'rance -the \~ars of Religion ushered in 
new levels of violence which once again turned France into 
a battlefield for the private armies of local lords and 
mercenaries; in Russia Ivan the Terrible ruled with a violence 
unseen in the west; in Ireland a more aggressive policy by the 
Tudor government turned the country into an amphitheatre of war; 
and of the Mediterranean Braude1 has written that violence was 
so endemic that it was ignored. Thus in Naples it was said that 
'there are robberies and crossed swords (every day) as soon as 
darkness falls". 54 It is "10rth while keeping this perspective 
53. As B10ch has argued, violence, at least violence which had a 
military dimension to it, "became a class privilege", b'lt 
while on the continent and even in medieval England class 
conflict lolas occa sional and vicious , it was completely 
unknown in Scotland. Bloch, Feudal Society, p 127. 
54. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, p 71-80, disc'lsses the 
rise of private violence; F.Carr, Ivan the Terrible, 
(London, 1981), is basically a biographical narrative,but 
it is fairly graphic on violence in Ivan's reign though 
only at the political level; R.Berleth, The Twiliaht Lords, 
(London, 1979), is a good readable account of the political 
feuding of Elizabethan Ireland; F .Braude1, The Mediterranean 
and the ~·lediterranean Horld in the AC1e of Phi1i 11, vol i1, 
(Glasgow, 1973 , p 737. Of course one could also mention 
the Netherlands and Phi1ip ll's other wars. Also for France 
see J.H.M. Salmon, Societ in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth 
Century, (London, 1979 for a good account of the violence 
of the religious wars. For a more general discussion of 
crime, including violence, in Europe during this period, 
Crime and Punishment in Earl Modern Euro , M.R. Weisser, 
- Brighton, 1982). 
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of European violence in mind when one turns to Scotland 
rather than the supposedly more civilised English society 
of lawyers and jolly decent yeomen. 
A complete survey of violent crime in Scotland for this 
period is unfortunately outside the remit of this thesis 
and so one must remain fairly ignorant of the levels of 
violence in local communities, among different classes 
and of the incidence of different crimes. statements like 
that by A.M.Clark that Scotland "must have been one of the 
most cr1.minous societies in recorded history, particularly 
in respe~t of crtrues of violence against the perso~1t 55 
are quite without foundation and even limited studies 
of law and order such as that by Hewitt are entirely 
unsGtisfactory.56 The best that one can do here ~s to 
give some indications of the sort of violence found in 
early modern Scotland and say something about the 
conditions out of which it arose. 
As has been said there was certainly a more casual 
attitude to violence. Thus,"Robert Cathcart slaine 
pisching at the wall in Peiblis wynd heid be William 
Stewart, sone to Sir "Iilliam Stewartll • 57 Or in 1580 
55. A.N. Clark, Murder Under Trust; The Topical Macbeth, 
(Edinburgh, 1981), p 45. 
56. Hewitt, Scotland Under Norton , p 140-43. 
57 e. Birrel, "Diary", p 46. 
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one finds George Auchinleck of Balmano meeting up with a 
rival as he walked to do his business at Edinburgh tolbooth~ 
killin~ him with his sword and then continuing on his way, 
or Lord Oliphant simply stabbing a kinsman for no apparent 
reason after they had supped together. 58 Spottiswoodets 
report of "bloods and slaughters daily falling out in every 
59 place!! may have been no different from the type of panic 
about law and order one often finds in certain popular 
newspapers today, but even a cursory glance through the 
privy council records reveals a massive concern for violent 
crime among people whom one finds it hard to classif,y as 
criminals, but who appeared to regard violence as the 
natural solution to their problems.60 
Of course the state itself was remorselessly ~iolent. 
James VI may on the whole have preferred peaceful solutions 
where one could be found, but the state machine he sat at 
58. Chambers, Domestic Annals, i, p ~41. 
59. Melrose, i, p 291. 
60. CautiOns, that is government enforced agreements under 
which men promise not to harm another under specified 
pains are a minor indication of the law and order problem. 
During the 1570' s these remained at usually less than 
twenty a year but by 1588 had risen to 100, by 1590 
there were more than 200 and in 1591 more than 300. 
As in feuding this may reflect greater government 
interest,but of the 100 in 1588 6% involved lairds 
and women who were the widows of lords, 11% were 
between burgesses and other members of the urban 
community and 71% involved lairds and other lairds 
or tenants. In other words one is essentially looking 
. at the potential for violence among the non-noble landed 
and "midd1e classes", if one can be permitted that loose 
description. ~~at this represents then is only a slice 
near the top of the pyramid. 
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the head of was capable of the most ferocious violence. The 
"extirpation" of the Magregors, the crushing of the MacDo~ld 
and Orkney rebellions and Dunbar's border raids were all 
episodes of extreme violence by the cro\01n. Criminals were 
hanged, beheaded, mutilated, strangled and burned and flogge~ 
in the enforcement of the law. Such violence was a spectacle 
of great public interest with an eye once again to visual 
impact and being perhaps at some level a "means of identifying 
society with the forces of order, as though their presence 
was a sign of approval. Thus the state could act as brutally 
as any private man as, for example, in the case of Robert Weir, 
"broken on ane cart whell with ane coulter of ane pleuche 
in the hand of the han.groan" or George Porteous whose "heid 
and hand wes straiken aff him at ane stroke". 61 Even the 
king was capable of a mixture of the petty and the tyrannical 
when for example he had a hangman executed for nailing his 
62 portrait and that of the queen to his gallows for sale. 
ltlhen it came to violence the Jacobean state like any .other 
was capable of exceeding the bloodiest deeds of its 
ci tizens. 63 
61. Birrel, "Diary", p 61 and 51. 
62. ibid., p 54. 
63. L. Martines, A Historical Approach.~o Violence, 
in Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities. 
1200-1500, (ed.) Martines, (London, 1972), p 17, 
"No inst.itution is capable of greater, more durable 
violence than the state in its moments of alarm." 
See also J.Ruggiero, Violence in Early Renais~ance 
Venice, (Rutgers U.P. 1980) for a good analysis of 
state violence. 
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How violent the home was in sixteenth century Scotland 
one does not really know. One finds il~tances of men like 
the earl of Caithness imprisoning his eldest son in the 
dungeons of Girnigo for ten years where he strangled 
one of his younger brothers who visited him, and was 
eventually starved to death. 64 The Sinclair family under 
both the fifth and sixth earls were perhaps something of 
a byword for violence,but other examples of family strife. 
are fairly common. What is more difficult to substantiate 
is how violent normal relations were between husband and wife, 
parent and child and master and servant. The assumption is 
usually that violence pervaded all these relationships and 
that therefore it is hardly surprising that people were 
even more violent with their neighbours. Again Wrightson 
has initiated some debate over these assumptions and it 
may be that they are simply prejudicial, but as usual the 
Scottish context remains virgin ground.65 
However, while we are almost equally ignorant of the 
extent of aristocratic violence one is able to highlight 
some aspects of it. In "A Historical Approach to Crime" 
the authors expose a great deal of the mythology surrounding 
the mafia and the idea of big organised crime in America 
and one suspects that similar questions might be asked 
64. Jordon, Suth~rland, p 168. 
65.·Wrightson, Ens!ish Societl, p 98-100, '116-18. Though 
Weisser in Crime and Punishment, p 21, disagrees. 
57. 
about ha'..! crime was organised around magnates in early 
66 
modern Scotland. Hen like Argyll with his bands of 
outlaws or Bothwel1 with connections throughout the 
criminal elements of the borders and with an interest 
in piracy through the exploitation of his office of 
admiral, might conceivably be seen as bosses of organised 
crime networks involved in protect.ion, blackmail, raiding, 
terrorisation and murder, but that would be to put too 
conscious an interpretation on their activities. Such 
relationships between magnates and an underworld of banditry 
and outlaws has certainly been observed elsewhere and in 
Scotland one can find it in the relationships between 
Argyll and the Magregors, Caithness, and the Clan Gun, 
Maxwell and the Armstrongs. Unlike the Mediterranean where 
the bandit seemed to occupy some sort of place in folk 
tradition as a social rebel, something which perhaps 
appears later in the Rob Ray type of character, in 
Scotland the role of such criminals was much more 
closely tied to ideas of lordship and maintenance which 
66 •. J.A.lnciardi, A.A.Block, L.A.Halloweil, 
A Historical ARproach To Crime, (U.S.A., 1977), 
see chapter four, "The Godfather Syndrome". 
67 upheld the system. 
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A great deal of the time maintenance was concerned with 
peaceful occupations and with enforcing not frustrating 
just.ice. Hany letters survive from noblemen to their 
dependants asking them to accompany them to days of law, 
to the court or on a journey.b8 Men like George Elphingstone, 
the baillie of Glasgow, were able to write in their wills 
councilling their sons to serve their lords "as I wes ay 
reddie durin~ my tyme to serve thame treulie to my lyf£is 
end as become me of my dewtie" . and in doing so might never 
67. Braudel, The Hediterranean, possibly tends towards an 
idealisation of banditry, but see his discussion 
of the relationship between bandits and lords, 
e.g. the duke of Montemarciano who with his bands of 
outlaws terrorised Tuscany, p 749-51. ~·.:ith even 
more emphasis on the social aspect of banditry see 
E.J. Holesbawen, Bandits, (Lo~don, 1969) where srr.ong 
other things he finds that many bandits began their 
career as the resilt of a killing in a blood-feud and 
of feuding between bandits. 'vleisser, Crime and Punisq/I"\ent, 
p 83-84 distin,~uishes outlaws from ba ndi ts, the latter 
being a sixteenth century phenomena who did not exist 
outside the law in a legal sense) but in areas where 
as yet the law had failed to catch up with them. Furt.her-
more their social composition was entirely made up of 
the lower classes. J.P.Cooper in the "Introduction" to 
vol iii of the Cambridqe Hodern His\o:a, p 26, identifies 
similar noble-bandit relatiolmhips elsewhere. For 
England see P.YJj.lliams t s article "The Welsh Borderland 
Under Queen Elizabeth", ",,191sh Historical Review, 1 (no 1, 
1960), p19-36; stone, Crisis of the Aristocracv, p 111; 
James, A Tudor ¥~~nate an~the Tudor state, (University 
of York, Borthwick Papers, no 30, 1966) p 10 and Qhan'{<3 
and Continuit in the Tudor North: the rise of' ThoIl1a~t 
first Lord Wharton, York, 1965 , P 8, "But behind the 
decorous facade all great lords were bound in a close 
mafia with the upland thieves, and patronized and 
. protected border lawlessness. It 
68. For a much fuller discussion of this see J.Brown, "Bonds 
of Manrentll • For a few of t.hese letters see ~.~. ltl.Fraser, 
Memoirs of the Maxwells of Pollok, (Edinburgh, 1875) p 73 
no 54, Lennox to Pollok or H.M.C., iii, p 419, Crawford to 
Abercairny and also Corres ondence of Sir Patrick Waus 
(ed.) R.Vans Agnew, Edinburgh, 1887), vol i, p 94, 
Cassillis to Waus of Barnbarroch. 
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have been asked to lift a sword in anger~69 Similarly the 
influence used by lords for their men could be applied quite 
scrupulously as when Ma~vell of Pollock wrote to an unnamed 
lord about a servant of his who had been summoned on a 
murder charge. Pol1ock wrote asking the lord to "eontinew . 
guid lord and maister to me and my servandis, according to 
the euqitie of the caus, as zour Lordschippis honour and 
conscience will permit". 70 On another occasion,however,· 
when Pollock thought his men had been unfairly treated by 
a local magistrate he wrote to him "in respect of zour 
onequitable de ling" , saying that "The dweill maid sowteris 
schiptmen, quha cowld nather steir nor row." 71 
It was this other side of maintenance which was so . 
closely bound up with violence. Buchanan railed against 
men "so enslaved themselves to other men's desires that they 
have left themselves no freedom for independent thought or 
actiorr,.72 Thus they became the armed retainers of lords. 
and magnates who in return overlooked their excesses and 
as Bowes observed "Many offenders are countenanced by 
noblemen, with great contempt of law and justice.,,73 
69. W.Fraser, The El~hinqstone FamilI Book, (Edinburgh, 
1897), vol ii, p 264, Testament of ~eorge Elphingstone 
of Blyth\.lood. 
70. Fraser, Pol10k, vol ii, p 167, no 171. 
71. Fraser, Pollok, vol ii, p 165-66, no 168. 
72. Quoted in A.H. Hilliamson, Scottish National 
Qonscio~qness,(Edinburgh, 1979), p 114. 
73. C.S.P. Seot. x, p 453. 
60. 
Instances such as the earl of Crawford's men freeing one 
of their friends from the Dundee burgh authorities, or James 
Conheith who was unable to get justice in Dumfries after an 
attack on him because the attacker was a "household man and 
servandll to lord Herries, the burgh provost, were common. 74 
Thus the king might well complain to the earl of Huntly 
about the behaviour of his men, but "as someone pointedly 
observed, Huntly "must be a Gordon when it comes to the 
worst".75 
The violence which was allowed to breed by these 
relationships can be demonstrated by the case of Bothwell 
and the Wauchope family. When Archibald Wauchope of Niddrie 
and his family took service with Bothwell is not known, but 
his first act of notoriety was the killing of the "laird of 
Sheriffhall with whom he had a feud of his own and for 
which he found himself an outlaw and dependant on Bothwell's 
good will. In l589,however, he was captured by the king who 
sent him for trial, charges being pressed against him by 
Sheriffhall's son, the lairds of Edmonstone and Broxmouth 
and Bothwell's own enemy lord" Hume. The trial attracted a 
great deal of interest and went on well into the night when 
the candles were suddenly extinguished, and in the confusion 
Niddrie and his friends made their escape. The king was 
furious that he was unable to "minister justice against him 
that the world abhored for his vicious and bloody life.", 
74. R.P.C., iii, p572-74,"p 349. 
75. C.S.P. Seot., xiii, part 2, p 864. 
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an indication that Niddrie's career of violence ~as extensive, 
b~t ~hile it ~as ~ide1y assumed that Bothwe11 had arranged 
the escape nothing could be done about it.76 
Niddrie then went back to Bothwel1's employment and when 
the earl ~as given responsibility for much of the government 
when the king left for Denmark later in the year, Niddrie 
joined him in Edinburgh. While there he struck one of the 
king's officers for some small matter and when challenged 
about it by another gentleman, he killed the man. On the 
king's return however, he had to slip back into areas more 
directly under Bothwell's protection. In 1591 he was 
almost captured at one of the earl's houses where he had 
arranged a duel with Edmonstone, but ~as tipped off and 
escaped. At much the same time he was cited in a·divorce 
case for having committed adultery with the wife of the 
laird of Craigmillar, but in the middle of the proceedings 
Bothwe1l marched in, arrested Craigmillar on some felo~ 
charge and had him dragged from the session house. 
Shortly after this Niddrie, or one of his family, did 
meet Edmonstone for the postponed duel and killed him.77 
With Bothwell's fall in 1591 Niddrie found himself 
being called upon to fulfil his obligations to the earl. 
He was present at the ill-fated raid on Holyrood in the 
ne~ year and ~as serio~sly wounded there but recovered 
76. C.S.P. Scot., x, p 73, p 77; Calderwood, HistorI, v, 
p 56-57. 
77. C.S.P. Scot., p 306, p 453, p 463, p 619, p 716, 
R.P.C., iv, p 372; Calderwood, History, v, p 71,169-70; 
Spottiswoode, History, iii, p 422; Birrel "Diary", 
p 27-28. 
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sufficiently to join Bothwell on the even more botched 
Falkland raid in the S;lIIlII1er of 1592. In the scramble 
to escape he and his men were picked up by lord Hamilton 
but for reasons of his own Hamilton released them and they 
fled back to the borders. However, one by one Bothwell's 
friends and retainers deserted him and somewhere along 
the line the \oJauchopes also parted company with him. 
It was not the end of their violence though with 
Edmonstone of \r10wmet being killed in 1597 and a royal 
messenger in 1599, as well as other less notorious crimes 
being committed by the gang. Justice appears to hgve 
caught up with some of them, with one being killed along 
with Wowmet, Niddrie's brother being brought to trial in 
1598, a cousin being executed in 1602, another of his 
brothers being banished for life and Niddrie himself is 
said to have met a sorry end. 78 
Niddrie was just one of many such armed men who 
rendered violent service to powerful lords. There were 
others, Huntly and the lairds ·of Gight, both father and son, 
Argyll and Magregor of Glenstray, Orkney and his bastard 
son Robert, the younger lord Maxwell and Charlie Maxwell, 
they and the many nameless men who followed in attendance 
to their lords were all men of violence. They were not 
78. C.S.P. Scot. xiii, part 2, p 620, p 659, p 661, R.P.C., 
. vi, p 1, Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, p 52, 402, 4OJ, 
p 410. A Robert Wauchope was granted a remission for 
the Edmonstone killings, S.R.O., Bruce of Earlshall 
Muniments G.D. 247/182/1. 
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exactly retainers nor 'Were they r.1ercenaries,but their 
relationship was based on a mixture of kinship, lordship 
and interest as the man guarded his lord and did his 
dirty work for him while the lord provided a living and 
protection. 
Another problem of the age closely related to this 
and to the ideology discussed above was that of youth. 
Much more than today young men played an important part 
., .:t.. '1 
in influencing society and many held positions of great 
respoll3ibility. vllien the king reached his twenty-first 
birthday in 1587 the average age of the t~enty-four leading 
noblemen - 22 earls, the duke of Lennox and lord Hamilton -
was aroand twenty-seven. Seven of these were children, 
two, Orkney and Rothes, were elderly men, being ih their 
late fifties, and Morton and Hamilton were in their forties 
with Montrose close behind at thirty-nine. The other twelve, 
three quarters of the adults, were in their thirties and 
twenties and it was these men, Glencairn, Marischal, 
sutherland, Crawford and the more youthful Atholl, Bothwell, 
Caithness, Erroll, Huntly, Mar and Moray who were to be at 
the centre of so much of the violence during the next decade.?9 
Duby has spoken of youth as "the spearhead of feudal aggression' 
. and though the feudal age may have passed, many of its values, 
particularly in the military sphere, continued to be the main 
79. Angus is the other but he died shortly afterwards. 
80 preoccupation of young men. Thus; for example, one finds 
in the north-east "1'he Society and Company of Boys" or "The 
Knights of the Mortar" as they were sometimes called. This 
seems to have been a mixture of old-fashioned crusading 
idealism, male clubbishness and a protection racket 
organised by ~ohn Gordon of Gight and his young friends 
which impressed the privy council en~ugh with its violence 
for them to order its suppression. 81 
More commonly young men acted on impulses and with a viey 
to bravado which, in a feuding society, yas intensely dangerous 
for their families. No doubt many fathers winked at their 
sons adventures as they were thus able to maintain family 
honour and retain their own respectability with the crown 
at the same time. Others wore the victims of simple 
inability to control them. 'rhe session judge and councillor 
Sir David Lindsay of Edzell found the last years of a 
highly successful career ruined by his son,who in 1605 
took part in a violent street fight in Edinburgh and then 
a few years later killed a kinsman, lord Spynie, in an 
ambush on the earl of Crawford, the family chief. 82 
80. Duby, The Chivalrous Society, p 115; see also D.Herlihy, 
"Some Psychological and Social Roots of Violence in the 
Tuscan Cities ll in Martines (ed.) A Historical Approach 
to Violence, p 129-54. 
81. Various refs., see e.g. R.P.C., vii, p 509, viii, p 271 
and Pitcairn,Criminal Trials, ii, p 532, 
82 •. R.P.C., vii, P 60, and for the Spynie incident, see 
Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 61-65. 
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Similarly,the laird of Cultmalundy's son killed Toshack 
of Monivaird in 1618,but was saved from criminal prosecution 
by his father's skill in agreeing an expensive compensation 
with the Toshack kin. A few years later the council wrote 
to the king that 
"this ffeade has altogidder undone Auld Cultmalundie; 
for his estait is exhaustit and wrackit, and he is 
become verie waik of his judgement and understanding, 
by the greif that thir troubles hes brought upoun him; 
whilkis wer the occassioun of his wyffis death, and 
of the exyle and banishment of goode rank and qualitie 
hes sones and freindis, now be the space of foure. 
yeiris; in the quhilk time tua of his freindis of goode 
rank and qualitie hes depairtit this lyffe."S3 
It 'Was a high price to pay for what we might call 
delinquency today. 
Violence was not the prerogative of retainers and young 
men,but came all too easily in a society which was in many 
respects still highly military. The castle and tower house 
remained a functional defensive dwelling and while the crown 
often complained that men did not always maintain themselves 
in the arms they were required to, few "/ere unarmed. Swords, 
pistols and daggers were carried quite commonly, ar~ in the 
retinues of noblemen and powerful lairds a wider assortment 
of weapons could be found. The appearance of the rapier 
with its lethal thrust and the hand-gun which was extremely 
popular in Scotland, made clashes between armed men much 
more likely to produce fatalities. By the end of the 
83. R.P.C., xi, p 439, xiii, p 769; Pitcairn, Criminal 
Trials, iii, p 443, p 479, p 480-81, P 542. 
sixteenth century there were thirty gun craftsmen in 
Edinburgh, fifteen more in the Cannongate and another 
eighteen in Dundee working to supply a ready market.84 
When the laird of Johnstone and the lairds of Cessford 
and Drumlangrig ran into one another in Edinburgh one 
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day,their parties are said to have exchanged some twenty-
five shots and on another occasion when lords Ruthven and 
Oliphant clashed in 1580 scores of shots were fired and 
a number of men killed and hurt. 85 Even a man's home 
was not safe as Aulay Macaulay of Ardincaple discovered 
when he yas shot at through his window or when lord Spynie 
had his windo\~s blown in by a petard, a small French canon, 
which was fired at his house by the Ogilvies.86 In war 
the gun was a great leveller and in the feud, where the 
object \~as to kill without much concern about how it Yas 
done,it Y3S especially effective. Even more than the rapier, 
84. D. Caldwell, IIRoyal Patronage of Arms and Armour Making" 
in D .Caldwe1l (ed.), Scottish 'H~J!.P..Q.ns_!lnd. Foptifications. 
1100~lSQQ, (Edinburgh, 1981), p 82. See the remainder of 
this article as well as his other one "Some Notes on 
Scottish Axes and Long Shafted Heapons" and that by 
G.Boothroyd "The Birth of the Scottish Pistol" in the same 
volume for more details on Scottish yeaponry for this 
period. stone says of England that "stockpiling of 
yeapons yes of modest proportions before 1550, reached 
a peak beh.Jeen 1550 and 1660 and thereafter declined." 
Crisis of the Aristocracy, p 106 and J.Cockburn in 
"The Nature and Incidence of Crime in England 1559-1625" 
has also highlighted the significance of fire-arms in 
violent crime in J. Cockburn (ed.), Crime in England, 
.] 520-1800, (London, 1977). 
85~ Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, i, part 2, p 89, 
C.S.P. Scot., xiii, part 1, p 57 • 
. 
86. R.P.C., vi, p 178 and p 492. 
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which ~as so popular in the duel, the gun ~as a threat to 
the peace of society. In 1595 a revolt by the schoolboys 
of Edinburgh Grammar School ended when one of the boys 
shot a town baillie dead as the burgh magistrates tried 
87 to gain entry to the blockaded school. There can be 
little doubt that such universal carrying of weapons made 
every confrontation a potential manslaughter. 
Of course there were restraints on violence; people 
did not just run around killing one another when they 
felt like it. The fear of punishment from the state, the 
even greater fear of blood-feud from the kin of a dead man 
or from his lord, the moral restraint of religion with the 
threat of eternal damnation, and a sufficient degree of 
consensus that violence bred violence and that, if 
possible, one ought not to encourage it, acted to prevent 
anarchy prevailing. Yet it is clear that early modern 
Scotland had an environment highly likely to instigate and 
encourage violence in ordinary men. . There were the 
usual murderers and psychopaths found in every society, 
those who brutalised for its own sake like the "cruel man 
hangit for setting on ane ",oman's bare ••• on ane girdil1 
quhen it was red hot" and IIJohne Stewart behead it ••• 
for cutting off ane man's private members", or the Drummonds 
~ho took Andrew Lawson and cut off his nose and pulled out 
87. R.P.C.,·v, p 236. 
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his teeth for no apparent reason. 88 Our own society could 
find its parallels in such behaviour as could any other. 
What was different was the casual approach to violence, 
the widespread employment of armed men, the dominant 
themes of military prowess among men which was so attractive. 
to the young, the spread of weapons throughout society and 
of course the less effective enforcement of the law and an 
ideological back~round which propelled' men into acts of . 
violent conduct. This was especially true of the feud .. 
itself. 
The table below gives .some indication of the part 
played by violence in a feud. 
Table 6: Conduct of Feuds 
Types of "An Class All Feuds Violence (contemp.) Feuds 
None 1 1% 43 11% 
Property Only 2 ( 1% 11 3% 
Property and 32 (23%) 72 (18%) other forms 
Bodily 24 l~ 75 18% 
Selective Only 26 19% 62 16~ 
Indiscriminat.e Only 18 13% 38 10% 
Select and 22 16% 30 S% Indiscriminate 
Unknown 46 33% 131 3/$ 
By bodily violence one means violence against the person 
88. Birrel, j'Diary", p 56; R.P.C., iv, P 457. 
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which is non-fatal, selective violence refers to killings 
in which the victim was to a degree the specified target 
of an attack or fight and indiscriminate violence refers 
to killings and slaughters in a feud which was conducted 
as open war on all kinsmen, dependants, servants, etc. 
of a corporate group. At a general level one can see that 
violence took place in one form or another in at least 
66% of all nAil Class feuds and at least 55% of all feuds •. 
The percentage is increased when one adds those feuds in 
which a slaughter was the origin of the feud but in which 
no further violence is known to have taken place so that 
one has figures of at least 73% and 61$. ·Furthermore, 
of the 43 peaceful feuds in the second category a great 
many of these are on the border line between what is and 
is not a feud and one can be fairly certain that non-violent 
feuds did not account for any more than 10% of the feuding 
in early modern Scotland. Violence was at the very centre 
of the feud with people being killed in at least 55% and 
53% of 11 All Class and all feuds. When one takes out the unknown 
cases from the total number of feuds the picture appears even 
more violent and whatever way one juggles with the figures 
one cannot escape the fact that violence was part of the 
very fabric of the feud. 
Evidence for non-violent feuds is the most difficult to 
interpret. Because no record of violence has survived does 
not mean that it did not happen; it may not have been 
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reported at the time and it may not have been recorded. One 
only really knows about the great violence in the feuds of 
the Sinclairs and Gordons and among the Kennedies from 
contemporary histories of these families and a reading 
of the government records alone would suggest a much more 
peaceful interpretation. Thus one knows that there was 
trouble between the earls of Perth and Linlithgo\01 during . 
1616-17, but one knows nothing of the details of that 
trouble because no private records survive which throw 
. ~ 89 further light on what happened. Anthropologists may 
be able to give more convincing evidence of non-violent 
feuds, but for the historian there remains the constant 
suspicion that the non-violent feud must remain unproven 
. t· t 90 ~n mos ~ns ances. 
Looking at the figures for violence against property 
one finds them to have been fairly low. Only a fraction 
of the feuds saw attacks on property in the form of 
destruction or theft as the furthest extent of violence. 
Apparently violence against property was not the main. 
objective of the feud, and even when such violence did 
take place to the accompaniment of violence on persons 
the figure remains at around one in five feuds. Again 
89. R.P.C., x, p 608, xi, p 54; Melrose, p 297. 
90. stone, Crisis of the Aristocracy, p 118, believed 
most English combats outside the rapier duel to have 
been harmless and Williams, The Tudor Re~ime, p 220, 
similarly thought that men "drew back from death blows". 
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one may be the victim of the reporting and of a tendency 
on the parts of the records to highlight the worst that 
happened in a feud rather than recounting everything. 
There is, hO"lever, a tendency for such attacks to be much 
more corrmon in the north, the highlands and the borders 
vlhere the feud more closely resembled small \-Jars and \-Jhere 
the cro\-Jn \-Jas less able to prevent such widesca1e 
devastation. 
There ~as of course a great variety of violence within 
such a broad category, varying from broken doors and the 
theft of a f e~ cO\-JS to the laying ~aste of ~ho1e 
communities. In 1602 Wa1ter Currour of Inchedrour 
complained about his neighbour, John Gordon of Avarchy, 
\-Jho, he claimed, had committed t\-Jenty-three separ~te 
attacks on him since 1598. These included a number of 
crimes against persons: a local government official had 
been killed by Avarchy, on five occasions Inchedrour's 
servants had been beaten up, one ~as forcibly evicted 
from his house, three \-Jere violently robbed and 
Inchedrour himself ~as t\-Jice attacked. For the duration 
of three years his mails and duties for certain lands 
\-Jere appropriated by A varchy,. his house ~as broken into 
and occupied, another of his houses was broken open and 
stripped of its timber, his mill \-Jas wrecked and all 
the. gear from it stolen, a barn ~as burned, crops spoiled, 
horses stolen, grain scattered and his salmon cobbles 
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broken. 91 As in most such reports some exaggeration 
mus~ be allowed but it still adds up to a catalogue of 
economic ruin. How many s~ch incidents took place one 
does not know, but there must have been some effect on 
the community. 
In areas like the borders and highlands cattle raiding 
was part of the economic fabric of the community. One man 
gained and another lost only to make up his losses else-
l-lhere, and while some men may have been forced to give 
up, for a great many more it was part of their livelihood. 
, 
Feuding,however,was more destructive and on the whole no-one 
gained. Thus in 1613 l1enzies of Pitfoddels and Forbes of 
Honymusk destroyed one another's corns with the res'llt 
that the corununity lost two harvests.92 One cann~t 
measure the economic impact this had on the kingdom, but 
surveys of Kintyre in 1596 and 1605, between which time 
the MacDonald-MacLean feud ravaged the land, saw an 
increase in waste land in north Kintyre from 23% to 41~.93 
Few other areas perhaps witnes'sed such efficient devastation 
though the earl of }foray was able to file a complaint for 
damages to the value of over £800,000 for five raids 
conducted against his lands by Huntly during the years of 
91. R.P.O., vi, p 501-05. 
92. R.P.O., x, p 172-73; Pitcairn, Oriminal Trials, iii, 
p 258. 
93 •. D.Gregory, History of the \-[estern Highlands and Isles, 
(Edinburgh, 1975), p 269. 
... . 
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their feud. 94 In 1616 Robert Maxwe'll, the heir to the 
forfeited lord Maxwell, executed in 1613, looked back 
over his father's and brother's feuding and found 
himself £40 ,000 in debt with no means to help limy present 
miserie" and the "distressit hous of Maxwell" and prepared 
to sell his lands and chieftainship of the family in order 
t 't 95 o preserve 1. • 
In the 10\-11ands damage to property also took place, 
but while it was often very intense it rarely ever 
affected whole communities as these others did. Thus a 
Thomas Boyd had some of his stock slaughtered, his houses 
and byres broken up, his gear stolen and his tenants driven 
off by"a neighbour and in 1598 Alexander Lindsay's mill 
was destroyed by his neighbour.96 However, as has been said, 
while the objective of the feud may have initially been 
economic its tactical objectives rarely were, and most 
property violence was simply frustration at not being 
able to get one's hands on the owner himself. 
The scale of killing in many of these feuds was often 
very large indeed. At Glenfruin and Dryfe Sands, battles 
fought ostensibly as confrontations between crown and rebel, 
but in reality as private affairs, thousands of men were 
94. S.R.O., Horay Muniments, N.R.A. 217/2/4/80. 
95., tt.acDowel1, w., Histor of the Bur h of Dumfries with 
notices of Nithdale and the Western Border, Edinb'lI'gh, 
1872), p 293-94; Fraser, Pollok, ii, 193-94, no 197. 
96. R.P.C., v, p 88, p 495,' 
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involved and hundreds were slain. Similarly in the feuds 
of the MacDonalds and HacLeans, the Sinclairs and Gordons, 
the HacLeods and Hackenzies, the 1/l8.gregors and Colhouns, 
scores of men died on either side. Often such slaughters 
arose as the result of clashes between large bodies of 
armed men, as when the earl of Cassillis with two hundred 
horsemen and twenty musketeers forced the laird of Bargany 
with his eighty men hastily collected in Ayr into a fight. 
Bargany was himself slain, Cassillis's men surrounding him 
and then one of them "haikitt ane lance at him, and straik 
him throw· the era ig and throw the thropi.ll", the la'nce 
breaking and remaining in his throat. The others then 
closed in to lance him through again while one cut away 
his face with the slash of a sword. Another man was 
lanced through the knee, the point coming out the buttock, 
one was struck through the chin and another shot in the 
groin.97 In the fighting between Sir Rory MacLeod of 
Harris and Donald Gorm of Sleat the two clans "wer bent 
headlong in against one another with spoills and cruell 
slaughters, to the utter ruin and desolation of both ther 
cuntries, untill all the inhabitants were forced to eat 
horses, cstts, and other filthie beasts.,,98 There 'Was 
nothing Tweedled~ and Tweedledee about these 
confrontations. 
97.'Pitcairn, Kennedy, p 45-48. 
98. Gordon, Sutherland, p 244-45. 
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Often these armed clashes were not sought out as that 
between Cassillis and Bargany 'Was, but occurred simply 
because rival bands of armed men happened to be in the same 
place at the SDme time. In one such case Hr. John Graham, 
a senator of the college· of justice, 'Was with his friends 
walkin3 between Leith and Edinburgh 'When they noticed 
coming up behind them the duke of Lennox Bnd 
Sir James Sandilands, an influential courtier 'With 'Whom . 
Graham had a feud. Lennox's men 'Were 'Waving 'Weapons in 
the air at them and so Graham and his friends launched 
an attack and a running battle broke out in the suburbs. 
In fact Lennox and Sandilands had been on their 'Way to 
Leith for a game of golf and the 'Weapons were golf clubs, 
but the incident left at least two gentlemen dead, 
including ~raham, and many others hurt.99 
The violence of the feud was not always so unpremeditated 
though. In 1586 MacDonald of Kintyre captured over forty 
kinsmen of MBcLean of Duart along 'With Duart himself 
'While they 'Were his guests. After burning t'Wo of them 
alive the rest 'Were "ilk ane·beheadit the dayis following, 
ane for ilk day, till the haill nomber WBS endit".lOO 
In 1593 a number of Gordons went to the house of Abercrumbie 
99. Historie, p 267; C.S.P. Scot., xi, p 49; Calder'Wood, 
Historx, p 223. 
100. Historie, p 217; Gordon, Sutherland, p 187ft. See also 
Clark, Hurder Under Trust, chapter 4, tor some unusual 
comments on this incident. 
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of Pitmedden from which they dragged him out, shot him to 
denth and "with thair draw in swordis, cuttit him all in 
peces; and as monsteris in nature, left nocht sax inche 
of his body, airmis, legis, and heid unde~dit, and cut 
101 
asunder ll • Equally callous were the Macfarlanes who 
captured a vlilliam Buchanan who had recently won a court 
case against them, stripped him and tied him to a tree, 
and over the remainder of the day slashed him some thirty 
times with a dirk, then cut out his tongue, slit open his 
belly, took out his entrails, entwined them with those of 
his dog and then cut his throat. Even the hardened 
earl of Glencairn who was called out to investigate it 
was horrified by the scene. l02 
William Buchanan's fate was worse than most, but 
Glencairn's vivid picture remains with one a long time 
and it is necessary to imprint the violence of the feud 
on one's mind from the start. Bravery and heroism, mutual 
r~t and gentlemanly conduct, peaceful sentiments and 
peaceful settlements, they too were part of the feud, 
.. 
but it was the hundreds of murders, slayings and vicious 
killings which were its hall-mark. Like the modern day 
terrorist men did not always see it that way; the violence 
was not criminal it was honourable, killing was not murder 
101. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 78-79. 
102. R.P.C., xi, p 635 and also Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, 
iil, p 547-48. 
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it was revenge and blood-feud meant exactly what. it appears 
to mean. 
Yet it would be equally unbalanced to think that feuding 
was all about killing and violence. Some feuds, as has been 
seen, had or appear to have had no violence,while the 
majority of feuds were of fairly short duration. In most 
feuds peace entered into them at some point. While the 
later sixteenth century was to see this being increasingly 
done because of pressure from the crown, this was by no 
means the only reason. Nor was it the result of men turning 
to litigation in any great measure. The courts held no 
special place outside of the kin-feud network which would 
necessarily give them any intrinsic right to people's 
confidence. At the trial of John Ross of Ba11ivot in 1600 
most of the proceedings concerned themselves with the 
composition of the assize. The defence raised objections 
against the laird of Duffus because Ballivot was at feud 
with him, and if that could not be proven then he was at 
feud with a relative of Duffus. He also claimed that 
another member of the assize was nephew to another man 
with whom he was at feud, and that yet another was third 
or fourth of kin to yet another of his enemies before 
going on to object to most other members of the assize.103 
Much of this was the wrecking tactics of lawyers,but there 
103. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, p 138-45; see also 
Weisser, Crime and Punishment, p 51-67, for a good 
discllssion of theprivate nature of justice in this 
period, e.g. p 66 "Crime was considered a private . 
affair, closely related to the extreme bonds of 
friendship, kinship and status that dominated 
medieval social relations." 
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was an element of real fear that. the courts were less reliable 
and more open to abuse and corruption than other means of 
achieving justice and bringing peace to a feud. One also 
finds complaints like that by Kirkpatrick of Closeburn, 
the deputy sheriff of Dumfries, that an assize had aquitted • 
a man who he was certain was a thier. l04 Thus whatever its 
decision,there was likely to be suspicion concerning the' 
relationships between men on the assize and either the 
accused or the pursuing parties. It was unlikely then 
that a feud would be settled by legal action, and the most 
that could be achieved by taking such a course might be 
the prosecu.tion of one side for crimes committed during 
the feud. Such an action would itself be considered a 
hostile act and would, as in the case of one of Ross of 
Ballivotts feuds, only result in an enhanced desire of 
re\Tenge. 
As in war, the first objective of those who wanted 
to brin~ peace to a feud was to achieve a cease fire. 
In the terminology of the feud this meant to bring both 
parties to sign mutual assurances. l05 The assurance was 
a guarantee in the form of a written contract that each 
side would not harm the other. Thus lord Semple assured 
that neither he, his kinsmen, his dependants, tenants or 
104. B.P.C., v, p 232,33. 
105. Philpotts discovered that on the continent it was the 
practice to "obviate blood-feuds by assurement and 
similar devices" rather than abolish them. Philpotts, 
Kindred and ala!!, p 2-54. 
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servDnts would molest Sir John lIJ8xwell of Pollok or his 
brothers, kinsmen, etc. "for quhatsume'lir callO, occasioun, 
or trubles fallin furth an:1 committit betuixt us in ony 
tymes bygain" and promised to observe this "be my honour 
lawtie, and fidelitie ll • l06 Such a contract was a private 
and voluntary one which the two sides had entered into by 
mutual consent, or after some pressure from their friends 
and neighbours. At the worst then a breach of contract 
could result in little more than a return to feuding so 
that its enforcement rested largely on the good will of 
the signatories. In order to give more authority to 
assurances some men had them registered by the 
privy council so that the crown became one of the 
witnesses to it and ~ndertook a responsibility to enforce 
it. l07 Occasionally the crown would in fact initiate the 
move to get a feud under assurance,as it did in 1582 when 
Kennedy of Bargany and Kennedy of Blairquan were ordered 
to assure one another and in 1586 when the master of Yester 
was outlawed for failing to assure John Stewart of Tracquair.108 
More formally the crown established some sort of foothold 
on the assurance when in 1587 parliament made murdering 
someone under assurance a treasonable crime.109 Financial 
penalties were written into the assurance with each side 
106. Fraser, Pollok, p 320, no 162. 
107. As in Lord Somervil1e and Wi1liam Graham in 1584, 
. R.P.C., iii, p 677. 
108. R.P.C., iii, p 503-04 and iv, p 67-68. 
109. A.P.S., iii, p 451. 
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promising the other that if they broke the agreement then 
they would pay a specified sum. Such sums could be fairly 
large, like the ten thousand pounds demanded in an assurance 
between the earl of Crawford and the master of Glamis in 
1582, but there remai.ned the problem of enforcing such a 
penalty and really the only effective deterrant to breaking 
the assurance was the odium of doing so.110 
The reasons for terminating an assurance were of course 
varied. In the first place most assurances were only made 
for a year or less, never any longer. That between 
lord Livin5ston and the laird of Carse was registered on 
the 27th of Harch 1583 and was to last until the last day of 
November. lll Hany simply fell into abeyance unless the 
parties concerned really wanted to prolong the pe?ce or if 
the same pressure was applied to them by kinsmen, 
neighbours, or the crown as had been the year before. 
Even during the period of assurance relations between 
the two parties remained potentially explosive as 
lord Hamilton found out when he had difficulty getting 
together a meeting of the gentlemen of the border marches 
because of lIt.he sundry quarrells and feades standing 
amongst them, which they be assured to certain dayes, 
not yet expired, yet hath no will to cum togedder 
110. See above p 48 on the laird of Johnstone. 
Ill. R.P.C., iii, P 561. 
81. 
dd nl · 1" 112 oth 1· ul d su e y ~n any pace • ers wereess caref an 
incidents, real, imagined or contrived, took place which 
led to the colJ.apse of assurances. In 1581, in Glasgow, 
John Pollok of that Ilk broke his assurance with 
Sir John Maxwell of Nethir Pollok when he "chasit and 
followit thame on horsebak to have s1ayne thame with 
swordis, and dischargit pist01ettis at thame". In 1586 
lord Hay and WaIter Scott of Branxholm were reported 
to have invaded one another "be oppin weir and hostilitie, 
committing divers slauchteris, mutilationis, grite 
heirschips, and depradations, to the wrak of mony trew 
-
men ••• " while they were ander assurance to one another. ll) 
This dependence in most feuds on voluntary good will 
was the weakness of the assurance system. In the. two 
cases above Pollok was called to account for his actions 
and both Hay and Branxholm were ordered to find caution 
for future good behaviour, but even where crown action 
was taken to enforce the assurance it \-las only underlining 
the lack of good will between the parties and thus the 
unlikelihood of there being a peaceful settlement in 
the future. It was the crown's distrust of the assurance 
system, and the suspicion that it inferred a legitimacy 
on feuding, that made it more confidant of acts of 
112. C.S.P. Scot., x, p 207. 
113. For these two cases and one other in which the Scotts 
charged the Elliots with breakin~ assurances, see 
~, iii, P 436, p 455, p 503; iii, p 380, p 388, 
p 404; iv, p 98. 
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caution os a means of ending the violence of a feud. 
The essential difference between the caution and the 
assurance was that they were enforced on the parties 
(or party as they were not necessarily mutual) by the 
crown. They were used to cover a multitude of sins in 
which one party felt threatened in some way and was able 
to persuade the crown that caution was required, or when 
the crown itself forced two parties to find caution on 
the basis of reports it had. In an act of caution the 
principal found surety for his good behaviour from 
cautioners who were usually kinsmen, friends or very 
often burgesses willing to guarantee the cash. In a 
world where good relations with these people was so 
important a man would perhaps think twice about bringing 
financial hardship on his friends by behaviour which 
caused them to forfeit the surety. Money paid to the 
crown in such a way was recoverable from the principal 
if he could be found, but by betraying his friends trust 
in him and putting them to some loss, even if it was a 
short term one, a strain was put on relationships and 
one's circle of reliable friends and kinsmen could be 
reduced. 114 
The cautioners themselves were thus acceptable on 
the basis of their relationship with the principal and 
their ability to pay the fines. Most,therefore,were 
114. Duby, The Chivalrous Society, p 53-54, identifies 
the development of a surety system from the eleventh 
century when regular courts were declining. 
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kinsmen, as in the three Hamilton lairds who stood caution 
for vJilliam Hamilton of Sanquhar in 1576, or neighbours, 
as in the case of the other man in this act of caution. 
John Wallaco of Cragy who persuaded George Crawford of 
Lefnoreis to back him.llS However, the crown's concern with 
being able to effectively have the fines paid if necessary 
was probably the reason for the fairly large number of 
burgesses who figure in cautions. Thus when Uthred 
MacDowell of Garthland had to find surety in 30,000 marks 
that he would not harm his Gordon neighbours he went to 
Robert Gourlay, an Edinburgh burgess, for help. Gourlay 
may have been related,but it is more likely that he was 
more able to guarantee the cosh than any of MacDowell's 
Gallo1l1ay relatives. What Gourlay got from it one does 
not know,but one can assume that he and others like him 
made their percentage from what was a type of credit 
116 facility. Most c8utioners were therefore men of some 
substance, as were the principals, since only landed men end 
burgesses 1IJere put under caution, but they were rarely 
noblemen. In 1591 the earl of Caithness complained that 
he had been horned and charged to enter Blackness in spite 
of having found caution from the earl of Huntly, but the 
council replied that they would not accept Huntly "or ony 
utheris of his degree and rank", telling Caithness to find 
some lesser men who would be accountable.117 
115. R.P.C.,.ii, p 493-94. 
116. R.P.C., iv, p403. 
117. R.P.C., iv, p 689. 
Once again the problem with cautions was in the 
enforcement. Being a crown measure gave them greater 
legal status, but the pains attached to them were still 
fairly limited. Apart from the fines which varied with the 
status of the offender, and the level of importance attached" 
to the feud, there was little real restraint imposed. A 
man's friends might concur in his feud and be willing to 
wait for their money: he might decide that the crown prooably 
would not get round to uplifting the caution anyway, or would 
be unable to, and would thus accept the inevitable outlawry. 
The dishonour which was attached to breaking an act of 
caution was less than that in an assurance because it had 
been imposed and did not really involve a man giving his 
word in any meaningful sense,though some did specifically 
state that "reproof, dishonour and infamy" would fall upon 
118 
whoever broke the terms of the Bct. Furthermore,as in 
assurances the cautions were for a limited time, one 
between lord Oliphant and some Murray lairds ordering the 
parties to abstain from feud until a fixed date, so that 
there remained the inference ,that the feud could be 
renewed.119 Like the assurance then the caution amounted 
to little more than an enforced cooling off period in 
which a great deal of stress was still being laid upon 
the good will of the parties themselves. 
118. R.P.C., ii, P 397. 
119. R.P.C., iii, p 208-09. 
85. 
Durin3 this cooling off the first steps would be taken 
in mediating between the parties at feud. Some of course 
would reject this out of hand and either the feud would 
be renewed in its active form,or it would continue to be 
put under constraint by assurances and cautions if the 
parties were scrupulous enough to observe them. The 
momentum for peace very often began in the locality and 
did not necessarily come down from the centre. Mostly t~e 
men who interfered in feuds in this way were neighbours 
concerned about the dislocation the feud was having on 
the community, or friends concerned that their friends 
-
were ruining themselves in a feud. Many also had a genuine 
concern for law and order when it was not their own 
personal interests which were at issue. Thus in 1595, 
during the feud between the earl of Montrose and Sir James 
Sandilands, it was reported that, "the great men of the 
west have comperit upon it".120 More specifically one of 
those great men, lord Loudon, wrote to Maxwell of Pollok 
telling him that he was going to Stirling to hear what had 
happened in the slaughter of a man by some of Montrose's 
men and to decide whether it should be taken up as a 
quarrel against ~Iontrose or "tane up and freindfullie 
agreit be the adwyis of freindis". He therefore asked Pollok 
to come with him as 111 culd nocht gudlie gif' ansuer thairto 
without the adwyis of freindis".121 Here one finds something 
120. C.S.P. Scot., xi, P 6)2. 
121. Fraser, Pollok, ii, p 179-80, no 185. 
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of the co-operation Gluckman wrote of as the webs of co-
operative relationships in a community pulled men into 
pressure groups with an interest in peace just as they 
could so easily be sucked into violent conflict. 
\f.here good lordship could be exercised the degree of 
pressure available was obviously greater. Thus James and 
Patrick Graham told the laird of Johnstone that after the 
slaughter of their father they were left "in the protectioun 
and favour is of your maisterschippis ll and would abide by his 
will in the matter of their feud with their father's killers. 
However,if he would not make any agreement for them, then 
"gif they wald offer unto us all the geir thai haif in the 
warlde, we wald nocht accept it gif we culd haif your 
maisterschippis favouris utherwayis ll • 122 The Grahams 
would very much have preferred revenge, but if thelr lord 
chose otherwise they would abide by his decision as his 
protection in the future was more important to them. 
However, they were also expecting him to get them a good 
settlement should he decide that they ought not to seek 
vengeance. Similarly a lord might t.lrn a man away from 
legal action,as when Menzies of that Ilk was advised by 
Atholl "not to seek the circumstance of the law", but to 
let the matter between him and Campbell of Glenorchy be 
decided by their friends, meaning Atholl himself end Argyll, 
122. W. Freser, The Annapdale Family Book of the Johnstones, 
(Edinburgh, 1894), il, P 274, no. 362. 
123 the overlords of the two men. 
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The pressure could work in the other direction however. 
Some time around 1600-02 attempts were made to end a feud 
between the earls of Erroll and Marischal by Huntly and 
the earl of Sutherland, but the initiative broke down on 
account of some rather strong language used by Marischal 
in a document in which he compiled his grievances against 
Errol1. Erroll complained that he had "lang and luiginglie ll 
sought to remove the troubles between their houses, n(nocht 
be law or truble quhilk is now the commour custome of the 
cuntrie in maiteris of less wecht) bot b~ all the freindlie 
meanis lay in my power or that I culd devyse ••• ", but that 
Marischal had so insulted and wronged him that he was 
breaking off negotiations. However while Huntly washed 
. his hands of the matter, a number of lairds who were 
dependant upon the two earls continued to work for an 
agreement. The lairds involved went to great lengths to 
persuade the earls that they were acting in the interests 
of them both,and when Erroll proved to be the more obstinate· 
they vaguely threatened to come out more positively on 
Marischal's side. Just as lesser men needed the protection 
of their lord, so lords needed the support of their men, 
and thus the latter had a bargaining lever which might be 
used in this way to force peace upon a reluctant lord.124 
123. Menzies }1.S., H.:H.C., vi, p693 no 37, p 696 no 86, 
p 707 no 206. 
124. "The Erroll Papers", ~iscellanI of the Spaldint.; Club, 
(Spalding Club, 1841-52), vol ii, p 285-92. 
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Hhatever the direction of such pressure its effect was 
to·persuade men to accept mediation. In certain cases, 
of course, the relationship between the two sides was such 
that the process was much less complex. In 15S2 a number 
of Grahams and Irvines approached the laird of Johnstone 
about the slaughter of one of his kinsmen and offered 
"full repentence in our hairttis" and "crawis forgiV'eness 
for Godls suke ll , offering to make substantial compensation 
for what had happened.125 In this case the disparate 
pO\ler between the two groups and the dependence of these 
clans on Johnstone meant that they had very little 
bargaining power and could do little more than try and 
make the best of their weak position by themselves 
initiating the peace moves. Others made their own 
arrangements, like the earls of Caithness and Sutherland 
who agreed to appoint Huntly to be their hereditary 
arbitrator so that whenever trouble erupted between them 
Hunt1y could automatically begin making peace moves without 
the need for preliminaries.12~ In the north Sir Robert 
Gordon observed that there was the IIbrieve ll , " •• a kynd 
of judge amongst the islanders, who hath ane absolute 
authoritie and censure they willing1ie submitt themselves. 
when he deter~ineth apY debatable question betuein partie 
125. Fraser, Annandale, ii, p 45-~6, no 48. 
126. Gordon, Sutherland, p 181ff, p 197-200, P 201-02; 
C.S.P. Scot., xi, p 849. 
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and partiel! .127 In the majority of feuds, however, t.he 
complexities involved were much greater and mediation was 
a long and complicated business with no certainty of 
success. 
Having agreed to mediate the first problem was to 
agree on the mediators. Usually each side would name a 
number of mediators in excess of the numbers required 
and then the other side would chose those most acceptable 
to them to the number specified. In this way each side 
was able to express some confidence in the arbitra~ors 
of the other side so that one was unlikely to have a 
case of, for example, four hardened Maxwells sitting down 
to try and work out a settlement with four equally die-
hard, feuding Johnstones. However, the arbitrators were 
still likely to be kinsmen and friends. In the 1589 decreet 
between the earls of Caithness and Sutherland the arbitrators 
for Caithness were two Sinclair lairds, both kinsmen and 
dependants, with Innes of that Ilk and three other Innes 
lairds all of whom were dependants of Huntly, while 
Sutherland had four of his Gordon kinsmen and two Dunbar 
lairds who were also Huntly dependants, Huntly himself 
being the oversman to whom the final decision was given 
. 128 
on a~ matter which the arbitrators could not agree. 
127. Gordon, Sutherland, p 268. For an interesting . 
comparison see the role of the leopard-skinned 
chief among the Nuer, Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, 
p 163-64. 
128. S.R.C., Register of Deeds, 1/36/24. 
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In an agreement between the kin of Andrew Burnet and his 
murderer, Alexander Spens, mediation was conducted by 
Burnet's six sons, his brother-in-law and his sister's 
son,while for Spens, his own brother and two other kinsmen 
who were Edinburgh burgesses conducted the negotiations. 
Both sides assl~ed responsibility for their entire kin, 
the Burnet's specifying that they d~d so for the I1relict; 
remainder, bairnis, kin, frendis and four branches of the 
said umquhile Andro".129 Apart from kinsmen the most 
likely people one would find participating in such 
negotiations would be lords. In a decreet in 1585 for 
the slaughter of John Frost by John Ker, the arbitration 
was conducted by Frost's two eldest sons while on the 
other side Ker's employer, the master of Glamis was 
represented by his wife, and in 1574 the regent Morton 
and the earl of Angus negotiated with the Hamiltons for 
compensation for Johnstone of l·lestraw, a dependant of 
their's slain by the Hamiltons.130 Kinsmen, more commonly 
from the agnatic side of the family, but not exclusively 
so, and from a fairly wide spread of relatives, friends 
and lords were thus the most likely men one finds being 
asked to arbitrate. 
129. S.R.O., R.D., 1/~335b. The place given to cognatic 
kinsmen here is not unusual, see also S.R.D., R.D., 
1/11/306. . 
13D. S.R.D., R.D., 1/25/155, S.R.D., R.D., 1/14/50 and see 
. also Cunninham and Dliphant, S.R.D., R.D. 1/14/31 and 
E1phingstone and Maxwell, S.R.D., R.D., 1/441359b. 
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The terms of reference for the arbitration committee 
were specific to each case,but some general principles 
were observed. The Caithness-Sutherland submission, that 
part of the process by which both sets of principals and 
arbitrators bound themselves to accept the findings of the . 
arbit.ration and submitted their complaints against one 
another, highlights some of these. Both earls were 
"ob1eist and sworne to stand, abyde and underly and fu1fi11 
the decreit de1yvrit" by the arbitrators chosen by them and 
by Huntly, their oversman. Claims were to be submitted by 
the 26th of November 1589 at Elgin and the committee was 
to have eight days to deliberate on them. Should they fail 
to come to an agreement on the claims then Hunt1y himself 
had a further ten days in which to impose his own terms. 
One question, that of the overlordship of Strathnaver, was 
deleted from the terms of reference of the committee and 
was to be submitted directly to the lords of council and 
session. If apY of the arbitrators failed to turn up 
at Elgin then the party concerned could elect another member, 
while if one side failed to appear at all then the other 
could go ahead and deliver a decreet which would have the 
authority of the entire committee. Finally, the decreet 
itself would be registered in the books of council and 
session and have the authority of an act or decreet 
of that body.13l 
131. S.R.O., R.D., 1/36/24. 
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The decreet itself was as complex as the problem it 
sought to resolve. That between Colin Mackenzie of Kintail 
and Robert Hunro of Foulis in 1573 runs on for twenty-six 
pRges in the Register of Deeds and while this is the 
132 longest I came across, ten pages is not uncommon. 
A few decreets can be found in the privy council records 
and another sixteen are in the Regi.ster of Deeds,while 
a great many more lie buried amidst the as yet uncatalogued 
Register of Acts and Decreets of the Lords of Council and 
Session. Due to the state of these records nothing like 
an exhaustive search of feud settlements can be made 
though I have been able to stumble across a few while 
randomly look~ng through some volumes. Surprisingly 
private records have very little to say about feud 
settlements and one can only assume that with a copy 
being registered with the crown few thought it worth 
while keeping one of their own. 
Even if one does have the decreets there is of course 
no evidence of the discussions which went on in the 
arbitration committees. The nearest one can get to 
this are the few cases where one has written comments 
by one side on the other side's submission. Thus in 
1589, the master of Forbes and his kinsmen submitted 
certain demands to Huntly concerning his feud with him 
132. S.R.O" R.D., ~13/459. 
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and the document has survived with HuntIy's own comments 
written in the margin. 133 While Huntly largely agreed with 
the terms demanded of him, Morton was less obli~in~ to 
::> ::> 
Sir Thomas Ker of Fernihirst in his submission and made 
a number of alterations to suit his own interests and 
requirements. Thus he refused to accept the offer of 
Fernihirst's eldest son in marriage to whoever he chose, 
but demanded whichever of his sons he liked best, 8S well 
as infeftment for him in lands of Morton's chosing. He 
accepted Fernihirst's offer of manrent, but on his own 
terms, and he was critical of Fernihirst's reference to 
his family's suffering as it was done under the king's 
authority "and thairfoir aucht to be buryit and not to 
be spoken of".134 Some of the major feuds discussed in 
detail below will establish more clearly the kind ·of 
problems which could develop during this phase of a 
settlement, and indeed many foundered here with 
irreconcilable aims, wrecking tactics and circumst.ance, 
while others dragged on over the years with no apparent 
gains at all except for the fact that as long as men 
were talking to one another they were less likely to 
be killing. 
However,many did reach settlements in the form· of 8 
decreet and assythment usually formed the greater part 
133 ~ S.R.O., Forbes Collection, G.D., 52/1089. 
134. Fraser, Annandale, i, p 42-44, no 45, 46. 
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of any decreet. Cash payments were a fairly common form 
of compensation though one has no real idea of how the 
final amounts were arrived at. One can only ass~e that 
factors like age, status, size of family, the nature of 
the slaughter etc. were taken into account in assything 
a kin for the death of one of their rr.embers. Thus 
David Fyvie of Drumbillo was to pay 500 merks on behalf 
of the killers of David ~~lcolm in Polento, the money 
being divided between Malcolm's wife and son,while the 
Spens kin were ordered to pay 800 merks to the six 
Burnet brothers. John Frost was found to be partly 
responsible for his own death at the hands of lady Home's 
men, but she still had to pay 300 marks to be "ane help 
and support" to his wife and children. John Spa1ding 
of the Hill of Kerimuir,however, found himself having 
to pay £1,000 and make a land transfer to the wife 
and sons of John Frendraucht in Kerimuir whom he had 
slain and the Hamiltons paid Johnstone of ~'Testraw' s 
family 2000 merks. 135 Usually payments were made to 
the wife and sons while payment was made by the principal 
and it was up to him to try and rally his family around 
him in contributing to the payment. Unfortunately one 
does not yet have enough information to be very certain 
about what kind of deduetions,if any,ean be made about 
135. S.R.O, R.D., ~30/63b, S.R.O, R.D., 1/4ll335b, 
. S.R.O., R.D., 1/25/155, S.R.O., R.D., 1/35/245b, 
S.R.O., R.D., ~14l50. 
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the kindred from such contracts.136 
Not all assythment Y8S in cash,however,and land was 
often just as important. In the Johnstone case the 
money was to be given tq Morton to redeem lands Westray 
had mortgaged during his lifetime and the remainder yas 
only then to be distri.buted as cash to any dependant 
kinsmen. In a more complicated arrangement between 
John Ross of Craigie and Peter Oliphant of Turingis for 
the slaughter by the latter's son of another Ross, Turingis 
Y8S to make over certain lands to Craigie yith the consent 
of his wife and son, and in return Craigie was to pay 
him 3,500 merks. Turingis was then to invest this money 
in other lands and infeft his wife, for the duration of 
her life, and then his son, in them. Turingis had also 
to pay an annual amount of grain to Craigie.137 In both 
these cases land Y8S involved, but the thinkin.g behind 
it yas social as yell as economic. The arbitrators in 
the Johnstone of Westray case clearly yanted to ensure 
that the Westray estate recovered, yhile in the latter 
instance Craigie yas obviously getting land cheap, but 
the payment he had to make, and the arrangements for its 
use, yere intended to prevent any feeling of grave 
136. In the Spens-Burnet case the 800 marks was raised 
by Richard Spens of Chirnsyde, brother to the killer, 
by transferring the life-rent of lands held by his 
Y:i.fe from her first husband to another kinsmen 
George Spens, an Edinburgh burgess, yho provided 
the ready cash. S.R.O., R.D., Ll45/206b. 
137. S.R.O., R.D., ~15/l2l. 
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injustice among the Oliphants. Others were less complicated 
and IvlacDowell of Garthland had simply to make over three 
five mark tracts of land and a further ten merk tract to 
Gordon of Lochinvar and one of his kinsmen.138 
It was not only for slaughters that such compensation 
was arranged h Ol-leV er • In 1595 lord Forbes accepted an 
offer from the earl of Argyll for 1800 merks for damages 
done by his men in a number of, raids and he thus dropped 
all·actions against him.139 Similarly, in 1579 James 
Wotherspuon of Birghouse was bound to pay £100 to two men 
Itin full contentatioun and assythment for the hurting, 
mutilatioun, and making thame impotentn • 140 At £50 per 
castration Wotherspoon appears to have got off fairly 
lightly, but when one considers the problems peopl~ 
_ have today in claiming for damages to health or body 
it seems not altogether unreasonable. 
There were other aspects to the decreet. Bonding 
was not a very common form of feud settlement since 
most men realised that a dependancy relationship was 
only of a~ real value if both parties wanted it. One 
does, however, find those like that in the Johnstone-
Graham or Norton-Fernihirst cases above, or in surviving 
bonds, like that given by William Edmonstone of D'lntreath 
138., S.R.O., R.D., ~36/302. 
139. Argyll M.S., H.M.C., vi, p 630~ no 223. 
140. R.P.C., iii, p 206. 
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to James stewart of Doune for killing his father or by 
John Kennedy of Blairquhan to Angus in 1578 for having so 
injured one of his servants that the man could no longer 
work for him.14l In another decreet in 1572 John Douglas 
of Erfchemoston was obliged to bond himself to Dalzell 
of that Ilk whose :.mcle he had killed. l42 
Homage was more common in a slaughter case with the 
guilty party being obliged to make public their "gret 
repentance and humiliatioun" to God and to the offended 
113 party. -~ Thus, even the powerful Hamilton brothers had 
to "do the honoris"l44 to Angus at Holyrood, "comming the 
whole bounds of the inner court bare headed; and sitting 
doun on their knees, delivering him the sword for the 
slaughter of Westrawu • 145 With even more lowly submission 
the above mentioned Grahams and Irvines had offered to go 
in "our lynning claythis to sit doune upone oure kneis 
and desyre forgivenes for Godis caus, and in tuiken of 
homage and repentance take our naikid swordis be the 
poyntis in our handis and offer thame ••• " to the laird 
of Johnstone. l46 Homage here was not about feudal service, 
141. Brown, "Bonds of Hanrent", Appendix, p 509 no 7, 
p 375 no 12. 
142. S.R.O., R.D., 1/13/322. 
143. Wauchope H.S., H.N.C., iv, p 537. 
144. S.R.O., R.D., 1/14/50. 
145·. Calderwood, Histoq, iii, p 346. 
146. Fraser, Annanda1~, i, p45-46 no 48. 
98. 
and when Alexander Spens had to do "homage and honour" 
to the six Burnet brothers he had not recognised them as 
his overlord,bQt had expressed his humiliation and 
repentence.147 Such an act was necessary because it had 
to be seen that the killers and their kinsmen were not 
only in the wrong, bQt in the weaker position, since to 
have conclQded the assythment with a payment only, no 
matter how high, would have suggested that the killers had-
committed an act against a kin which was unable to extract 
vengeance and whose honour could be bought. It was a 
means of restoring the moral status quo upset by the 
success one side had had in killing a member of the other 
kin or clan.148 
In feuds, hO\Jever, one was often dealing with a 
. situation in which men from both sides had been killed. 
In the Caithness-Sutherland settlement the decreet dealt 
with hostilities between the two earls between February 
1587 and its submission in 1589 dQring which time there 
had been widespread fighting between the two sides. 
Caithness claimed that Sutherland's men had slain ten of 
his people and listed extensive material damage while 
Sutherland claimed for the deaths of six ~en and similar 
ravaging of his land. Unlike the Icelandic sagas the 
147. S.R.O., R.D., 1/1~/J35b. 
148. How con-roon th~s was one cannot. be certain but one 
decreet referred to it as "the custom of the realm", 
S.R.O., R.D., 1/1)/)22. 
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arbitrators did not set killing against killing so that 
one death cancelled out another, but decreed that the 
kinsmen of the dead were to take their claims individually 
to Caithness or Sutherland, whichever was responsible, 
and the earls would be bound to satisfy them. Claims for 
material damage were to be similarly treated.149 
Such a settlement was obviously of mutual interest, 
but even in instances of a slaughter only being committed' 
on one side there was a degree of mutuality. In their 
agreement with the Spens, the Burnets "frelie fra thair 
hairtis remittis and forgives safar as in thame lyis ••• " 
the murde~ of their father and received the killer and 
.his kinsmen in kindness as if ~othing had happened. All 
civil criminal actions against him were dropped an? he 
was to be iIDmediately freed from the tolbooth where he 
was being held and was to receive a letter of slains 
from the Burnets stating their forgiveness of him. By 
a mixture of Christian forgiveness, good neighbourliness, 
justice and self-interest, the relationship of feud was. 
replaced by that of outward friendship and both sides 
"faithfullie binds and obleiss thame to stand and remane 
in perpetuall aimitie and freindschip ••• as gif the said 
1 uht h d b uhitt d id" 150 s a er a never eene q e nor ma • In 
another such agreement the Humes and one of the Wauchopes 
149. S.R.O, R.D., ~36/24. 
150. S.R.O., R.D., 1/~335b. 
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of Niddrie agreed to live Hin godlie peace in brotherlie 
societie ll with one another. 151 The Gordons promised the 
MacDowells that lIall rancor and malice of the hairtis 
consaivit and bornell against one another would be removed 
"sua that the memorie of it (the feud) salbe forgot and 
extinguisheit in all times heirefter ll • 152 These sentiments, 
found in the letters of slains, were ~ore than rhetoric, 
and while men may have inwardly still found it hard to 
forgiv'e, in a social sense all grievances were put aside. 
and normal relationships in the corr:munity re-established. 
The letter of slains was thus handed over at the time 
assythment was paid so that both sides wer.e seen to be 
gaining something from the agreement and neither was 
losing face 'lnciuly.153 
The letter of slains was ,however, only half, though the 
more difficult half, of the means by which a man re-
established himself in the community. Remissions from 
the crown also had to be acqllired if one was to g~rd 
against any future criminal prosecution. In principle 
remissions were grDnted in return for a cash payment; 
in effect a fine, on production of a letter of slains. 
151. vJauchope H.S., H.M.C., iv, p 537. 
152. S.R.O., R.D., ~36/302. 
153. Thus James VI's habit of having his nob1es feast to-
gether after they had made their peace with one 
another. For a letter of slains, see S.R.O • 
. Hackintosh l-luniments, J.D., 176/166, 15/Feb/1594 from 
David Rose in Lyn to John Rose in BaIIivat in which' 
the former accepted that the killing of his son had 
been accidental and accepted assythment in return 
for the letter of slains. 
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Thus in 1589, the kin of David Tllrnbl.lll in Preston were- able 
to bring a case against vJilliam Douglas in Bonule for 
Turnbull's murder in 1569 on the grounds that,while Douglas 
had a privy remission, he had no letter of slains. However, 
the case collapsed when Douglas was able to produce both 
documents. In fact the case ~derlines the importance of 
including as many kinsmen as possible in a feud settlement, 
for what had happened here was that the letter of slains had 
been subscribed by Turnbull's wife and brother, but not his 
daughter who had been too young at the time but-who, twenty 
years later, felt that she had not been properly compensated.154 
However the entire remissions system remained very much 
at the mercy of the crown and irregularities were conwon. 
Thus in 1575 Horton granted a remission to John Smith in 
Balmayne and his brothers for the murder of Henry Hoffet, 
their father having "satisfied the kinsmen and friends of 
the said Henry'. Six months later he granted Alexander 
Crawford a nineteen year respite - a limited remission -
for his part in the killing of Richar-d Allan "bcause my 
lord Regentis grace has sene ane letter of slanis given 
to the said Alexander for the said slauchter". HOlNever 
in two other respites granted during this same period, 
Thomas Gilbert was given his so that "in the menetyme he 
may laboure to satisfie the partie offendit" and a number 
of Adairs were given their respite that "in the menetyme 
thay may traV'~ll for satisfactioun and assythment of the 
154. R.P.C., iv, p 346. 
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155 . 
said tlmquhile Uthreidis ••• ". Probably the authorities 
mixed a degree of common sense with the immediate needs of 
the king to raise cash so that one found remissions being 
granted as an official blessing on the termination of a feud 
and as a means to al101-/ discussion about peace to begin. 
Either way the crown was paid and often that was the more 
pressing concern than the principles supposedly adhered to. 
This does not mean that the crown had nothing at all 
to do with pacifying feuds in the days before th~ legislation 
of the 1590's. Decreets might be delivered by the crown after 
parties had made a submission of their feud to it, as Scott 
of Branxholm and Tweedie of Drummelzier did in 1587.156 
As a decreet handed down by the crown and registered by it, 
then it was also more likely to be enforced by the ·crown.157 
The royal will could be brought to bear more directly on a 
feud,as in 1575 when the regent Horton intervened to settle 
the E11iot-Hoppringle feud or at a convention of the nobility 
in 1602 when the king was involved in. mediating in the feuds 
between Lennox and Argyll. Ochiltreeand Loudon, Huntly and 
Erro11 and others. Here the king was acting as overlord to 
his noblemen and was using his personal relationships with 
155. Eeiistt.lln i2ecreti Si,gilJ.i Re~wn Scotorum (ed.) 
H. Livingston and others, (Edinburgh, 1908- ), vii, 
p 58 no 379, p 85 no 579, p 56 no 375, p 66 no 439. 
156. R.P.C., iv, p 225. 
157 • For example in 1601 the C011ncil arranged to disc:1SS the 
interpretation of a decreet between Atholl and stewart 
of Gairntullie, R.P.C., vi, p 299-300. 
103. 
them to pacify their disputes.158 Feuds did on occasion 
reach the justice court where a defence was likely to ask 
to be taken into the king's will should it become apparent 
that the assize would find them g'lilty. Thus in 1598 the 
earl of Cassillis charged"l1athew Stewart of Dunduff with 
having attempted to assassinate him and, seeing the drift 
of the trial, Dunduff asked to come under the king's will 
to avoid the likely death sentence which would follow the· 
assize finding him guilty. James in fact handed the matter 
over to Cassillis and his advisors and they satisfied 
themselves with D'.lnduff's banishment from Scotland, England 
or Ireland, and for his part the king asked for a thousand 
merks.159 In another"case James Gib was in fact found 
guilty by the assize of attacking and wounding James Boyd 
of the Kipps in an act of premeditated feud and at first 
the king refused to accept him into his will, as was 
often the case, and told the justice to go ahead and 
execute him, but he then intervened and reduced this to 
amputation of the right hand and banishment and finally 
to banishment only.160 
More direct pressure could also be brought to bear 
on feuding families. The bloody feud between the border 
families of Haitlie and Burnfield was brought to the 
158. C.S.P., Scot., xiii, part 2, p 940. 
159~ Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, p 39-40. 
160. ibid., i, part 2, p 187-89. 
.-
atten-~ion of the privy council in 1576 when the former got 
the backing of the king's advocate, David Borthwick, and 
the treasurer, lord Ruthven, in presenting their case 
before it. The Bttrnfields were ordered to find caution 
not to harm the Haitlies, but ignored it and carried out a • 
further attack on their neighbours, wounding two of them. 
The council responded by charging that the surety on the 
cautions should be paid and Alexander Burnfield, one of . 
the least law abiding members of the king, be warded. A year 
later Alexander escaped from ward, but found himself isolated 
from most of his friends when the crown forced an 
agreement with them under which they were to ostracise 
him and others at the horn with him, and forego any 
"quarrell, deidle feid, nor revengell should any of them be 
slain at the horn. Six years later, however, Alexander 
was still at the horn for· failing to answer "tuiching the 
removing of the deidlie reid and contraversy standing 
betuix thame and certane of the surnames of the Haitleisll •l6l 
The ease with which men like Alexander Haitlie avoided 
the attempt of the crown to impose peace upon their feuds 
demonstrates its severe limitations in enforcing its will 
in the localities. It can be argued that the Scottish crown 
was very powerful when:it came to dealing with political 
opposition, but effectiveness at the level of local politics 
161. R.P.C., ii, P 302, p 534, p 625, p 6)0; iii, p 35, p 562. 
was much more difficult. It could take sides and crush one 
side of the feud, but that was unlikely to guarantee that 
the feud would end. Certainly it was this thought which 
dominated the thinking of many feuding parties and formed 
one of the principal connections between local politics and 
the workings of the great court parties and factions and 
the control of the patronage flow. It was this political 
background which undermined so much of the bureaucratic 
attempts to pacify feuds, for as long as outlaws could hide 
in the protection of powerful noblemen and royal officials 
then outlawry itself was meaningless. Similarly, in· policing 
the crown had to use someone in the locality and whoever he 
was,one could be sure that he would have some relationship 
with the feuding parties which made him appear not as an 
external policeman imposing law and order,but as a'partisan 
taking sides. 
The limitations of the effectiveness of the formal 
organs of government meant that if there was to be peace 
in the feud then it would have·to come from private 
initiatives,or at least in the form of private settlements 
with some pressure having been exercised by the government. 
However,even these private means of bringing peace to the 
feud could so easily founder. The table overleaf gives 
a very rough indication of the settlement of feuds during 
th ' . d 162 ~S. per~o • 
162. These figures incorporate the years to 1625 and thus 
include the effect of the reforms and anti-feud 
legislation at the end of the century. 
Table 7: Settlement of Feuds 
Types of 
Settlement 
Vict.ory for 
one side 
Volunt.ary 
Private 
Crown Sponsored 
Private 
Crown 
Enforced 
Unknown 
"All Class 
(contemp.) Feuds 
9. 
15 
43 
11 
61 
7fo 
11% 
30% 
8% 
106. 
All Feuds 
26 
58 
80 
21 
205 
7fo 
15% 
20% 
5% < 
53% 
From this one can see that some 10-15~ of the feuds were 
settled privately without any interference.from the crown, 
which represents a fairly small percentage. However, to 
this one can add those private settlements which were the 
res~lt of crown pressure and one has a figure of nearer 
40~ of the settlement remaining in largely private hands. 
Furthermore, one can assume that the majority of 'unknowns' 
were pacified privately since if it were otherwise one 
would expect to find evidence of a settlement in government 
records. However, while stressing the importance of these 
private means of settlement one must not lose sight of the 
role of the cro\-In in pressurising people into set ,t1ements, 
a procedure which was intensified by the anti-fe'ld legislation 
of the 1590's end early 1600's. Thus the "speed and 
effectiveness,,163 of private agreements which Worma1d writes 
of is basically correct, especially if one remembers 
163. Hormald, "B1oodfeud, Kindred and Government", p 73. 
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the short duration of the majority of feuds, but it was the 
crown which really ensured both speed, in devising legislation 
to hurry a settlement along, and effectiveness, in tightening 
up on its enforcement capabilities. How that was done belongs 
to a later discussion, but it is a point which ought to be 
borne in mind even at this stage. 
Why the crown's help was necessary can be seen from the 
many reasons which contributed to the collapse of a private 
settlement. In "Njal' s Saga" the story is told of Lyting of 
Samstead who killed Hoshuld Njalsson and paid compensation 
to Hoshuld's father Njal and to his brothers· and was thus 
freed from the threat of blood-feud. However, three years 
later he was approached by Amendi the Blind, Hoshuld's 
illegitimate son, and asked for compensation for him as 
he had been left out of the settlement. Lyting refused 
and in a fit of God inspired rage Amendi killed him. When 
Amendi later told Njal about the killing the wise old 
Icelander said, liNo-one can blame you for what you did for 
such things are foreordained. It is a warning to others 
in similar circumstances never to rebuff those who are so 
close of kin. lIl64 The inclusion of a wide spectrum of 
kinsmen in a feud settlement was thus f~ndamental to its 
success, and in many instances failure followed the 
neglecting of such people. The murder of lord Torthorwald 
in the streets of Edinburgh by a nephew of captain James 
Stewart occurred while the crown was in the middle of 
164. lijal's Saga, p 226-27. 
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pacifying the Douglases and stewarts, but had been unable 
to include William stewart in the settlement because of 
his own obstinacy.165 In 1580 the privy council was 
making arrangements for settling the quarrel between 
Colin Campbell of Glenorchy and John l-!enzies of that Ilk, 
but on the date laid aside for discussing the feud 
Glenorchy's son turned up and said that his father was 
too old to travel in such weather and that he had been 
sent in his place. The council refused to go any further, 
saying that a feud was too important a matter to be 
settled without the principals' preseroo ann set a new 
166 date for hearing. "!hen the Ancrum branch of the Kers 
finally agreed to make their peace with their chief, 
, 
Cessford,and take him by the hand,they did so,but 
protested "alwayes that thair dewitie of freindschip 
micht be reservit to the bairnis of the said umquhile 
William atthei perfyte age, to so in the mater, tuiching 
the said slauchter as salbe then thocht expedient be 
freindis • ,,167 This ques tion of including the rights 
of minors was an important one and one finds many feuds 
like those between Glencairn and Eiglinton, Crawford 
and Glamis and Huntly and Horay having to postpone a 
settlement because the son ofa man killed in the feud 
was too young to put his own name to it. The dangers 
165. R.P.C., viii, p 514. 
166. E.P.C~, iii, p 297 • 
. 167. R.P.C., v, p 273. 
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of assuming that a feud WAS pacified. could be all too 
brutally exposed when vengeful sons came of age and 
reopened old wounds, as lord Maxwell did when he 
murdered the laird of Johnstone in spite of the peace 
made between Johnstone and other I-faxwells. 168 
Even the negotiations themselves did not always 
work out as planned. People sometimes ju~t did not 
bother to turn up at mediation meetings for reasons 
which might be genuine or were more likely excuses. 169 
The fact was that no-one wanted to appear too eager 
for peace as it was token as a sign of weakness. On 
other occasions the negotiations started but broke down, 
as in 1608 when the arbitrators for the earl of Mar and 
the laird of Colquhoun went home after eight months of 
trying to reach. a settlement, protesting that the failure 
was not for a want of trying on their part,but that the 
two principals themselves wanted them to fail.1?O Fear 
might pr·event men from becoming friends ,as when the 
lairds of Culzean and Drumrnurchie were brought into the 
same house for a meeting to see if they could resolve 
their differences. However,their own quarrel was only 
part of the greater feud between the earl of Cassillis 
168. See below vol ii, p 533-36. 
169. For example see the }~ster of Ochiltree's letter to 
the Laird of Barnbarroch, Q2,rrespondence of Sir Patrick 
. Waus, i, p 93. 
170. ~.P.C., ·viii, P 73. 
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and the laird of Bargany and at the last moment Culzean 
lost his nerve as he reflected on what the earl would 
have to say should he hear of this and he left the house 
before he had even met Drummurchie.171 As one might 
expect there were o~,her more dangerous problems which 
might arise when one brought together men who had for 
long sought to kill one another. Thus,the younger Kennedy 
of Blairquhan got himself drunk in Edinburgh one night and· 
struck Livin6ston of Pantoshane in the face \-dth his sword 
guard after some words had passed between them. The 
following evening Sir John Kennedy brought the two men 
together for a reconciliation, but as soon as they came 
to shake hands Pantoshane attacked his rival, laming one 
of his hands and striking his head "to his disgrace and 
that of his convof,.172 Similarly,when Sir Robert Maxwell 
of spotts brought together lord Haxwell and the laird of 
Johnstone in 1607 all his elaborate precautions proved 
unable to prevent Maxwell shooting and killing the laird.173 
Other feuds were settled and then foundered on the 
failure of one or both parties' in fulfilling the agreement. 
In 15B6 the kinsmen and friends of Robert }~xwel1 of 
Crusteans complained that the men who had murdered him had 
lately been given a letter of slains after deceiving the 
171. Pitcairn, Kennedy, p 53-55. 
172.' ibid., p 42. 
173. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 43-48. 
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king into giving them a remission on the grounds that they 
already had pa~d assythment. 174 Here one was dealing 
with deception, but in 1577 the Scott kindred broke off their 
agreement with the Kerrs, signed in 1564 and ratified in 
1574, saying that "the said feid is newlie gevin up, 
freindschip dischargeit, and deid1ie hatrent and grudge 
proclamit". The Ker chief, the laird of Cessford, complained 
to Morton that he was shocked since "thair is na place left 
now to renew that deid1ie feid nether for thingis bygane 
nor to C:mlll, as he had scrupulously observed the terms of 
the treaty, besIdes which the settlement had also written 
into it its own mechanism for dealing with a breakdown of 
relations between the two families. However, when the 
case was more fully investigated by the council it was 
discovered that George Kerr, apparent of Fawdonside, had 
failed to marry Janet Scott and had therefore incurred a 
penalty of 1000 marks •. The Scottts complaint was thus 
upheld and the council offered to help mend the broken 
bridges .175 
While relating the tale of· Finn in "Beowu1fll the 
writer warns of those who would "fetch the feud to mind 
176 
and by taunting words awaken the bad blood ll , and 
174. R.P.C., iv, p 130-31. 
175. Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission on the 
Lain'! Nanuscripts preserved in Edinburgh University, 
·(London, 1914 and 1925); i, P 27-28; R.P.C., ii, P 643,p 665. 
176. Beowu1f,·p 85. 
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even more extremely Evans-Pritchard has, as already seen, 
argued that a feud goes on forever since "A Nuer is proud 
and wants a man's body in vengeance and not his cattle.,,177 
However wnter-tight a settlement might appear to be, there 
thus remained this possibility that the feud might be 
rekindled. In 1598 Hr. John Nicolson and James Bellenden 
had been brought together by their minister after a long 
period of deadly hatred between them. While the 
two men appeared to be reconciled, Bellenden sent his son 
out to attack Nicolson later that same day.178 That same 
year the family of D~ncan Buchanan in Gler~ocarne had 
complained that a feud between them and Robert Co1quhoun 
of Camstrodane had been patched up by the latter's chief, 
but that shortly afterwards Camstrodana and his ~en had 
come to their land and killed Dunoan, and then "in ane 
barbarous and eithnik maner, eftir thay knew that he was 
deid, cuttit and manglit his hail1 body with durkis and 
swerdis".l79 This does not mean that every feud was 
likely to be brought baok to life at any moment,for the 
fact that both these incidents took place within a 
fairly short time of the settlement, is signifioant and 
the longer the settlement lasted the less likely it 
was that the feud would be revived. 
\fuen writing of late medieval Germany, F.R.H.Du Boulay 
177. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, p 154-55. 
178. R.P.C., v, p 491-93. 
179. ibid., p 381-82. 
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pointed out that lI~li thout durable institutions, every 
init.iative is an expedient." Thus the organisation of' 
peace was not something for which there were clear legal 
forms to be observed, but was a "task of persuasionlt 
, 180 
and much the same can be said of early modern Scotland. 
Both the crOHn and the local lord CO'.lld wave big sticks, 
but on the whole there were too mnny,ways of avoiding 
them and, recognising their ineffectiveness, neither king . 
nor lord risked failure too often. The problem with the 
customary procedures which might bring peace was their 
voluntary nature. Can one imagine the contestants in 
the political feuds of Northern Ireland voluntarily sitting 
down together and sorting out their differences? No-one 
really had to end a feud and to take the initiative in 
doing so was considered a sign of weakness, inferring that 
the kindred or lord was unable to protect its members or 
dependants. with society structured in such a way as to 
favour feuding and with an ideology there to justify it, 
there was no reason to imagine that men necessarily wanted 
peace. Peace itself held a less ideolo~ical attraction 
than honour or revenge, and while law and order may have 
had a significant place in men's conception of how society 
ought to be, the feud was, in their own eyes, on the side 
of law and order and its violence was an ordering force in 
society. Only when they looked at other peoples feuds did 
. 
180. F.R.H.Du Boulay, "Law Enforcement in Hedieval Germany", 
in History, 63 :209 (19,78), P 347. 
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they sometimes sce it differently. Thus wherever interests 
and ambitions clashed, feud W1S the best means by which a 
man might seek to have his way, and within feud violence 
was the tool of persuasion most immediately on hand and 
most in accord with the values of sixteenth century 
Scottish society. Hith this perception of the ideals and 
mechanics of the feud one can make m!lch more sense of 
Scottish politics, both local and national, and it is in 
politics that the issues of the feud come to life. 
LOCAL POLITICS A}ID THE FEUD 
115. 
The Countryside 
To the sixteenth century Scotsman, the kingdom of 
Scotland would have been a concept he would have had 
difficulty identifying closely with. The degree of 
identity may have varied depending upon status, location 
or inclination, but men from Orkney to Liddisdale and 
from Islay to Lothian recognised James VI,as their king, 
both in theory and in practice. Men travelled the length 
of the country to attend the king's court, to s~ek a 
favour or petition there, or to attend to their business 
before the privy council, the parliament, the justice 
courts or the session and the other organs of royal 
administration and justice. The newly established 
protestant church of Scotland which grafted a more 
efficient and pervasive infra-structure onto the old 
episcopal system, added a more widely perceived link 
to those existing between individual localities and a 
common political and social heritage,. Finally, the law 
was the same , with mino,r exceptions ,throughout the 
country, and in Scots law men found a third pi.llar upon 
which the Scottish state rested. These three, king, 
church and law, built upon a collective memory of history 
and myth formed the basic understanding and recognition 
of the Scottish kingdom and would have'been shared in to 
some extent by its people •. 
116. 
Yet this was still a society in which the locality even 
more than the nation shaped one's loyalties and the course 
of one's life. The locality co~ld mean little more than a 
ramshakle cottage, or it could mean t.he vastness of the 
earl of Argyll's estates, it could mean the hard worked 
fields of a small independent laird or the bustling streets 
of the burgh. The locality was, at its most simple, home, 
and it was around it, along with God, kindred and lord 
that a man perceived his life. Home, livelihood, family, 
friends and enemies were, on the whole, to be found there. 
Nen might find the king to be a poor law enforcer, but of 
much more significance was whether the local lord was; 
they might find taxation oppressive, but again of more 
importance was whether one's neighbours were oppre~sive. 
What then was the locality? As has already been 
suggested the answer was largely an existential one; 
it depended upon who you were and where you lived. The 
earl of Huntly's beck yard was somewhat larger than that 
of John Knox of Ranfur1y and even his would be great 
when compared to the average tenant. or peasant. However, 
for many the locality was not as tangible as the ground 
one tilled, but was closely tied up with lord and kin, or 
with bLlrgh, so that the bonds of blood and dependence gave 
life to the skeletal form outlined by geography. Even 
the humblest of men could thus take pride in the name and 
lands of a lord Maxwell or earl of ~~r. To be Hume's, 
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Atholl's or Donald Gorm's man said as much about where a 
man lived as about who he took his orders from. There 
were exceptions, but if a man's name was Campbell and he 
lived in Argyll, one had more than his address. 
In a str~ctural sense the locality is more visible. 
It was castle or tower-house, baronial court, church, 
village, c~ltivated lands, grazing pasture, water and woods. 
Within this physical environment the cow~unity largely 
worked, worshipped, entertained itself, gave and took 
in marriage, was born and died. It was a community with 
much less need to look outside of itself than localities 
do today, though they were by no means islands cut off 
from one another. Except for the few whose horizons were 
greater or whose occupation took them further afie~d most 
men would also find that their frustrations, their conflicts 
and their enemies were also local, if not from within their 
own immediate community then from among its neighbours. 
Leaders of local society, lairds and noblemen, were, 
because of their positions of predominance, responsible 
for shaping the politics of the locality, and where their 
ambitions clashed with one another, feud became the politics 
of the locality. 
Land was of course the greatest source of conflict in 
pre-industrial society as for all;but a very few it or its 
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produce \'las the basis of wealth.l James VI himself 
recognised that the "mairt pairt" of feuds "haith arysen 
upoun contraversie of marches, teinds, or casting of faill 
and diwott, or s11ch lyk occasionis, the beginning wherof 
oftentymes carryed perhaps small schaw of inconvenience 
howeiver thay haif afterward tryed to bring very hard 
2 and troublesome, an:1 dangerous requellis and eventis." 
1. For a discussion of this question of territory throu~hout 
the animal kingdom see R.Ardrey, The Territorial Iml2erative, 
(London, 1970). J.K.Leyser identified inheritance laws as 
responsible for the fragmentation of land and as the main 
cause of the "perennial fe'.lds" and rebellions of the ninth 
century German aristocracy, Leyser, "The German Aristocracy 
from the Ninth to the early Twelfth century. A Historial 
and C'.lltural Sketch", in fast and Present 41, (1968), 
p 25-53. J.Larner drew attention to similar problems 
in fifteenth century Romagna in his article. "Order and 
Disorder in Romagnalt in L.V.I8rtines (ed.), Violence and 
Civil Disorder in Italian Cities. l2CO-150C, p 64; 
K. Nicholls shows the similar effect tanistry laws had 
in leading to feud and instability in Ireland, Nicholls, 
Gaelic and Gaelicised Ireland i the I'liddle A es, 
TDublin, 1972 , p 25; even in En~land with its more 
refined legal str'.lcture "technical flaws could nearly 
always be alleged or found", J.P .Cooper, "Patterns of 
Inheritance and Settlement by great landowners from the 
fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries", in Goody, Thirsk 
and Thomson (eds.), FaThilx and Inheritance, p 210. 
Also of some ase is E.Le Roy Laduerie, "A System of 
Customary Law: Family structures and Inheritance C!lStoms 
in Sixteenth Century France" in R.Forster and O.Ranun 
(eds.), Familx and Society, (Baltimore, 1976). Nor have 
such conflicts altogether disappeared from our~own 
society as Yablonsky has shown in his study of gangs in 
New York. Thus a gang member describes a territorial 
dispute, "You have a certain piece of land, so another 
club wants to take your land, in order to have more space, 
and so forth. They'll fi~ht you for it. If you win, you 
got the land; if you don't win, then they got your land. 
The person that loses is gonna get up another group, to 
help out, and then it starts up all over aC'ain." 
Yablonsky, "The Violent Gang" in Endleman {ed.) , Violence 
in the Streets, p 234. Glen makes similar observations 
for Glasgow, Glen, A Glasgow ·Jan~ Observed, p 90. 
2. R.P.C., viii, P 621. 
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Ownership of land was the cause of inumerable law-suits 
and a great many blood-feuds in a society which had not 
so developed its legal procedures and b1Lreaucracy that 
n:ost claims could. be substantiated on paper. Nor ",as 
t.here sufficient respect for the written word anyway 
to ensure that what was upheld in the court would be 
adhered to on the ground. Forgeries, badly worded charters, 
redeemable land contracts, enforced sa les ,. forfei tures, 
escheats and long memories all made the land market a 
source of continuous claiming and counter-claiming. 
In sixteenth century Scotland the feuding movement and 
the transfer of church lands, and in particular of teinds, 
to secular owners brought a whole new set of people and 
problems to land ownership. ~~ile much of this was settled 
in court or in peaceful out of court deals, a great many 
- men turned to the feud in pursuit of their interests. 
Just how many land disputes there were for this period 
is not known, but it was very high as even a survey of the 
number of ca:ltions in which men promise not to molest 
another man in certain lands could show.3 In 1587 the 
earl of Angus and lord Fleming submitted rival claims to 
the lands of Kilbacho to parliament in the hope that they 
could end a dispute begun dQring the years of Morton's 
regenoy but others did not agree to mediation so e8sily.4 
3. For example R.P.C., iii, p 675, Arohibald and Dundas. 
4. A.P.S., 111, p 472. , 
I 
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In 1591 a simmering dispute between the earl of Argyll and 
lord Ogilvy over the seignorie of Coupar abbey bley up when 
the master of Ogilvy, believing that the dean of the abbey 
was administering the abbey in Argyll's interests, began to 
intimidate him. Argyll immediately responded by sending his . 
own men with a contingent of Magre~ors and other outlaw 
bands Qllder his control on a series of retaliatory raids 
against the Ogilvies. During the late summer and early 
autumn of 1591 the raiding intensified with sixteen of 
lord Ogilvy's men being killed on one of them. Seeking 
revenge for this the master of Ogilvy led a party of men 
into Atholl where four Campbells were living under the 
protection of the earl of Atholl and slaughtered all four 
of them. Argyll, or more likely his tutor, John Campbell 
. of Cawdor, unleashed an even more severe raid, this time 
not with the objective of booty but to inflict punative 
destruction. Lord Ogilvy himself was almost captured and 
the Campbells turned on the country "with sic barbarous 
crueltie, not sparing wyffis and bairnis, bot murthourit 
and slew all quome they fund thairin,·to the mowmer of 
xvlll or xx personis" and stole a great amount of livestock. 5 
FUrthermore, the earl of Atholl was furious that his lands 
had been invaded and wes raising his own forces to use 
against Ogilvy. Recognising that the matter was getting 
very quickly out of hand in an area already de stabilised 
5. This is the more conservative estimate of deaths, 
another puts it as high as thirty. 
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by the Huntly-Stewart feud, the crown intervened. Both sides 
were ordered to assure one another and a committee was sent-
north on a fact finding mission and 'vlith a cOIrJTIission to 
arran~e a private settlement. However, ArJYll had been so 
angered at the murder of the four Campbells that he insisted • 
on taking the matter to court, and when the king blocked this 
because he wanted it settled out of court for political 
reasons of his own, Argyll ordered another raid. Annoyed' 
at Argyll's intransigence, the king gave permission to 
Ogilvy to execute two Magregors he had captured'in the raid. 
This only made Argyll all the more stubborn about a trial 
and he pushed ahead in spite of the king's wishes and only 
after weeks of manoeuvring and persuasion did he agree to 
drop the case if the matter were tried by the privy council. 
There, Argyll's outlaws, the master of Ogilvy Bnd all those 
who took part in the murder of the Campbells were denounced, 
both men were bound over in £20,000 and shortly afterwards 
the Ogilvies concerned went into banishment in England, 
Argyll's men being beyond the reach of anyone but himself.6 
Apart from showing some sUrprisingly efficient government 
action at what was a bad time for the crown, and the foolishness 
of a man like lord Ogilvy feuding with Argyll, the case shows 
how in a few weeks a feud could erupt from peaceful competition 
into violent conflict. However this was not just a highland 
problem. In 1579 the first lord Torpichen died and in his 
6. R.P.C., iv, p 682-84, p ,687-88; C.S.P. Scot., x, p 566-57, 
p 569-70, p 572-73, 575, 585. 
122. 
will made over to his wife the heritable rights to the Halyards 
in Lothian, "Jhich, by a second disposition, he had also 
granted by feuferm or for rental to the tenants and labourers 
of the land " ••• and that fraudf'.lllie to collect in great 
so'Wmes of money". His wife later married John 3raham, a 
senator of the college of justice, and she transferred her 
rights to the lands to him. By exploiting his position 
Graham was able to have the rights of the tenants nullified 
by the college, but it was later discovered that one of 
the notaries working on the case had been bribed into 
fixing some of the evidence by Graham's brother. \{hen the 
matter was investigated all sorts of damaging loopholes 
were found in lord Torpichen's other rents and in those 
of his tutor, Sir James Sandi1ands. The notary was hung, 
. but while Graham escaped intact, he had incurred the wrath 
of the Sandilands family and a feud broke out which 
event11ally lead to his death in 1593 in the golf club 
incident described above, and to the involvement of the 
duke of Lennox and his o'Wn chief, the earl of Montrose, 
before it was settled in 1599.7 
In the highlands there was certainly more opportunity 
for old fashioned baronial expansion. Since 1518 the 
Glengarry ¥~cDonalds and the Mackenzies of Kintail had 
been skirmishing over the rights to Loch8lsh, Lochcarron 
7. tltstorie, p 265-67, Spottiswoode, History, p 437; 
Birrel, "Diary", p 29. 
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and Lochbroom which had been shared between the chiefs of 
the two clans. However in 1582 Kintail stepped up the feud 
when his brother captured Glengarry himself in his home. 
The unfortunate chief was dragged around the countryside 
and over thirty of his kinsmen and servants were also taken • 
by the 14ackenzies who 11 ••• band thair handes with thair awin 
sarkis, and cruellie and unmercifullie, under promise of 
sauftie of thair lyffes, caussit murther and slay thame with 
dirkis, appointing that thay suld not be bureit as Christian 
men, bot cassin furth and eitten be dOiggis and swyne" while 
one of Glengarry's principal friends was not put to a 
"simple death", but "to buitt thame in his blude and be a 
strange exemple to satisfie thair cruell and 'lnnaturall 
heartis, first cutt of his handis, nixt his feit, ~nd last 
his heid, and, having cassin the some in a peitpott, exposit 
and laid out his carage to be a prey for doiggis and revenus 
beistis:". Jlengarry himself was eventually freed and his 
own men committed equally cruel deeds over the next twenty 
years, but the Mackenzies had taken the initiative and 
were to keep it with the disputed lands event~lly being 
8 
conceded by the much weakened Glengarry clan. 
Women landowners were a particularly vulnerable target 
for s~ch aggression. Many banas of caution concern women 
8. R.P.C., iii, p505-06 and others for the rest of the feud. 
See also Jregory,' History of the ~.Jestern Islands and 
liighlands, p 218. 
124. 
who required protection from neighbours or more commonly 
from sons, if they were a widow, or from former husbands 
if they were divorcees. In 1588 William Johnstone complained 
to the privy council that ten years before, his mother had 
obtained, a decreet upholding her rights to the lands of 
Wamphray which his elder brother had been keeping her from 
since 1567, but that the decree had never yet been put into 
effect. Three years later lady Wamphray was still trying' 
to get her lands back and it is not known if she ever did.9 
Dame Jane Hamilton complained that her estranged husband, 
the earl of Eglinton, was molesting her tenants and had 
refused to infeft her in lands promised to her and that 
"he being a grit man and Judge in the ,cuntrie quhair he 
duellis, sche can get na remeid nor redress againis him 
by way of captioun or atherwyise as he war ane privat 
10 persounll • Nor were such problems ended with divorce as 
lady Innermeith discovered when her former husband, 
James Gray, the younger brother of the master of Gray, 
gathered his friends and kinsmen and'attacked her lands 
and occupied Reidcastle, her home. 11 ' Women, particularly 
powerful ones, were not defenceless hovlever. The countess 
of Erroll was just one who had to give caution that she 
would not harm one of her male neighbours and lady Ross 
similarly agreed to leave 01iver Sinc1air in Renfrew in 
9. 'R.P.C., iv, p 273-74, P 654-55. 
10. R.P.C., ii, p 303-04. 
11. R.P.C., iii, P 125, 155, 171-72, 188-89, 211, 217-18, 
p 230, 276, 278, 361. 
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12 peace. Others went further and in 1616 lady Howpaslot 
and her friend. Jean Scott of Satchellis held "a Course of 
War" when they discovered that Douglas of Drumlangrig had 
acquired the property of Howpas10t by toJadset. There they 
decided on a course of action which led to them hiring some 
local ruffians who went and slaughtered a great number of 
Drumlangrigts sheep before they were· caught and hung.13 
HO"lever few women could hit back in this way and, unless 
they could find protection in marriage, they often found 
themselves the victims of territorial ambitions. 
As one might expect, many disputes arose over march 
land betw.een two landowners, for while the land itself 
was usually of no economic importance, any infringement 
of it was seen as a test of a mants willingness to defend 
more valuable properties. Thus one finds the earl of 
Perth and lord Livingston feuding over march lands in 
Mentieth in 1615. Both these men were courtiers but they 
were both willing to risk the king's. disapproval for the 
. 14 
sake of marginal lands on the periphery of their estates. 
Such a matter was as important to them as it was to obscure 
lairds like Haig and Halyburton who in 1610 were called to 
account for their feuding over similar marches between 
12. R.P.C., iv, p 383, p 315. 
13. Pitcairn, Qriminal Trials, iii, p 380-89. 
14.· R.P.C., x, p 362. 
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their lands. lS 
It was not just among landowners that SllCh problems 
arose for landowners and tenants misht also take to arms 
to defend their interests. When the earl of Atholl tried 
to dispossess Campbell of Glenorchy from his land of 
Drwnmancrieff in Perthshire which the latt.er held on a 
tack of twice nineteen years, Glenorchy resisted. Atholl 
threw out Glenorchy's tenants and prevented him from drawing 
rents and when Glenorchy took the matter to Perth sheriff 
court and was awarded six cows in compensation Atho~l's 
men simply stole them back again.16 Only a few years 
previously Atholl had signed a bond with Glenorchy a,~reeing 
to help him force Menzies of that Ilk to give him back lands 
he and his family had previously held from ~1enzies· but 
from which Menzies had ejected him.17 
The uncertainty of the ownership of teinds or tithes 
payable on old church lands was an additional source of 
conflict in the later sixteent~ century. The problem 
became especially acute in the late summer when the 
"leading of the teinds", their ingathering, took place, 
15. R.P.C., ix, p 8. This is of course a fairly common 
phenomena, e.g. see Larner, "Order and Disorder in 
Romagna" in Martines (ed.), Violence and Civil Disorder, 
p 40-41, IIFrom time to time private wars over boundary 
disputes and rights of pasturage would break out between 
rural communes and even on the plains, boundary disputes 
·at harvest time were likely to lead to killings between 
communities." 
16. R.P.C., iv, p 687. 
17. Brown, "Bonds of Manrent", appendix, p 546, no 73. 
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and both sides turned up armed and ready to prevent the 
other from collecting that tenth of the harvest under 
dispute. This happened in 157~ in Perth when lord Ruthven 
and Bruce of Clackmannan both appeared with their men to 
collect the teinds "quhairupon grit blude shed, deidlie 
reid and utheris inconvenientis happynnit ••• 11. 18 Thus 
in the following year the government pre-empted any such 
recurrence of the fighting and appointed a neutral man 
to gather the teinds until their ownership was decided. 
In a similar feud between lord Oliphant and Nontcrieff 
of that Ilk in 1580 the crown appropriated the teinds 
from lord 01iphant,19 but when in 1619 two' of the king's 
guard were sent to the parish of Greenlaw to collect a 
stack of teinds, ownership of which was bej.ng disputed by 
Hume of Co1denknowes and Hume of }~nderston, they were 
only partially successful as ColdenknOloles and his friends 
made up what they considered to be their loss from the 
. 20 . 
threshed victual in Manderston's barns. Nor was the crown 
able to prevent the treasurer, lord Ruthven, and the master 
of Oliphant coming to blows o~er disputed teinds in an 
incident which left a number of men dead and wounded. 21 
A more detailed look at one teind confrontation shows 
just how potentially dangerous such situations could be. 
18. R.P.C., ii, p 273. 
19. R.P.C., iii, p 311. 
20. R.P.C., xii, p 81, P 89. 
21. R.P.C., iii, P 329; Historie, p 180; Pitcairn, 
Criminal rrrials, i, part 2, p 89-92. 
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In this case no violence took place and the question was 
settled on a short term basis by neighbours in the locality; 
but the brinkmanship involved was highly risky and could 
very easily have ended otherwise. The earl of Cassillis 
had been in the practice of employing the laird of Bargany 
to act as tacksman in the collection of the teinds of the 
lands of Girvanmains while similarly·using the laird of 
Girvanmains on Bargany's lands. However, he was not 
satisfied with the procedure, possibly suspecting that 
the two lairds had come to some arrangement of their own 
which was reducing his returns and he obtained a decreet 
against them while secretly preparing to go and uplift 
the teinds himself. Unfortunately the two lairds found 
out about his plans in advance and convened their own 
forces, posting them within their enclosures so that the 
earl could not gain entry without a fight. Frustrated by 
this, Cassillis went home and obtained a further decreet 
against one of Bargany's tenants which allowed him to 
intromit with the man's entire standing crop. This time 
his men did arrive unsuspected but they had only shorn 
half the crop when Bargany appeared with a larger force 
and some carts and took the corns away with him. With a 
fine display of Sabbitarianism both sides let the next 
day, a S~day, pass without incident, and on the Monday 
Cassillis led out a much bigger force to collect the 
remainder of·the crop. Again, though, Bergany beat him 
129. 
to it and 'Was entrenched 'Within the enclosures and the walls 
of the yard and houses 'With six hundred horsemen, two hundred 
hagbutters and a number of basses (a long light weight canon) 
'Where he was joined by lord Ochiltree with another hundred 
horsemen. Cass i11is could easily outn..unber thi"s, but seeing • 
Bargany's tactical advantage Bnd the number of guns he had 
with him, he was reluctant to order an attack. Fortunately, 
lord Cathcart was either sent for or turned up ~nd he was' 
able to arrange a settlement which saved face all round and 
prevented what could have been a very bloody incident. Thus, 
the Kennedy historian tells us, Bargany went home, Cassillis 
took possession of his lands and John l-1acAlexander, the tenant, 
"schoir his cornis in peace". It was a fortunate escape for 
all involved and any thoughts that it 'Was all a matter of 
bluff and counter-blurf ought to be dispelled by the fact 
that Bargany and a number of his men 'Were cut down a fe'W 
years later when they were overwhelmed by the earl and his 
forces. 22 
The question of land ownership and the rights to what 
grew on it were thus a significant factor in deciding the 
politics of a locality, creatin3 enmity where none had 
existed and forcing men into friendships to co:mter their 
enemies. Yet it was not just the land itself which could 
divide a locality, it was only one, though the major one, 
of a number of natural resources. Peters' point that 
22. Pitcairn, Kennedy, p 36-38. 
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"feud is competition for preferential access to natural 
resources" and that "as long as these natural resources 
are scarce and competition continues, the pattern of fe~ding 
stays" is a simplistic but relevant argument. 2.3 Though less 
important than arr.ong Peters' Bedoiun, water was one silch 
important natural resource over which reen competed. In 
Scotland water was not scarce and it was not for drinking 
that men fought over it but as a source of energy and of . 
, .' 
fish. In 1609 Innes of Innermarcky aftd Innes~of Blackhills 
were warned not to make convocation of their men in order 
to pursue their quarrel over the bigging of a mill dam and 
the bishop of Moray was asked to intervene and rnediate. 24 
Lundy of Balgony was warned not to b~ild a darr. on a part 
of the Water of Leven as the ownership of it was being 
contested by lady Bass whose armed men had also been seen 
at the site.25 Lord Oliphant complained that the master of 
Tullibardine had brought his armed men to his mill dam and 
destroyed it and in 1588 Tait of Adamhil1 complained that 
Wallace of Cragy had blocked his passage to a water-gang 
and a mill dam. 26 
Peats were another natural resource nei~hbours fell 
out over. When Heymes of that Ilk and Scott of Balwery 
set about gathering their men to gather certain "turves" 
2.3. Black-Hichaud, Q'1hesive Force, p xxvii. 
24. R.P.C., viii, p .320, p 589. 
25. R.P.C. , x, p 657-58. 
26. 1i~, ix, p 2.35; iv, p .328. 
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or peats and a skirmish looked likely, the privy council 
heard of it and sent the sheriff of Fife to collect them 
until their ownership was decided. Thirty years later, 
in 1615, the earl Marischal and Douglas of Glenbervie had 
a similar dispute and were also warned off by the crown, 
but in 1621 events in the locality ran ahead of privy council 
intelligence. The Douglas lairds of Drumlangrig and Cashogle 
argued over the rights to the raising of the peats of the 
Moss of Knockonie which were claimed,by the latter, even 
though they lay on theJlands of Drijmlangrig's brother. 
Cashog1e had formerly been allowed to raise the peats as 
a favour but that right had been withdrawn when he and the 
Drwn1angrig Doug1ases had fallen out over some small matter. 
However, his insistence in continuing to raise the peats was 
more serious. On two occasions his servants \Olere turned away 
from the l-!oss, but on the third occasion he went himself 
with a larger force of armed men. Dr~langrig turned up 
with his own men to stop him and fighting broke out in the 
course of which one of Drum1angrig's younger brothers 
suffered a severe head wound while Ceshogle's son lost en 
ear, one of his men was killed and a number of others 
uff d 1 d 27 s ere ance woun s. 
Fixed property could also be the cause of such local 
feuding. On the borders the Humes and Kerrs contested the 
27. Chambers, Domestic Annals, i, p 520-21; Pitcairn, 
Criminal Trials, iii, p 500-01. 
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ownership of Spie1aw cast1e and on one day turned up in 
force and the fight which followed caused "the breaking of 
many staves a nd shot of many I pistol1is "' .28 In 1600-01 
Brl1.ce of C1ackmannan and Bruce of Fingast fought over the 
ownership of a house and a number of men were hurt and 
one killed before Fingast, the rightful owner, finally 
29 burned the house down. In 1613 the lairds of Largo and 
Cambo came close to breaking the pe$ce of their locality . 
over some coal fields and the commendator of Cambuskenneth 
and Hurray of Touchadam were at odds over some stones in 
the mouth of the Doven Water.30 
Nor was the sacred exempt from being the object of 
such profane struggles. A" common source of tension in a 
community was the seating in the local kirk which .was 
becoming too small for the number of lairds in a locality 
who thought that they ought to have the place of honour 
there. Andrew Wood of Largo and Robert Lundy of Ba1gony 
feuded over a seat in Largo kirk for over a decade during 
which time Largo destroyed the seat installed by his rival, 
both men defied the local presbytery and the crown and so 
disrupted church life that it was unable to meet for 
worship.31 Similar disputes took place between Kerr of 
Cessford and Haig of Bemerside in 1599 'and between Sir 
28. C.B.P., i, p 460. 
29.·B.P~~, vi, P 167, p 197-98. 
30. H.P.C., x, p 5, p 27; viii, p 158. 
31. R.P.C., vii, p 424 through to refs in R.P.C., x. 
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John Wood of Fettercairn and Stratoun of Lauriston from 
1612 to at least 1622.32 In fact as a place of meeting and 
one of the focal points of the community, the church and 
its yard was oft.en the place of confrontation on Sabbath 
mornings. In 1591 John Hoppringle of Muirhouse and his 
followers went to the churchyard of stow and killed there 
a David Taylor with whom they had a quarrel. In 1612 the 
Lochie and Hair famil:i.es lined up in the kirkyard for an . 
affray and only the intervent~on of the deputy sheriff of 
Dumfries prevented bloodshed.33 Nor were ministers immune 
from the dangers of feud. In 1576 the kirk in Ancrum 
divided when the minister refused to baptise the child 
of a man whom he said kept images in his house and when 
the mother died shortly afterwards, supposedly of grief, 
"the husband conceived a deadly feud against the Minister.,,34 
Other ministers sought protection in acts of caution and 
32. C.S.P. Scot., xiii, part 1, p 373; R.P.C., x, p 208. 
33. R.P.C., ix, p 490. This same point is made by C.Haigh, 
~rmation and Resistance In Tudor Lancashire, (C.U.P., 
1975), P 53-54, "The church was the only place where 
enemies were almost certain to meet, and this is one 
reason why conflicts between families often revolved 
around ownership of a pew in a church or chapel." Nor 
was this a new problem in Scotland as the fifteenth 
century Scottish church was also frequently 'violated 
by the effusion of blood t. I.B.Cowan, "Church and ~ 'l, 
Societt' in Brown (ed.), Scottish Society in the Six~eenth 
~ntucr, p 113, is also illuminating. 
34. The Booke of the Universall Kirk of Scotland: Acts and 
Proceedin1s of the 3eneral Assemblies of the Kirk of 
Scotland from the Year MDLX, ed. T.Thomson, 3 vols., 
'[Maitland Club, Edinburgh, 1839-45), i, p 364. 
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in 1595 a George Eure was hanged for killing t"10 ministers. 35 
However some ministers could strike back and a number of them 
had to find caution not to harm their neighbours. 36 What one 
does not really find, in spite of Professor Donaldson's 
assertion of the contrary, are feuds over religious issues 
and a common complaint by observers was that "never a 
nobleman will countenance the ministry, such excepted as has 
private quarrels to debate that will be contented for some 
time to receive their assistance for palliation of their 
. 37 proper designs". 
Many feuds however were concerned with less rational 
objectives. In 1579 1-1acLean of Dowart went to the isle of 
Giga and there "maist cr~lellie, barbaruslie, and unmercifullie 
murdreist and slew nyne of the maist honest men within the 
said y1e ••• " and" ••• not satiat thairwith, tressonabillie 
rasit fyir and brint and distroyit the houssis and cornis 
on most of the island". Very often such raids began with 
cattle as the object.ive and cattle raiding was common in 
both the highlands and on the borders, but the aim of 
cattle raiding or any other f~rm of raid with an economic 
objective was not destruction on this sort of scale. 
35. Balfour, Sir James, "Annales of Scotland", The Hist.orical 
Wor~8 of Sir James Balfour (ed.) J.Haig, (Edinburgh,1824-
25), i, P 397. ' 
36. For example, R.P.C., iv, p 120, p132. 
37. G.Dona1son, ~and, James V-VII, (Edinburgh, 1971), 
'p 40; C.S.P.Scot., xiii, p 557. The only vag~ely religious 
feud was a duel fought in Edinburgh between two men, one 
of them argued that there were seven sacraments, the other 
"but two, or else he would fight". Both men died. Birrel, 
"Diary", p 42; Chambers, Domestic Annals, vol i, p 285. 
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Raiding was part of the economy of such a society but very 
often it got out of hand and was fol1o\o/ed by an escalated 
response, as happened in 1579 between MacLean and the earl 
of Argyll who seemed to be indulging in mutual destruction 
t 38-for no apparen reason. Of course there might be no more 
reason for s!lCh feuding than oppressive bullying. Thus 
William Dunbar of B1antyre complained that William Hamilton 
of Sanquhar "having consavit ane deidlie hettrent and malice 
causles" against him went to his house one night and broke 
in intending to harm him, but not finding him t.here he set 
about wrecking the house.39 In this case Senquhar himself 
did not even know what the feud was about.· Similarly between 
1598-1602 George Eurray of Brouchton suffered a series of 
attacks from Stewart of Garleis and his friends during which 
time five attempts were made on his life, one of his servants 
. ~ 
was mutilated, horses were stolen and property damaged. 
Again Brouchton did not seem to be aware of any reason for 
such attacks and Garleis's behaviour seems to simply be that 
of an oppressive neighbour who liked to throw his weight 
around. There is an obvious problem here in whether such cases 
are in fact feuds since only one side appears to be actively 
feuding, but Blantyre described Sanquhar's attacks 8S feud 
and so one must accept that they were indeed feuds, however 
reluctant and passive one side might be. 
38. R.P.C., ii, p 94-95, p 135. 
39. R.P.C., iii, p 187. 
40 • .R.P•C., vi, p 405-06. 
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Feuds over jurisdictions were, however, more com~on and 
are more identifiable. \~hile lordship was essentially a 
cohesive force in society, where it was in doubt it could 
also be destructive. The Kennedy kin in south Ayrshire 
were throughout this period in a state of almost constant 
feud over questions of lordship d~e to a combination of 
circumstances in the Cassillis earldom of Carrick. In one 
clash between the young earl and his uncle, the master of 
Cassillis, the latter slew a dependant of the earl's because 
he had accepted a grant of land from him in opposition to 
the master's own nominee. On another occasion the 
independently minded laird of Bargany broke into the 
house of another of Cassillis's dependants, infuriating 
the earl who vowed "to be evin" with Bargany since "my Lord 
thocht the samin done to him", while the sons of the laird 
. thought the earl "owr reir cumit thairof to craiff thair 
bluid" and determined to kill him instead. 41 ~Jhen Cassillis 
began evicting many of his kindly tenants in Galloway he 
found his lordship further questioneq and the Galloway men 
agreed that "quhome on that ewer me Lord beganne to 
dispossess, that thay suld all defend him, with thair horse.", 
which they did, trapping the earl in one of his castles and 
forcing him to make a number of concessions. 42 Cassillis's 
problems were perhaps worse than most, the presence of a 
powerful cadet branch of the Kennedy kin in the house of 
41. Pitcairn,· Kennedy, p 28-29, p 21-22. 
42. ibid, p 30-35. 
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Bargany and of a number of extremely tough minded characters 
compounded th~ strains already being put on lordship by 
changing economic and social conditions and the usual 
difficulties which followed a minority situation, but they 
were not unique to him and the powerful.Campbell kin was 
experiencing similar problems in Argyll. Like Cassillis, 
the earl of Argyll eventually came out on top and re-
established his authority by a mixture of force and persuasion, 
though in Argyll's case it took most of his life to achieve 
it, and even then his relations with his dependants remained 
a little sour. 43 
-,Other lords' difficulties with dependants brought them 
into clashes with their neighbours as D. dependant sought 
to free himself from one lord and seek better terms from 
another. In 1613, Argyll accidentally uncovered some old 
charters ,,,hich gave him rights of lordship over Alan MacDonald 
Duy in Lochaber, and after seme discussion with MacDonald 
the latter agreed to accept the terms of the charters. 
Ho,,,ever, this infuriated Argyll's old enemy, Huntly, 
who had traditionally exerted control over Lochaber, and 
he refused to accept MacDonald's excuses that his agreement 
with Argyll was really only an economic one and that his 
loyalty to Huntly was never in question. Hunt1y then sent 
43. For a discussion of the Carnpbell situation see E.J.Cowan, 
. "Clanship, kinship and the Carnpbell acq:lisition of Islay", 
in S.H.R., iviii, 2: No 166: Oct. 1979, p 130ff. 
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his son, the earl of Enzie, to dispossess MacDonald and put 
others in his place, but 11acDonald called a meeting of these 
men and others among his kinsmen and told them that he 
understood the pressure Huntly had put them under, but that 
everything could be settled if they remained united, However,. 
they insisted that. he go and see Huntly himself and sort it 
out with the marquis. MacDonald went to Edinburgh for legal 
advice and while he was there these men turned against him' 
and plotted to make theJr peace with H'lntly at his expense. 
He therefore went home, gathered his most trusted friends and 
tricked these others into an ambush where around twenty of 
them were slaughtered. His victory was short-lived though 
'-' 
as Huntly ~nleashed his forces against him, and with Argyll 
too busy on the west coast, ~~cDonald was soon reduced to 
the role of an outlaw. It was the sort of firm handling which 
was so typical of Huntly and which earned him a reputation 
for violence, but it was the sort of action which made his 
lordship so strong and effective.44 
In 1618 a similar revolt faced the earl of Sutherland 
and his tutor, Sir Robert Gordon, when t.he earl of Caithness 
began to undermine his authority over Macky of Strathnaver. 
Caithness and V~ckay met secretly and agreed to smash the 
clan Gun who operated as Sutherland's hit men in the feud 
with Caithness, something Meckay wos happy to participate 
in as he felt that Sutherland had been excluding him from 
44. R.P.C., x, p 818-20. 
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his council. Word of this was soon leaked to Sutherland who 
let it be known ~at he would defend the clan Gun and he 
offered them territory closer to his base at Dlnrobin. 
Mackay responded by committing himself even further to 
Caithness and promised to carry out a murder for him. 
Sutherland's problems were exacerbated when John Gordon of 
Enbo fell out with Sir Robert over the possession of certain 
teinds and joined with Hackay against his overlord. Both· 
sides began preparing for fighting and a number,of instances 
of probing brinkmanship followed. However, Caithness was 
virtually impossible to work with and his suspicions of 
Mackay persuaded the latter that he had probably done enough 
to persuade Sutherland to accept him back on improved terms, 
and in fact the earl readily agreed to arbitration, he being 
in a very ansound financial position and unable to sustain 
yet another long feud. Enbo,however, was excluded from the 
agreement, it being thought "ane evill exemple, that the 
Earle of Southerland his owne vassallis should come under his 
other vassalls protection and accord'i, and he was removed 
from SUtherland along with any. others who had joined 
Mackay.45 
That there should be feuds over lordship is not really 
surprising; it was one of the principal sinews of power 
both in national and in local politics. The more men 
one had at one's call, the more powerful one was, and 
45. Gardon, Sutherlanq, p 354. 
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to steal another man's support not only increased one's 
own status in the locality but reduced that of one's 
competitors. It was something which dependants like Mackay 
were as aware of as their lords and it was thus a lever 
to be used when they became dissatisfied with t.he kind of 
lordship they were getting for their support. ¥~ckay had 
backed Sutherland for years against Caithness, but in return 
he felt that he had been left on the outside by the Gordons 
and·that his own personal interests were being ignored. 
Caithness offered the prospect of·· a change which rdght 
bring better returns for his investment or at the least 
it was a way of putting pressure on Sutherland and his 
advisors. For Caithness, as for Argyll in the previous case, 
it was all part of a wider regional struggle in which ~~ckay 
. could change the balance of power just as the shifting of 
Lochaber to Argyll could. In neither case did the opposing 
earls come int.o conflict, though in other instances such 
manipulations did bring the principals to blows, but clearly 
such exploitation of lordship was destabilising and disruptive 
in their localities. 
Yet the feuding which could break out between lord and 
dependant and between lord and lord over dependants. should 
not persuade one that it was a~ less stable a means of 
exerting power in a locality than through the official 
channels provided by the king and his government. Royal 
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offices and commissions were as much a source of local pre-
dominance as land or men since many of them brought additional 
authority to the holder, both in giving him the right to command 
others in the locality and the opportunity to exploit their 
loyalty to the king for his own purposes,while also ensurin~ • 
that his actions were largely within the law and that those 
wo opposed him were opposing the king himself. Such commissions 
could give a man enormous political advantage and alter t.he 
power balance in a locality in his direction even if few of 
them actually gave him any more immediate power in the sense 
of more land or royal soldiers to command. The fact that 
the king could not pay his officials and control or govern 
the localities through men in his employ meant that he had 
to put his trust in men who were already powerful in a locality 
and could effectively do the job for him. In effect,the king 
was forced to take sides in the politics of a locality while 
local fac~ions had to have their connections at court to 
ensure that they, and not their enemies or rivals, received 
the king's favour. The court side of this equation is 
explored later, but in the localities themselves, the struggle 
to hold a bailley court or the practice of exploiting the 
sheriff's office was no different from the more publicised 
feuds to control the great offices of state and to.exploit 
them. 46 
46. Even in England. it has been argued that "the order 
keeping forces of the state remained largely in 
private hands", Jemes "Politics and Honour", p 43-44. 
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Holding court, ~hether baronial, bailley or whatever, 
on the land of a man who clo~ned exemption from its a~thority 
was a common cause of friction. S~lch a situation arose when 
either the holder of the office sought to extend his influence 
in a locality or when another man felt that his prestige had 
now grown sufficiently for him to be slighted by being ~nder 
the jurisdiction of one who he refused to acknowledge as 
his social superior by submitting to his court's authority .• 
Thus, in 1612 a quarrel broke o~t between Angus an~ Ker of 
Fernihirst over th~ holding of a court on the former's lands 
by Fernihirst whp claimed that he did so as heritable bailley 
to certain of the earl's lands. t·rnen Angus turned up to stop 
him challen~es were exchanged and an u~ly scene was narrowly 
avoided. 47 In 1598 the tenants of the lordship of Coupar 
took the earl of Atholl and lord Ogilvy to court because they 
were tired of being the object of a feud between them as to 
who had bailley rights to Coupar. 48 On another occasion it 
was reported that "some discontents wer lyke to breed a greate 
deall of mischeiffe" between the marquis of Hamilton and the 
master of Ogilvy over the holding of bailley courts in the 
regality of Arbroath. 49 Nor was it just bailley courts which 
. 
were a source of trouble as even an admi~alty court in 
47. R.P.C., ix, p 372-74, p 394, p 398-400; x, p 156. 
48. S.R.O., Airlie Muniments, G.D. 16/41/108. This feud 
is first mentioned in 1593 when fighting first took 
place and it was still unsettled under Athol1's S11ccessor 
'in 1606. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 102; R.P.C., v, p 523, p 552; 
G.D. 16/417129, S.R.O., G.D. 16/417I34. 
49. Balfour, "Anna1es", ii, p54. 
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Galloway could bring men to confrontation as in 1600 when 
Gordon of Lochinvar' 8 son took con:mand. of Lochryane and 
held court there in his father's name in spite of an order 
from the crown to desist from doing so until the feud with 
Kennedy of Bargany over these admiralty rights were settled. • 
In fact this feud, which is first mentioned in 1580, was 
still causing rumblings of discontent in 1615. 50 
The manner in which s'lch courts and other commissions 
and" offices were exploited explains why so much effort was 
put into acquiring them. Men were expected to mani~u1ate 
such positions in their own interests, and even if they 
did not, others would claim that they had in order to 
discredit them. Sheriffs were a prime object of s'~ch 
attacks. Thomas CUIDing of Altir was able to present 
sufficient evidence, real or contrived, to persuade the 
government that he should be exempted from the authority 
of James Danbar of Cumnock, the sheriff of Elgin, because 
of the deadly feud between them. However,this did not 
stop Cumnock who arrested one of Altir's servants and 
executed him for theft and. even after being denounced by 
the privy council he continued to exercise his office and 
to feud with Altir.51 In 1596 Kirkpatrick of Closeb'xrn 
complained that the sheriff of Dumfries, Crichton of Sanquhar, 
50. R.P.C., iii, p 317; vi, p 84, p 87-88; x, p 394, p 622. 
51. R.P.C., iv, p 283-84. In 1619 Cumnock's s~ccessor, 
James D'~nbBr of i-!estfield signed a disposition which 
referred to the "inimitie and deadly feud standing 
onreconceillit betuix me and my predecesseuris and 
James Cuming of Altar.", Cuming H.S., H.M.C. vi, p 688. 
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had broken off friendship with him and intended to exploit 
his authority against him. In particular the sheriff had 
bonded with his enemy, Douglas of Drumlangrig, wit~ whom 
Sanquhar had agreed to "giff up kyndnes with the said 
Thomas and prosequute his haitrent and malice aganis him 
as thair commoun enemy with all extremitie." Since the 
agreement had been made Sanquhar had already taken one of 
Closeburn's men prisoner, and when he had sent another to 
him with a missive, he had executed the man for alleged 
theft. The council responded more positively this time, 
or were more able to, arrested Sanquhar and discharged 
Kirkpatrick from his jurisdiction. 52 
A much greater scandal of this sort took place in 
Aberdeen in 1616. A feud had broken out between members 
. of the Gordon and Hay kins following the murder of a 
uordon by a Francis Hay. Gordon of Gight gathered together 
a party of armed men on hearing of this and rode off to 
the home of the Hays of Brunthill who had reset the killer. 
There the Gordons broke in, badly beat up the three HaY. 
brothers who lived there and captured Francis. He was 
then dragged off to Aberdeen, to John Gordon of Clubbisgoull, 
52. R.P.C., v, p 378-79. Closeburn was in fact SaI~uhar's 
deputy-sheriff. A few years before Closeburn and 
Drumlangrig quarrelled as the latter had acquiTed a 
new commission of justiciary which clashed with 
Closeburn's, to "cullour and cloik the wicked and 
rnischivous deidis" of his men, and a number of 
confrontations followed. R.P.C., iv, p 735. 
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Huntly's deputy-sheriff of Aberdeen, and a trial was staged 
in which the assize was composed of Gordons and their supporters 
and Hay's lawyer was warned not to appear. Not surprisingly 
he was found guilty and was taken out into the.nearest backyard 
and slaughtered in a badly messed up execution, his corpse 
being left there horribly mangled. 53 What infuriated the 
earl of Erroll here was not that his man had been executed 
by the deputy-sheriff of Aberdeen for a crime of which he 
was in fact guilty, but the manner in which it had been done. 
The form of law may have been observed, but the killing was 
considered an act of feud, every bit as much as it would 
have been had Gight and his ~en killed Fran6is.Hay where 
they found him. 
It was not only sheriffs who exploited their offices in 
'this way. In 1576 the earl of Cassillis (the fourth earl, 
of Crossmaguel fame) went with two hundred men to the home 
of George Cory where they broke in, took him and his brother 
prisoner and stole most of his movable valuables. For two 
weeks the Cory brothers were held in various prisons on 
Cassillis's authority as bailley of Carrick. An order from 
the council telling him to free them was ignored and only 
after further lobbying by their friends did the earl agree 
to bring them before the council for a more impartial 
ruling on their fate. 54 In 1593 Robert Galbraith of Culcreuch 
conspired with the laird of Buchanan to get a co~mission 
53. R.P.C., x, p 496. 
54. R.P.C., ii, p 486-88. 
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against the 11agregor clan, but which they both exploited to 
oppress the r~cAulay clan with whom they had private 
quarrels. 55 In 1608 the earl of Crawford's commissions 
were suspended when it became apparent that he intended 
to use them to pursue his feud with Sir David Lindsay of 
Edzell whose son had killed the earl's brother. 56 However, 
not everyone was sQccessful in overturning or being 
exempted from the commissions of their neighbours and 
-' 
occasionally the government saw through what was simply 
an attempt to manipulate evidence to weaken a rival in 
the locality. 57_; 
It was all just part of the jost1ine for power which 
went on in e very locality as men sought to be pre-eminent 
among their neighbours. It was beneficial to the crown 
in that it allowed the king to intrude on a locality 
without having to insist on doing so, and it provided 
central government with a free intelligence system as 
men made the trip to Edinburgh to complain about the 
goings on of their neighbours. On the other hand it 
tended to mean that the privy council, which dealt with 
... 
most of this business, was usually at the mercy of whoever 
was last to submit a complaint and hence the incessant 
issuing, suspending of and re-issuing of commissions. 
The king and -his officials rarely had what one might call 
55. 
56. 
'57. 
R.P.C., 
R.P.C., 
1b.EJh, 
v, p 74-76. 
viii, p 117-18. 
vi, p 227-28. 
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an objective view of a locality but one or a number of 
partisan ones which they had to try and evoluate,remembering 
that the councillors were themselves local men with local 
interests and \oJith political debts to pay. Except on very 
rare occasions, the locality was thus the preserve of 
private interests and even royal offices within it became 
the prey to those interests and subsequently the cause of 
disorder and violence and not the peace they were intended· 
to enforce. 
In looking at feuds over economic objectives, like land 
and water rights-~ or the political value of royal commissions 
and offices, one is dealing with feuds between neighbouring 
corporate groups which are distinct from one another on the 
grounds of their allegiance to a specific lord and .to a 
specific kin. However, just as the lord-dependant relationship 
could fracttlI'e and result in feud, so could that bet'oJeen 
kinsmen. The clan or kindred was one of the major constituent 
elements of a locality; hence the politics of the kin itself 
affected the politics of the entire locality. In fact feuds 
within the kindred accounted for something between 10-15% 
of all feuds. A kindred, such as the Cunningharns with the 
earl of Glencairn as their chief, or the Karrs with the laird 
of Cessford as theirs, was not a monolithic interest in a 
loca1ity, blindly following a chief and working in unison, 
for relations within the kin could break down and often res~t 
in feuds everY bit as violent and destructive as those between 
kindreds. The reasons could be exactly the same as those 
already described; land, natural resources, prest.ise, 
lordship, jurisdictions etc., but in a context where 
"so far from acting as a protection against discord, 
community of blood often intensifies the bitterness of 
family quarrels, and the most violent hatred of which 
human nature is capable occurs between brothers and 
58 
sometimes even between father and son". i>.Tbether the 
later sixteenth century was any worse in seeing this kind 
of feuding one does not know; pressure on the land from 
younger sons may have been greater in the wake of the 
Reformation and the ending of the French alliance with 
the reduction of the prospect of careers in the church 
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and in France, but then the seventeenth century certainly 
opened up other avenues in Ireland and in the armies of other 
continental powers. One imagines that it will have to remain 
another unknown factor until more precise research 
can be done on the kindred of Scotland and any wider 
conclusions drawn from these fifty or so cases of the 
58. From fIles Feudale" by Thomas Craig of Riccarton and 
quoted in i{ormald, "Blcodfeud, Kindred and Government", 
p 69 and see her comments p 69-70. 
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sin of Cain must be treated with caution. 59 
Feuds between fathers and sons were certainly rare. 
In 1590-91 old lord Forbes was drawn into a feud between 
his sons over their inheritance. The old man had been 
persu9ded by his younger sons to disinherit the master 
of Forbes and the latter responded by taking his father 
60 prisoner and some raiding took place bet\oJeen the brothers. 
In 1588 Andrew, master of Semple, complained that he was 
being oppressed by raids and his tenants were being 
intimidated by his father, lord Semple, who was denounced 
by the privy council on the strength of t.he complaint~l 
while in 1616 Sir Thomas Kirkpatrick of Closeburn and 
his son had to be disciplined by the council for their 
quarrel over family debts which was threatening the peace 
62 
of their locality. Lord Somerville, however, was saved 
59. See Mair, Primitive Government, plO, "Conflict and 
competi tion begin within the family". She does however 
point out that among the Nuer such feuds do not result 
in property violence or violence against women and children, 
somet3ing which also appears to be largely true of the 
Scottish feuds. Black-}1ichaud parallels intra family feuds 
\-11th incest and describes a quite different code of 
respor~e to such kUlings, Cohesive Force, p 228-34. 
B.H. Hestman1s study of crime among peasant families 
in the middle ages in England found intra-familial 
crime to be rare but to be more violent than in other 
cases when it did occur. Only 0.7% of the murders 
examined were intra-familial compared to 53% in England 
today. B .H. ~,:estman, "The Peasant Family and Crime in 
Fourteenth Century England", in .l!ournal of British studies, 
(1974), 13(2), p 1-18. Harding in The Anatomy of a Power 
Elite, p 165-66, blamed the increasing use of primo~eniture 
in France for the erosion of parental authority, the decline 
of the kin and hostility among brothers. 
60. R.P.C., iv, p 497, p 617-18. 
61. ibid, p 248-50. 
62. !!:.P.C., x, p 606-07, p 646, p67S-Sl. 
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from feuding with his eldest son after the" latter accidentally 
shot and killed his younger brother, when the killS told him 
"he was a madman; that having lost one son by so sudden an 
accident should needs wilfully destroy another himselfll and 
persuaded him to forgive his surviving son. 63 
As far as one knows there were few killings in such feuds 
between fathers and sons though the infamous Sir James }mcDonald 
was probably responsible for his father's death and the 
murderous behaviour of the Caithness Sinclairs has already 
been alluded to. Even among brothers, while quarrels were 
both more corr@on and more violent, fatalities were few. 
In 1592 John Colquhoun was executed for his part in the 
slaying of his brother the laird of Luss64 and in 1604 
George Meldrum was found guilty of, among other wa~ters, 
conceiving a feud against his brother, attacking him and 
taking him prisoner and was sentenced to be beheaded.65 
In 1595 Robert Tinto of Crimcramp complained that his 
two brothers and his mother had come to his house, broken 
in, beat up his wife, stolen his documents, silver and gold 
and shot him in the arrn.66 As one might expect the 
Kennedies had their share of fraternal animosity and when 
the earl of Cassillis uncovered a plot by his brother to 
63. Chambers, Domestic Annals, i," 191-92. 
64. B1rrel, "Diary", p 29; Balfour, Annales, i, p 392. 
65. ~itcairn, Qriminal Trials, ii, p 428-30. 
66. R.P.C., v, p 215. 
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kill him he locked him away in the dungeons of Dunure castle 
until he had cooled off.67 In 1613 the HacNeills of Barra 
fell out among themselves when two sets of sons from 
different mothers, a HacLean and a HacDona1d began warring 
over their father's favour. Various acts of slaughter 
and depredations followed with the C1anranald becoming 
involved as the feud was locked into .the greater str'.tggle 
between the l'~cLeans and HacDonalds. 68 
This sort of feud was more common among the.clans of 
the western isles because of the less strictly defined 
inheritance laws. 69 The intensity of s~ch feuding can 
be grasped from a feud within the MBcLeod of Assynt family 
which spanned the greater part of the century, lasted until 
1609 and from its beginning with the death of the chief, 
An~us Hoir, cost the lives of fourteen of his twenty-eight 
male decendants, or fourteen of twenty-three decendants 
if one excludes the one branch of the fa~ily which stood 
apart from the fighting. Some time in the first half of 
the sixteenth century Angus Moir was killed by his own 
brother John, and was succeeded by his son Donald Cairn, 
but Donald died after an encounter with the HacLeod chief, 
MacLeod of Lewis, and left no sons to succeed him. His own 
67. Pit~airn, Kennedl, p 20-21. 
68. R. P • C ., x, p 6, p 42, p 817. 
69. 'For example see the feuds of the Tyrone OINeills in 
Berloth, ~he Twilight Lords, p 246-48. 
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brother, Tormot, thus became laird of Assynt, b'J.t he fell 
out .with his younger brother, An5us Beg,who killed him and 
took his place. Like his elder brother, Tormot left no 
heirs of his own, b'J.t his bastard brother Alexander was 
determined to have revenge on Angus Beg and eventually 
managed to slay him before bein~~ killed himself by Angus's 
"life's kinsmen in Ross. Hea nwhile the success ion had pa ssed 
to the fourth of Angus Hoir' s sons, John Reawigh, yho yas . 
able to rule in relative peace for the next fifteen years. 
A sE:cond s'.1ccession feud hm.Jever followed his death. 
Probably because his own sons were too youn~, John ReaYigh 
left the rule of Assynt to his brother Neil, ~uch to the 
resentment of Hucheon, Aneus Moir's other s~viving son. 
Hucheon captured his brother and imposed some sort. of 
settlement on him Yhich provided for a po·..;er sharing 
agreement, bl.lt once free Neil renounced it and murdered 
Hucheon and his younger son, Donald, when they visited him 
at some later date. The brutal horror of this crime seems 
to have reslllted in a rebellion against Neil and he was 
taken prisoner by his kinsw.en and sent to Edinburgh for 
trial and subsequent execution. Angus Mack-ean Reawigh 
noy took over as rightful laird of Assynt, but he was lame 
in one leg and was deposed by the clan when he proved 
incapable of effective rule. This revolt was led by an 
alliance of the sons of Hucheon and the bastard sons of 
the executed Neil, thus leaving out both John Reawigh's 
other sons and Neil's legitimate sons. Of these, the former 
Rory t-IacLeod of Lewis 
· 
· 
Geneology of the MacLeods of Assynt 
Torrnot 1'!ecLeod of Assynt 
· ............................................. . 
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passed from the scene, either because they were too young 
to act themselves or because Angus Hack-ean's weakness 
had discredited them, and opposition to the ruling faction 
came from Nei1's legitimate sons. Of these, the eldest, 
John Reawigh, died while bein5 held prisoner in the earl 
of Caithness's awful dungeons in Girnigo castle and the 
younger was in Ross under the tutorship of the laird of 
Fou1is. The Hucheon faction with their allies were thus· 
able to rule without opposition and the land was divided 
up amongst them with the eldest of Hucheon's sons, Neil, 
being named as their captain. However, they fell out 
among themselves and two of the bastards, Tormot and 
Allister, were killed. At this point Donald Bane returned 
from Ross with Angus, son of the recently slain Allister, 
and they killed John Hucheon. A truce was arranged shortly 
afterwards by the earl of Sutherland to whom all the 
factions gave their dependence, but his reco~nition of 
Nei1 Hucheon as laird of Assynt left Donald Bane 
dissatisfied and even a further treaty involving the 
marriage of Neil's daughter to Angus, son of Allister, 
failed to settle th~ feud. Within a year Angus killed 
his father-in-law,and shortly afterwards Donald Bane slew 
Neil's brother Rory and captured and executed the last of 
Hucheon's sons, Angus. Further fighting continued 
in~ermittently until 1609 with the only grandsons of 
Hucheon trying to oust Donald Bane from his position, 
but in 1609 the senior branch of the femily, led by Donald, 
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son of Angus Hack-ean Reawigh, agreed to accept Donald Bane's 
effective chieftainship in return for certain lands during, 
his lifetime and resistance from the others ceased. 70 
Only a very few feuds appear to have reached this level 
of internecine strife and it is presented here not as a 
typical feud but as a feud of extreme proportions. It was 
not particu.larly bloody in terms of· the total mmbers 
killed, even allowing for the nameless followers who nO 
doubt died along with their leaders, but no other Scottish 
family suffered this level of fatalities in a feud during 
this period. Here the feud most clearly approaches the 
classic idea of the elimination of an enemy family in 
vengeance killings. The fact that both sides ,,,ere from 
the same family made the total effect even more d~structive 
than usual. Its inclusion here is more 011 the Jrounds of 
its uniqueness, as an example of just how terrible the 
feud could be and not as a pointer to the shape most 
feuds took. 
In looking at the Assynt feud one is already moving 
away from conflict within the nuclear family to include 
feuding uncles and cousins and one is not at all surprised 
to find that feuding is more common the more tenous the kin 
relationship is. One thus finds, for example, cases like 
Robert Bartilmo in Kirkshaw who murdered his uncle 
70. Gordon, 'Sutherland, p 262-66. 
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Patrick Bartilmo in 1601; of Robert MacClellan of Bomby 
who had to give assurance in 1608 that he would not harm 
his kinsman l.Jilliam MacClellan of Auchlean; and of 
George Leslie of Crechie who in 1614 had to promise 
that he would keep the peace with his nephew Leslie of 
71 Wardes. In 1605 the strains within the large Lindsay 
kindred finally snapped when the ma~ter of Crawford 
ambushed Sir Halter Lindsay of Balgays, killed him and 
hewed him to pieces. Sir David Lindsay of Edzell chose 
to let the murder of his brother by his overlord and 
chief's son pass, but his own son was less easily 
satisfied and in an attempt on the by now earl of 
Crawford, he accidentally killed lord Spynie, the 
earl's uncle and his own kinsman. 72 In the north-east 
the Innes family split over leadership of the kindred 
and in 1580 Innes of Innermarcky and the weak laird of 
Innes stabbed Innes of Cromy to death in Aberdeen, each 
of the murderers having to thrust their weapons into the 
body to reinforce their solidarity.' However, in 1584 
Cromy's son came out of his refuge with the 3ordons, 
tracked Innermarcky down and killed him, sending his 
head to the king, and thus enabling him to succeed in 
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time as chief of the Innes clan. On the borders, the 
71. R.P.C., vi, p 203; viii, p 98; x, p 259. 
72. R.P.C., vii, p 143, and for Spynie's death R.P.C., 
vii, P 383 • 
. 
73. "The Chronicle of Aberdeen", SEaldin1 ~1iscellany, 
ii, p 52; Chambers, Domestic Annals, i, p 134-37. 
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Kerrs, Scotts and Humes all had their own internal feuds 
while the Turnbulls kept up a bloody str~ggle for over 
twenty-five years. 74 In 1579 ~~cLean of Dowart broke 
int.o the castle of MacLean of Coil, ejected Coil and his 
kinsmen from it, held one of his sons prisoner and 
executed Hector MacLean, Coil's former tutor. Seventeen 
years later Coil was still complaining about the oppression 
of his more powerful kinsman. 75 
Such cases can be repeated time and time again. Power 
within the kindred was there for the taking as in any 
other area of local influence. Peters was thus wrong, 
at least insofar as what he said was intended as a general 
principle, when he wrote that "Feud is excluded from the 
corporate group ••• 11. 76 That is patently not the case in 
Scotland where some fifty instances of feud within 
recognisable corporate groups can be identified. Certainly 
feud was less likely because the bonds which held the 
family and the kindred or clan together were stronger 
than those operating in the locality as a whole, but 
they were not water-tight and the kindred could erupt 
in a fury of the worst kind. Like neighbours, kinsmen 
were just as capable of the same human failings of greed, 
74. For the Turnbulls, R.P.C., ii, p59l; iii, P 302, 
p 619-20; vi, p 4; Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, 
p 509-11. 
75. R.P.C., iii, p 132-33, p 134-35; v, p 354. 
76. Black-~Iichaud, Cohesive Force, p xiii. 
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pride and jealousy which were at the root of SO many feuds. 
The strength of kin obligations WDS, in the last analysis, 
dependent upon self interest, and where self interest could 
be pursu.ed more effectively by other means the ground rules 
could be changed. Some kindreds, like the Gordons under 
the sixth earl of Huntly escaped any intra-familial fe~ing 
in spite of the great size of the ~ordon kindred and one 
cannot argue that the larger the kin the more likely was 
the breakdown of cohesion within it. Oertainly within 
each, kindred relationships were less certain the more 
dist.anced men were from one another, but the exercise of 
good lordship, like Huntly's, could maintain the cohesion 
whatever the total size of the corporate group. 
Like economic objectives and political influence 
within the locality, control of the kindred or the 
pursuit of such objectives by men within a kindred could 
be the material of local politics. In one sense the kin 
was just another, smaller locality in which competition 
was restricted to a more select group of men. Here, as 
elsewhere in the locality, feud was a relationship between 
men, a relationship of conflict. The landed men who were 
the leaders of these societies or communities simply headed 
interest groups of varying sizes, each with local} Bmbitions 
commensurate with their power. Unlike today when corporate 
groups can shift wealth, distribute patronage and change 
officials by elections both within themselves, that is 
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within the party, or within the community, by competing 
with other parties, the sixteenth century had no means 
of doing this except by personal relationships either in 
the form of co-operation, that is in bonds of one sort 
or another, favours or deference,or in conflict, in the 
threat of feud or in actual feud. The killing, burning 
and stealing which were all a part of it did not mean 
that local society was breaking down or that they were 
the works of bad and ruthless men, they were simply the 
best meCl~ of working out competitive politics in a 
society which had no other means of doing so. One cannot 
dress feud up and pretend it was something other than 
violent and disruptive, but neither can one argue that 
it was wrong morally or that it was avoidable. The local 
politics of early modern Scotland were conducted through 
the feud, whether in the violent clash of interests or 
in the mediated or imposed settlement which ended them. 
i~hat has been discussed here were the issues which men 
in their localities felt were of political significance, 
the things they were willing to incur and to initiate feud 
for. It is also clear that this was a form of political 
behaviour common to the entire kingdom, be the looality 
in the highlands, lowlands or borders. Perhaps more 
surprisingly it was also a form of politioal conduot also . 
familiar to the burghs of the country. 
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The Towns 
Urban society has always had a reputation for violence 
despite its apparent sophistication when contrasted with 
the rural community. 11any explanations have been postulated; 
. 
crowd psychology, overcrowding, loss of identity, alienation 
from the natural world and deprivation have all been blamed 
for the violence that so often stalks the streets of the 
world's towns and cities. In its most extreme form urban 
violence takes the form of the riot, whether spontaneous 
or orchestrated, when the normally peaceful citizen becomes 
caught up in the wanton destruction of the mob. Urban 
violence is not however a modern phenomena, a product of the 
massive growth of cities in the twentieth century. The 
cities of the ancient world with their violently.alternating 
politics were no strangers to violence; in the middle ages 
the pogrom, the bread riot and the tax strike saw urban 
communities engulfed in days of vandalism and terror; and 
these traditions continued into the modern era with Scotland 
contributing its part to this history in the Porteous Riots-
of 1736. In the sixteenth century religious dissent added 
another factor to the scenario and thus Antwerp in 1566, 
Paris in 1572 and Edinburgh in 1596 all experienced 
varying degrees of mob violence. 
Theiroportant word is "degrees" for the Edinburgh riot 
was nothing in comparison to the continental experiences. 
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Class tensions did exist within Scottish to',Jns and Calderwood 
wrote of lithe feud betwixt the merchants and craftsmen,,77 of 
Edinburgh, but apart from Edinburgh, Scottish towns were 
simply too small to be a threat to the forces of the landed 
nobility who effectively controlled most of them. Even 
during the hangry 1590's the Scottish urban population 
remained passive, the exception beiI.1~ the 1596 riot which 
was essentially a stage managed political protest by a 
jealous court faction. Similarly, the upheavals in Perth 
in 1559 and Edinburgh in 1592 were manipulated"by external 
political forces. IICarnival in Romans" could never have 
occurred in a Scottish town, but does this mean as 
Naurice Lee suggests, that "The townsmen could be counted 
on, in the interests of law and order ••• 11, as though 
burghs were havens of peace amidst the violence of the 
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countryside? Alternatively, Nichael Lynch has 
persuasively argued of Edinburgh, that IIBy 1580 bur5h 
politics had been swallowed up in the factionalism that 
enmeshed Scottish politics as a whole."'79 However, it 
was not just national politics which invaded the b!.lrgh, 
for the close interdependence between town and country 
meant that at a local level the burghs were not different 
77. Calderwood, History, iv, p 1~1. 
78. E.Le Roy Ladurio, CarniVAl in Romans, (Pctlg'lin, lQ8l), 
a detailed analysis of a religious-political riot in 
one sixteenth century French town. M.Lee, 30vernment 
by Pen, (Illinois, 1980), p 5. 
79. 1·1. Lrnch, Edinbur~h and the Reformation. (Edinburgh, 
1981), p 156. By far the best discussion of Scottish 
burgh politics yet published. 
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worlds from the cO;.lntryside, but an inte:sral part of 
Scott.ish society as a whole. 
The pervasive nature of Scottish kinship and lordship 
did not simply stop at the burgh gates. SO Hence Stirling 
was very much under the influence of the earl of ~fur, 
Aberdeen was dependant upon Huntly, Perth looked to the 
earl of Gowrie for leadership, D'.lnfries was dominated by 
lord Maxwell and even Edinburgh could be tied to the tail 
of . a noble faction as it was to the Humes frQm 1593.81 
Like anythin3 else in the locality which offered wealth 
and influence, the burgh, its offices, its resources and 
its manpovler ",ere "up for grabs", and noblemen and powerful 
landowners lost no opportunity to grab as much as they could. 
The burgh could thus find itself in conflict ",ith" these 
neighbours as it sought to maintain its independence of them, 
and as in other such competitions feud could follow. ~~ere 
the burgh was less able to resist it might find itself the 
bone between two dogs as other rura~ dependants did. 
FUrthermore, the burgh was the commercial, and in the 
80. M.Lynch, Edinburgh and the ;teforrnation, p 208, "in burgh 
society, as in clcottish society as a whole, the pull of 
family and kin was llsual1y more potent than that of ideas." 
Also P .Clark and P .Sleck l Encrlishrowns in Transition, 1500-1700, (Oxford, 1976), p 14, sllggests that kinship 
between town and country may even have increased d1lring 
the early modern period. 
SI. As late as 1621 the earl of Melrose, lord advocate 
Hamilton wrote that "It kythes that the towne of Drumfrieis 
cairies,their olde respect to the name of Maxuell, and that 
they affect the towne, and "'ill be ready to protect them." 
Nelrose, iii, p 433. 
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case of the larger ones, the c111tural centres of a locality 
and attracted men who came to buy, to sell" to borrow, to . 
consult, to meet friends, and in the case of F~inhurgh, 
to attend court, to celebrate and to seek or obstruct 
justice. The burgh thus played host to lords and their 
large companies of dependants, servants and retainers, 
and in the narrow wynds or crowded market places there 
was every likelihood that feuding parties l.Jould clash. 
The burgh streets'often became the setting for individual 
-, 
combatR, brutal assassinations and runnin~ battles which 
had nothing to do with the internal affairs of the burgh 
itself. 82 Finally, there was conflict within the burgh 
corr~unity itself, conflict which resulted in slaughter, 
feud and mediation as in the countryside. The Scottish 
towns may have avoided the \.Jorst excesses of the urban 
riot, but with the feud and the duel in their midst 
they were less distinct from the countryside than is 
often assumed.8) 
~~ile most burghs were happy, or at least stoical, 
to accept the leadership of 'a local magnate they strongly 
82. stone, Crisis of the Aristocracr, p Ill, writes "If the 
countryside remained liable to civil disorder the same 
was true of the towns.... In London itself the fields 
about the city and even the main arterial roads were 
continual scenes of upper-class violence." 
83. This mer5ing of town and country is convincingly argued 
by Le Roy Ladurie in chapter one of Carnival in Romans. 
"The Urban and Rural Setting". The case can of course 
be taken too far and Dr Sanderson has correctly argued 
that a]l burgesses did not simply want to become landed 
men, Hargoret B .H.Sanderson, SCottish Rural Society, 
(Edinburgh, 1982), p 146-47. 
resisted any attempt by lesser men to overawe them. In 
AU~llst 1592 Robert Bruce of Clackmannan went to Perth to 
attend to some business there, but as he prepared to leave 
he was halted by the burgh authorities and asked to pay 
custom on some of his 50ods. He refused, the burgh 
confiscated his goods and Clackmannan went home mouthing 
all sorts of threats against the townsmen. Shortly afterwards 
a party of Perth citizens passed by his house and he attacked 
them, taking their weapons from them, but instead of 
frightening the burgh it simply angered it all the more 
and a number of townsmen went out to Clackmannan's lands 
and trampled down much of his corns. The laird and his 
men came out to stop this, fighting broke out and 
Clackmannan took two of the Perth men, both of wh0m were 
friends of the town baillie, prisoner. Again the burgh 
responded decisively and that night the baillie and town 
council led an assault on Gaskenhnll, Clackmannan's house •. 
The house was surrounded and shot at before being set on 
fire thus forcing Clackmannan to come out. His prisoners 
were freed, he was dragged half dressed along the road 
to Perth and many of his valuables which were saved from 
the fire were stolen • 
. Furious and humiliated by this defeat Clackmannan 
took his case to th~ king, but the privy council was 
unsympathetic and warded both sides for their behaviour. 
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However, pressure was put on both parties and an agreement 
followed in which the town appears to have paid Clackmanna~ 
damages and mutual assurances were exchanged. This did 
not satisfy Clackmannan and a few months later he attacked 
another party of citizens on route to st Andrews, sin3ling 
two of them out for particularly rough treatment, they 
"being baith hurt and wounded in dh~'ers parts of their 
bodies, to the effusion of their blood iri great quantity,. 
the said laird and his accomplices maist shamefullye tirrit 
them baith naked, and in maist barbarous and shameful manner 
scourgit them with horse bridles through the town of 
Abernethy, as gif they had been thieves or heinous malefactors." 
This time Clackmannan appears t.o have got away with his attack 
and nothing more is heard of the feud, though one presumes 
it was some time before he or his men traded in Perth 
. 84 agaJ.n. 
The scenes described here are fairly familiar ones, but 
what is so striking is that they took place between t.ownsmen 
and a relatively powerful local laird. Here the burgh acted 
no differently from any landed corporate interest, defending 
itself with the same mixture of collective detennination and 
84. R.P.C., v, p 6-8, p 80-81; Chambers, Domeflti.c Annals, 
i, p 240. 
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violence. A few years earlier Aberdeen had found itself 
in a similar position, though the politics involved were 
compounded by divisions within the burgh community. The 
shaking of Gordon po\~er in the north-east during the 
mid century upheavals in church and state created a highly 
unstable situation in the region which left Aberdeen both 
less committed to Huntly and open to pressure from other 
local influences, chief of which was the Leslie kin under" 
the laird of Balquane. When trouble broke out between the 
burgh and the Leslies in 1587-88 Huntly in fact took very 
little to do with it, partly because the burgh was reluctant 
to become too dependant upon the Gordons again, and because 
Huntly himself was reluctant, both Balquane and Aberdeen 
bein~ potential supporters who he had no desire to offend, 
particularly in the political cltrnate of 1587-88. 
The quarrel between the two ortginated over the possession 
of land and teinds, just as in soree of the cases above. A 
number of town councillors headed by Alexander C~llen and 
Alexander Rutherford were the heritable feuars and owners 
of certain salmon fishing rights and teinds at Nidchingill 
in Banff, but their ownership was challenged by another 
85. Again cautions give further evidence of the similarity 
in behaviour between townsmen and members of the rural 
commuhity. Thus in 1587 a great many people in Kinghorn 
had to give caution not to harm John Boswell of Balmuto, 
R.P.C., iv, p 193ff, and in that same year the entire 
town of Lanark had to give its band not to harm William 
Livingston of Cerviswood, R.P.C., iv, p 239. ,The reverse 
was however more common as in 1585 when Lord Hay of Yester 
gave caution ror the safety of John Hutchison, a merchant 
burgess of Edinburgh, R.P.C., iii, P 716. 
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burgess of Aberdeen, master Thomas Leslie. The dispute 
developed with Le81ie trying to dispossess the others 
until one day both sides turned up on the lands in 
question with their armed followers and friends. However, 
Cullen and Rutherford had been able to enlist the support 
of their colleagues on the burgh council and using their 
authority they forced Leslie to back down. Lacking the 
political clout his rivals had in the burgh, Leslie turned 
to his chief, John Loslie of Balquane, and to his rural 
kinsmen. Balquane irrmediately took up his case and 
"consavit a deidlie hatreid and malice" against the 
Aberdeen men, gathered his own men and rode against the 
burgh only to find the town gates locked and his entry 
barred. F~rious at this, he warned the town coun~il 
that he would deal with them if they dared come out from 
behind their walls and sent them a letter in which he 
"discharges kyndnes and denuncen his evill inimitie to 
thame". The town did not take the threat lightly and 
retained a strong guard in arms, all of which it claimed 
was damaging to its business and trade, and a great 
insult to the authority of the burgh.86 
The burgh thus took the matter to the privy council 
in Edinburgh and complained of Balquane's oppression. 
The council ordered Balquane to bock off and ordered 
the local sheriffs, of whom Huntly was the most important, 
86. Aberdeen Council Letters, vol i, 1552-1639, P 7. 
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to intervene on the side of Aberdeen if he refused. Having 
dealt with this external threat, the burgh council turned 
on Thomas Leslie and his brother. John who had endan~ered 
the security and peace of the town. The Leslie brothers 
were charged with having "purchest lordship" against the 
burgh in contempt of an act of James V and of the oath 
Thomas had taken when he became a bur6ess of the town. 
They were tried by assize, found guilty on both these 
counts, as well as on failing to Bct as dutiful citizens, 
were deprived of their freedom of the burgh and were fined. 
The ruling faction had thus quashed this threat to"t.heir 
authority both within and without the burgh.S7 
Hevlever, the strength of their position was illusory 
for it was little more than a paper victory. The king 
may have given his backing to the town, but in the north-
east it was not the king's authority which wos important 
at a local level, it was Huntly's. Thomas Les1ie went 
to see the earl who agreed to collect the disputed teinds 
himself until a settlement had been mediated, and he in 
fact came north to deal with'this and other business. 
By this manoeuvre Leslie had appeared to be acting 
reasonably and had put the town in a position where they 
were resentful of Huntly's intervention and began making 
moves to block him through their agents in Edinburgh.SS 
S7. Aberdeen Council Letter~, i, 1552-1639, p 7, plO, p 11-13. 
88. ibid., p 14-15; D.Moysie, Nernoirs of the Affairs of Scotland 
from 1577 to 1603, (Bannatyne and ~~itland Clubs, lS30},P 36. 
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HOY1ever, there too the Leslies' lobby was beginning to 
make ground and a number of townsmen had to give caution 
not to harm them.S9 Shortly after this, on the 16th of 
Harch 1588, Balquane I s son, his friends and the Aberdeen 
Leslies, attacked a party of burgesses on the road outside 
the town and while no-one was killed a number were badly 
hurt with shot or sword cuts and they were comprehensively 
robbed. Once again the burgh began to stir up its lobby 
in Edinburgh, but this time they also directed their 
energies to persuading Huntly to listen to them.90 
The result of the attack was a severe set-back for the 
Leslies in terms of support in Edinburgh. Thomas Leslie's 
actions against Cullen and Rutherford were thrown out, 
his letters against them were suspended and Balquane was 
ordered to find caution for their safety. It was in this 
context that the burgh arranged for the fake bloody sarks 
to be presented before the king to increase the impact of 
their case.91 Something of the workings of the burgh's 
lobby can be gleaned from the events of these weeks. 
Having received his instructions from the Aberdeen burgh 
council in a letter from the burgh clerk, their agent in 
Edinburgh went along to see a junior official or lawyer 
89 .R.P.C. , iv, p 260-61. 
90. Aberdeen Council Letters, i, p 18-19, p 20-24, p 34-36. 
91. ibid., p 13-14, p 19-20, p 24-28; R.P.C., iv, p 265 • 
• 
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by the name of William MacCartney who furnished him with 
a bill allowing him access to the justice clerk's office. 
There he was able to enlist the help of another official 
who took him to the chancellor's office and introduced 
him to a friend there. This man finally approached his 
boss, chancellor Nai tland, but wa s told that when the 
matter had been put before the privy council, the king 
had "fund fault that sic billis war past abefoir in 
favour of the townschipe of Aberdene" and had ordered 
tha t Cul1en and Rutherford themselves come and' answer 
for their part in the dispute. The burgh's lobbying 
had thus come to nothing either because the king was 
trying to be as fair-minded as possible or because the 
Les1ies had again outflanked them.92 
In the locality too the Les1ies had retained the 
initiative. Ba1quane's son organised another attack, 
this time on OQ1len's country house in B~chan, killed 
two servants and broke in and smashed up the house. 
Elsewhere townsmen were intimidated and were warned 
that "thair wald be folks schortlie in this toun quhe 
wald rip up our housses and buthis in despyte of us 
and all that wald assist us 
" • •• • 
Ba1quane was thus 
making good his claim that he would make it dangerous 
for the townsmen to leave the security of their bounds.93 
92. Aberdee~ Oounci1 Letter§, i, p 31-34, p 37-38. 
93. ibid., P 38-39, p 40-41; Spaldin~ Misce1lanv vol ii, p 58. 
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In Edinburgh, Balquane further pressed home his advantage 
by complaining to the council that he was being victimised 
by the town council, and that the ban on his entry to the 
burgh was damaging his business interests. The council 
passed the matter back to Huntly, but the earl chose to 
ignore it, thus allowing the Les1ies to continue putting 
pressure on the town.94 Further measures by the council 
against the burgh magistrates fo110,,,,ed, including an order 
telling them not to intervene in the Hidchingi11 fishing 
dispute as it was none of their business, and the Les1ies 
appeared set for an outright victory.95 
In fact this was the high point of their campaign and 
the criminal activities of Ba1quane's son in the previous 
months came home to roost. The town council's ag~nts in 
Edinburgh quickly exploited Ba1quane's failure to come and 
answer for the behaviour of his men and the entire situation 
turned around once again with the Les1ies' letters and 
commissions being suspended and they in turn being horned. 
It cost the burgh £12 in lawYer's fees but it was considered 
money well spent. It did not resilt in a victory for the 
burgh, but it did stave of a defeat and something of a 
stalemate set in.96 Only the Aberdeen Les1ies appear to 
94. R.P,C., iv, p 267-68, P 272-73. 
95. Aberde~n COl.ln~il Letters, i, p 41-42, p 43-44, though the 
cautions were reciprocated; R.P.C., iv, p 276-77, P 278-79. 
96. Aberdeen Council Letters. i, p 44-46, p 47; R.P.C., iv, 
p 280, P 281, p 304. See also the adultery case involving 
Thomas Leslie, Aberdeen Council Letters, i, p 16-18; 
R.P.C. iv, p 279. 
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have been outright losers in that their position in the burgh 
had gone, but whether they had more success over the fishing 
rights and teinds is not known. Factionalism in the burgh 
was to continue for a number of years with a revolt against 
the provost, Henzies of Pitfoddels, following two years later 
and the involvement of the burgh in the dangerous politics of 
the earl of Huntly in the early l590 1s.97 Like Perth the 
burgh had thus shown the kind of tough-minded approach to 
challenges from external threats which guaranteed it some 
level of independence from the local rural community. 
The degree to which the burgh community understood and 
identified with the values and conduct of the rural 
community becomes even more explicit in an event which 
took place in Edinburgh in 1597. i·,1hile parliament was 
sitting, Andrew Stalker, an Edinburgh goldsmith, accidentally 
killed the master stabler of the earl of Angus. Stalker 
was imprisoned and was to be tried for his life, but some 
young men of the town who were acting as a town guard 
for the duration of the parliament went to the king to 
plead for him. The king gave them a sympathetic hearing, 
but told them to go and see Angus 11 ••• and satisfy and 
pacify his wrath ••• II. This they did, their captain going 
to the earl and offering him the manrent of his entire 
company if he would grant Stalker his life by dropping 
97. E.P.C., iv, p 533, and Brown, Bonds of Manrent, 
appendix, p 469, no 71, 72 for bonds between the 
provost and Huntly. 
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. 98 the charges against him and An3us agreed. Apart from the 
comments this invites on the king's attitude to the questio'n 
of assythment in cases of accidental manslaughter, and on 
the power of lordship, one has here townsmen turning away 
from the formal organs of the law to private justice, and 
as a consequence recognising the lordship of a rural magnate 
over them. Such episodes raise all ·sorts of doubts about 
the role of the burghs as natural allies of the advocates 
of central criminal justice. 
Not all burghs and towns were so successful in either 
fighting off or coming to terms with the landed nobility 
and the local lairds. Thus, in 1600 Peebles found itself 
locked in a quarrel with James Gledstanes of Cokilaw 
over some lands lying close to the town and were unable 
to prevent the Gledstanes invading the town and shooting 
dead their "pundler" James Dickson.99 In 1598 William Lauder, 
baillie of Lauder hurt one of the Humes in a fight and 
shortly afterwards lord Hume and his men rode into the town, 
set fire to the tolbooth and cut the baillie to pieces when 
h d f 't 100 e emerge rom ~ • In 1588 the town of Leith complained 
of oppressions from the earl of Bothwe1l who was extorting 
money from merchant shipping in a protection racket which 
98. Chambers, Qomestic Annals, i, p 294-95. 
99. R.P.C., vi, p 152; R.Renwick, The Burgh of Peebles, 
1604-52, (Peebles, 1911), p 9. 
100. Chambers, Domestic Annals, i, p 300-01. 
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he was disguising beneath his dutie·s as lord high admiral of 
Scotland.10l In 1578 Ayr complained that the sheriff of A~, 
Campbell of Loudon, was trying to usurp power in the town, 
and a few years later the town suffered a raid from a party 
of Kennedies who broke open the tolbooth and freed one of 
their kinsmen, assaulted and insulted the magistrates and 
spent two days in the town parading .through it and 
, ti 'd t' th 't' 102 ~n m~ a ~ng e c~ 1zens. In GlasgoW a feud erupted. 
in 1606 between Sir George Elphingstone, the newly elected 
provost, and Sir Mathew Stewart of }finto, whose influence 
in the town had been undercut by Elphingstone's arrival on 
the scene. The rivalry finally broke out into a large-
scale riot with vicious street fighting involving scores 
of men though only causing one death and "sundry hurt with 
103 . 
staves". The feud between the town of Jedburgh and the 
Rutherford family on one side, and the Fernihirst Kerrs 
on the other, lasted from the civil war until the 1590's 
when the Kerr chief, Cessford, finally wrested control of 
the burgh from the other competing factions. Fighting 
between the two main cont.estants was fierce with the town 
itself describing its relationship with the Kerrs as one 
of "deidlie feid and grite inimit.ie" shortly after the 
killing of three townsmen by the Kerrs in 1586.104 
101. C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 641. Extracts from the Rccord§ of the 
Buro-h of 'E~1inburo-h 1 7 -8 , Burgh Record Society I 
Edinburgh, 1882 , P 150. 
102. R.P.C",; ii1, p 44-45; D.lhrray Lyon, AV" In Olden Times, 
(Ayr, 1928). . 
103. Chambers, Domestic Annals, i, p 395-96. 
104. R.P.C., iv, p 63. 
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More common than these feuds between burghs, lairds and 
noblemen were those in which the burgh was the unfortunate . 
and unwilling host or arena in which lords, lairds and their 
retainers played out some of the most violent episodes of 
their feuds. Aberdeen played host to vicious street battles· 
between the Gordons and Forbe8 in 1573, and with Inverness 
\o1OS a strategic objective of both sides in the great fe".ld 
which engulfed the north in the early 1590'8.105 In 1598 
there was "a ~reat fray" in the burgh beh'een the follower 
of the earl of Erroll and earl V..a!'ischa1.106 Dumfries was 
the setting for a fight between Jardine of Applegirth and 
Kirkpatrick of Closeburn in 1580 in which the town provost 
was hurt trying to stop it.107 Ayr narrowly avoided a 
similar affray in 1578 between two local lairdsl~8 and in 
1590 Dumbarton fair broke out in riot when bands of 
Buchanans and MacAulays clashed, one man bein~ killed 
and many ot.hers hurt. 109 Incidents like these could be 
found for many more burghs, but it was above all in 
Edinburgh that such occurrences were commonplace. 
The sj.ze of Edinburgh alone distinguished it from 
all the other Scottish towns. Not only was it bigger in 
105. See below vol ii, chapters 5 and 6. 
106. C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 1, p 338. 
107. R.P.C., iii, p 263, P 268. 
lOB. R.P.C., iii, P 47. 
109. R.P.C., iv, P 535. 
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size, but its population was the second or third largest 
. B' t· d . . idl 110 It th t 1n r1 a1n an was r1s1ng rap y. was e si e of 
the king's court for longer periods than any other of his 
residences, the centre of his administration, of the law 
courts and of much of the business of the church, and was 
a town of considerable commercial activity. Hore than 
anywhere else then it drew men, especially men of power 
and men with large followings. Thus in 1595 the earl of 
Hontrose was attacked outside the tolbooth by Sir James 
Sandilands and his friends in "a furious onset on the 
erIe, with gunnis and swordis in great nomber". Some 
forty shots were fired and a number of men were killed 
or wounded, Crawford of Kerse being among the slain and 
S~ndilands himself bein~ left for dead with bulle~ wounds 
in his head. III In 1589 the Scotts and Kerrs had fought 
out a similar battle which had left three or four Kerrs 
112 dead on the streets; James Geddes of Glencoquo ar~ 
his friends, all I1bodin in feir of weir" cut down a 
Mr David Bai11ie on the High Street;113 in 1608 
lord Torthorwald was murdered there one eveningl14 as 
was lord Spyniel15 and the young laird of Ancrum who 
110. Lynch, ~dinburgh and the Reformation, p 2-3. 
111. Historie, p 345; C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 527-30; 
C.B.P., ii, P 12. 
112. C.S.P.Scot., x, P 122. 
113~ R.P.C., iv, p 656. 
114. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, iii, p 65-72. 
115. R.P.C, vii, p 383; Pitcnirn, Criminal Trials, 
iii, p 61-65. 
was ambushed in an Edinburgh close and stabbed to death 
by Sir Robert Ker of Cessford and his kinsmen. 116 Nor 
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was the Cunnongate any different, Patrick Bryson being 
slain there by James Stewart of Buchan in a quarrel. 117 
The streets of Edinburgh may never agai~ have run with 
blood as they reputedly did in 1520 when the Hamiltons 
and Douglases slaughtered one another, but blood was 
never far from them. 
Efforts were of course made to combat this violence. 
The government often went to extraordinary lengths to 
keep apart men who were at feud. ~·1hen lord Maxwcll and 
his father-in-law, the ~Brquis of Hamilton, with whom he 
had a deep quarrel, turned up in Edinburgh in 1607 
Hamilton was ordered not to leave his lodgings until two 
o'clock in the afternoon and Naxwell was ordered to 
return to his before noon. On Sunday, Hamilton was to 
attend church at st Giles, going there by a specific route, 
and "Maxwell was to attend the the Abbey Kirk. Both were 
then to go straight home and remain there all day while 
on the Eonday Hamilton was, on account of his rank and 
seniority, to be allowed out all day and }~xwell had to 
118 
spend the day in his rooms. However, the density of 
116. 9.S.P.Scot., x, p 430, p 448, p 562. 
117. Birrel, "Diaryt, p 56. However some perspective on 
this is given by the claim that in ~fudrid et the same 
time one murder was committed every day, Braudel, 
The Mediterranean, ii, p 713. 
118. RIP.C" vii, p 295. 
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Edinburgh made it easy for a man to slip in unawares as 
the council reminded the king when he expressed impatience 
at the master of Crawford's success in avoiding detection 
in the town for "your maietie knowis that malefactors may 
be in Edinburgh, without the Counsellis knowlege ••• " .119 
The towns added their own efforts to those of the government 
in 158) when parliament was being held in Edinburgh, the town 
council was faced with a security headache and decided to 
arm thirty citizens to augment the burgh guard. Furthermore, 
it outlined fines ranging from twenty shillings or a three 
hour stand in the market for slander to £10 for drawing 
blood in a brawl.120 Sirr,ilarly Peeblcs tried to introduce 
its own gun control laws.121 However, with the crown 
struggling to impose its legislation, burghs were. unlikely 
to be any more successful, and it was only with the more 
sustained ffovernment initiatives against the feud as a 
whole that this type of urban violence was reduced. 
The burgh community could thus be the victim of what 
it saw as its less civilised neighbours. This, at least, 
was how Richard Abercromby, a baillie of Edinburgh, 
viewed matters when he complained to the privy council 
about the harassment he had sUffered for three years 
l19~ Nelrose, i, p )2. 
. . 
120. Extracts from the Records of the BllI'gh of Edinburgh 
1573-89, (Scottish B~gh Record Society, Edinburgh, 
1882), p 295. 
121. Renwick, The Burgh of. Peebles, plO. 
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from Ramsay of Dalhousie who resented him rr.oving onto land 
he had bought near to the town. Abercromby told the council 
that !lin a cuntrie quhilk sould be peciabill, sa neir the 
seat of justice, and sould rather gif exampiIl to the far 
Hielandis and Bordouris, quhair sic forme of unqueist is 
usit, nor to bring that kynd of evill tred in practize in 
the inland, in contempt of God and of his Hajestie.,,122 
His voice was that of the God fearing townsman with strong 
ideas about civic virtue and royal justice, but in 1576 he 
was at least a generation too soon to speak for the urban 
community where violence and the feud were every bit as 
much at home as they were in the countryside. 
other townsmen did not have to go out into the country-
side to meet with feud. In 1578 the government established 
procedures to be used in mediating a feud between the burgh 
of st Andrews and the university of st Andrews.123 In 1600 
a private combat was fought in Edinburgh between two b~gesses 
in which one was slain and the othe~ was shortly afterwards 
executed.124 Acts of caution have many examples of caution 
. 125 being given by one burgess or indweller for another. 
122. R.P.C., iii, P 109-12. 
123. R.P.C., iv, p 370. 
124. R.P.C., vi, p 860; Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, ii, 
p 112-27. 
125. e.g., in 1585 David Bannatyne, burgess of Ayr, gave 
caution not to harm John Jameson, burgess of Ayr, 
R.P.C."iv, p 18, P 20; in 1588 the bai1lies and 
other inhabitants of Crai1 gave caution that the 
burgh clerk, John Ramsay, would be harmless of them, 
R.P.C., iv, p 244. . 
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On the 12th of garch 1610 the Stirling burgh records have 
the'followins entry: 
"0rdines Johnne, Hilliam, and James Donaldsannes, to 
be inhibit and discharget at any tyme heirefter during 
the inimitie and feid betuix thame and Duncsne Patersoune, 
deane of gild, ather to croee, pas, or repair throw the • 
soid Duncanes clos, or within ony uther the said Duncannes 
boundis, or yit to contend with him for the gait quhen 
they salhappin to meitt togidder, bot that they giff 
him the gaitt as becumes thame to do to ane mafigtrate, 
under the pane of ten pundis, toties quoties." 2 
Three years later the affair was again before the town 
council. Adam Donaldson, burgess of the town, had been un-
able to control his hatred of Paters on who had by t~is time 
risen to the office of provost and he was charged with 
"dispersoning of him and minting to ane quhinger to have 
struik him thairwith, als also with ane gold club" which 
he grabbed from the unsuspecting hand of John Skeror, 
the astonished dean of the burgh guild. Donaldson was 
fined thirty pounds for this attack and was held in ward 
until the day he could be taken to the market cross where 
he "sall thair oppinlie crave God, the Kingis l-faiestie, 
the said provest and haill magistratis of this burgh, 
forgiveness of his offence foirsaid." In effect Donaldson 
was having to offer assythment to the town council and to 
Paters on in particular for his attack on him. Donaldson 
was also stripped of his freedom of the town and was 
banished from it under the threat of a hundred pound fine 
126. BUrgh of Stirling. Ext,racts from the Records. 1513-1666, 
(Glasgow, 1887), p 124. 
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if he ever returned to it or menaced one of the magistrates 
. 127 
agaln. 
Donaldson's fate may have been a mixture of the old 
and the ne\.], a civic imposed punishment for an offence 
against a magistrate in the form of a private assythment, 
but other cases were simply straight forward feud 
settlements by way of assythment. In 1576 lord Livingston 
came to an agreement with Robert and John Moffet, burgesses 
of Edinburgh, over the slaughter of their elder brother, 
Thomas Moffet of ~lenkirk, by two of his men. Lord 
Livingston paid the brothers seven hundred marks to be 
distributed among Glenkirk's wife and children and he 
agreed to infeft Robert in certain lands of his own. 
Finally, the killers were to be brought to Glasgow and 
there would offer the point of the sword to the ~roffet 
brothers in an act of penitence and homage. This was 
the opposite of the Stalker case with a lord's retainers 
doing homage and a lord himself givi~~ assythment to 
townsmen.128 In 1585 Christine and Violet Kellie, with 
the agreement of their brothers and their "ha ill kinsmen 
and freindis of the surname of Kellie", made separate 
agreements with David and Andrew Home, indwellers in 
Dunbar for the slaughter of their father, Cuthbert Kellie, 
burgess of Dunbar. As compensation each of them was infeft 
127. Burp;h of Stirling, Extracts from the' Records t 1513-1666, 
P 133. 
128. S.R.O., R.D., 1/15/241. 
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in land worth twenty marks annually.129 The Arthour kin, 
including two lairds and a commissioner of Edinburgh, 
made a similar agreement with a number of st Andrew's men 
in 1583 for the killing of a James Arthour ,·31th six of 
the latter accepting banishment in return for the Arthours 
forgiving them and all others implicated in the killing.130 
In 1591 John Ook, baxter burgess of'Edinburgh, accepted 
two hundred marks on behalf of his daughter whose husband 
had been killed and on behalf of the rest of his son-in-
law1s kin from John Orombie, maltman burgess of the same 
131 burgh. In 1595 John Rollock, burgess of D'.l.ndee, and 
others gave a letter of slains to George Ross of Balnagowan 
for the slaughter of Patrick Rollock by one of Ross's kinsmen. 132 
In all these cases kinsmen played an important part, 
. assythment was paid in one way or another and forgiveness 
was granted. The burgh community was thus thoroughly 
familiar with the procedures and terminology of the feud 
and was not only a participant in t~e violence of the feud, 
whether with outsiders or within itself, but in the peace 
of the feud too. The town was not just the country with 
walls around it or markets in the middle of it, it WBS 
distinct and different. However, in the context of this 
129. S.R.O. , ~.D. , 1/38/231, ~341322. 
130. S.R.O., R.D., 1/31/38b, 1/31/40. 
l3i. S.R.a., R.D. , 1/39/172. 
. 
132. Hoss M.S. H.~!.C., vi, P 717, no 15. 
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discussion of the feud it would be wrong to think of the 
burghs as so distinct from the ehtos of the countryside 
that they were natural enemies to feud, both in its violent 
form and as a means of enforcing private justice. The 
towns were not ready made constituencies for those who 
may have wanted to reform or eradicate feuding, though 
there was probably a degree more sympathy for such ideas 
there than say in the west.ern isles. The Scottish towns 
were thus an integral part of Scottish society as a whole, 
at the political and social level as at others. The 
politics of the burgh were conducted within the same 
environment of kin alliances and friendships, respect for 
lordship, potential for v::l.olence and sympathy for private 
justice, that made the feud the means of competition in 
the rural community. 
The politics of the locality were far removed from 
the great matters of state which receive so much attention 
in most histories, but not so far removed from the courtiers 
and government officials that one cannot see where they 
merge. This was a world of c'ontested land ownership, 
disputed marches, of squabbles over water rights and 
peats, of prestige in the local church, of tensions 
between lord and tenant and lord and dependant, of 
jurisdictional quarrels, of strains and fractures within 
families and kindreds, of town against country, am of 
factions within towns. For most contemporaries these 
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issues were far more important than who was chancellor 
or whether bishop or presbytery steered the course of 
the church. To the vast majority even these issues were 
of less importance than the weather and the harvest, but 
at the level where men's political choices were their own, 
local issues were the dominant ones in their lives. Even 
the great men of the kingdom, as we ·shall later see, 
sacrificed court ambitions for their local interests. 
After all, for most noblemen the point of having power 
at court was not to change government foreign policy or 
legislate for social change, but to tighten their ~ip 
on their localities. 
The tensions in local society were ones which would 
not go away and thus each one was a potential feud. No 
doubt the majority were settled peacefully, or at least 
without bloodshed, but most local lairds and almost 
every nobleman experienced at least one feud in his life. 
To have escaped the feud would have been almost impossible, 
and unless one was highly fortunate to have good and 
reasonable nei~hbours all one's life it would have meant 
an abdication of responsibilities to oneself, one's 
dependants and one's kinsmen, and submission to the greed 
and bullying of neighbours and other kinsmen. Similarly, 
the aggressiveness which claimed that which was not one's 
ownw8s expected. To refuse to compete was to invite 
disaster, and in the competition lay the dangers of feud. 
185. 
No man 1,Jished a feud on himself but most \oJanted the prizes 
whlch running the risk of feud might bring, be it another 
field or simply a strip of march land and the honour and 
prestige which came with the winning of it. The significance 
of that for the balance of power in a locality has already • 
been discussed; power, that is support, gravitated to men 
who showed a willingness and a skill in using it, and in 
this vJOrld the feud was the ultimate test of a man's 
power. 
The Scottish localities were not anarchic, torn 
assunder by bloody feuds all the time, but most of them 
were disturbed, and on occasion some of them approached 
civil war. However, the feud was not an aberration in 
this society, but a condition which existed within 
it and partly defined it. It bespoke a vitality of 
local competition for pO\.Jer as much as it did a sad 
picture of suffering, greed and sheer bloody cruelty. 
Power was not so structured and apportioned that it was 
closed off from ambition, but rather it remained fluid 
and there for the taking. Those who did try to take 
may have been reaching for no more than the increase 
in \olealth and status which fishing rights or some minor 
local jurisdiction might give them in the connunity, or, 
like the earls of Moray or Caithness, their ambitions 
may have been regional. ~batever the scale, their actions 
and the opposition they encountered shows a society where 
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the pOI.Jer structure was neither so strong and rigid that 
it .could not be changed, or so rotten that newcomers 
could carve their way into it with ease. Instead it was 
excitinglJ'- volatile and hence pot.entially explosive. 
It was a society in \llhich clever and tough men like 
Hackenzie of Kintail and Johnstone of that Ilk could 
do well by challen~ing the political status quo of their 
localities and in which others like Horay, Kennedy of 
Bargany or Ker of Ancrum were smashed by the powers they 
sought to replace or dislodge. In a society in which 
changes in religion, politics and the economy were' 
creating many uncertainties it is hardly surprising 
that chanGe and instability should be found at a local 
level. There men fou:;ht for what they knew to be ri:sht, 
be it the ownership of a teind or the possession of a 
barony. In a world of uncertainties, tan~ible possessions 
like these seemed all the more worth fighting for. 
LOCAL POLTI~ ICS AND THE FEUD: 
THE CUNNINGHAH-HONTGOHERY FEUD 
187. 
The feud between the Cunningham and the Montgomery 
families of the bailiery of Cunningham in north Ayrshire 
has the reputation of being one of the longest feuds in 
Scottish history. The locality itself was formed by a 
combination of geography and administrative needs. The 
diRtrict is formed by hills and water. In the south it 
is bounded by the river Irvine with the seaport burgh 
of Irvine at its mouth, while to the west is the firth 
of Clyde which sweeps north and then east into the mouth 
of the Clyde itself. In the north, the Kilbirnie Hills 
form a natural barrier which even today divide the Ayrshire 
community from that part ?f Renfrewshire which forms the 
south coast of the Clyde estuary, and while the hills on 
the eastern flank of Cunningham are much less impressive, 
nevertheless they divide the district from Lanarkshire. 
Only along the south side of the Kilbirnie Hills, where 
the road to Paisley and Glasgow ran, is them no natural 
barrier to communication with a neighbouring locality and 
; while the people of Cunningham.did have many contacts with 
people from without their locality, especially in Kyle to 
the south, it was with the communities of east Renfrewahire 
that their interests most overlapped. Within the bailiery 
much of the land was hill and bog with the Irvine plain 
and the Garnock valley being the most fertile and populous 
areas. 
It was here that the Cunningham and Montgomer,r families 
had for so long been the dominant kindreds. Very briefly, 
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the chief of the Hontgomeries had become bailie of Cunningham 
in 1366 after a succession of other families had held the 
office and, except for a brief hiatus in the early fifteenth 
century, the Mont.gomeries continued to be bailies of 
Cunningham thereafter. D~ring the fifteenth centuries both 
chiefs became lords of parliament as lord Montgomery in 
1444 and lord Kilmaurs in 1450, with further promotions to 
earl of Glencairn for the Cilnninghams in 1503, and earl of 
Eglinton for the Montgomeries in 1507. Competition between 
the two appears to have been very low key and it was not 
until 1509 that one first hears of the Montgomery hold on 
the office of bailey being challenged by the C'..Ulninghams, 
and not until the 1520's that the blood-feud really began. 
However, while the Cunninghams seemed to get the better 
of their rivals during the decade or so of fighting, the 
earl of Eglinton's great favour with James V in fact sew 
an increase in their hold of the locality, and in 1536 
the feud was ended and the Hontgomeries were soon tied 
up in a quite different feud with lord Boyd and hia 
kindred which lasted until 1563. During these troubled 
years, troubled for both the locality and the kingdom, 
the earls of Glencairn found themselves at the fore of 
the political stage while their territorial expansion 
elsewhere reduced their sense of frustration in 
Cunningham itself, and thus a half century of peace 
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between the two families followed. l 
While the two families were for a while on opposite 
sides of the political fence d'lring the upheavals of the 
fifteen sixties and early seventies, there is no evidence 
that this brought them into conflict in the way the 
civil war sparked off the Gordon-Forbes feud in the 
north-eest. Alexander, 4th earl of Glencairn was among 
the most single-minded protestants of the Reformation, 
a man of genuine religious convictions and considerable 
political skill and in the civil war he again emerged 
as one of the core of king's men who overthrew queen Mary 
and was the only real threat to Morton in the regency 
election of 1572. However, the Jrd earl of Eglinton 
was a catholic and until 1571 a queen's man, but in that 
year he and the other conservative Ayrshire lords changed 
sides and were thus able to end up on the winning side in 
1573. National politics did not therefore throw the 
G~nninghams and Motgomeries into co~1ict again, and it 
was only with the resumption of peace in 1573 that the 
. 2 
opportunities for conflict re-emerged. 
1. Further details of these years can be gleaned from 
Fraser, Memorials of the 140nt omeries Earl of E linton, 
vols i and ii, Edinburgh, 1859); G.Robertson, 
A Geneological Account of the Principal Familieg in 
Ayrshire, (Irvine, 1823-25), vols i and ii; 
The Scots Peera~e, (ed.) by Sir James Balfour Pa 111, 
(Edinburgh, 1904-14), vol iii, "Eglinton", vol iv, 
"Glencairn" • 
2. ibid. 
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The issue over which the two clashed in the 1570's was 
control of Kilwinning abbey. By this time the Montgomieries' 
dominance of local patronage was almost complete; only the 
abbey remained outside of their jurisdiction. Even here 
they had obtained a toe hold with Eglinton being granted 
the. office of chamberlain, justiciary and bailie of the 
abbey lands in 1552, and receiving some of the feus of the 
abbey in 1565. The growth of Montgomery influence in the 
abbey's affairs had been helped along by the commendator, 
Gavin Hcmilton, a kinsman of Eglinton's first wife, but 
he died in 1571 and was s~cceeded, surprisingly, by 
Alexander Cunningham of Montgreenan, Glencairn's youngest 
son.) The appointment probably reflected Glencairn's 
greater influence in the government, and possibly part 
of his reward for services to the king's cause. Whatever 
the reason it represented a slap in the face for Eglinton's 
ambitions, but given Glencairn's political influence he 
made no attempt to challenge him, and it was not until 
the death of lithe good earl" in 1574 that Eglinton dared 
to test the strength of Cunningham resolve in holding 
onto their recent acquisition.4 
The first record of the Montgomeries beginning, to 
apply pressure on Montgreenan was in 1576 when Eglinton's 
3. Registrurn Magni Sigilii Regum Scotorurn, (ed.) J.M.Thomson, 
(Edinburgh, 1882-1914), vo1 iv, part 1, p 161, no 724; 
Scots Peerage, iv, p 241. 
4. R.P.C., ii, p 566. 
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brother, Robert Montgomery of Giffert, went to the home of 
one of Montgreenan' s tenants, broke into his house, stole 
the family's goods, beat up the man's wife and drove them 
off the land. Giffen was denounced, but the incident gave 
Eglinton enough confidence to carry out a more audacious 
attack on the abbey itself when six months later he and 
his men took advantage of the cOlnrnendator being in 
stevenston to break into the abbey at Kilwinning and put 
in a garrison of his own men, believin3 no doubt that 
possession was the better part of the law. 5 However, 
Montgreenan did not escalate the situation any further, 
but instead took up his case with the privy council where 
he was given letters ordering Eg1inton to vacate the abbey 
on pain of horning or else come and explain his actions 
6 ' . 
to them. The earl decided on the latter course, hoping 
to either persuade the council that he ought to have 
control of the abbey, or else to entangle r-1ontgreenan long 
enough in a legal tussle for Eglinton's effective control 
to become recognised. The decision QY both sides to try 
and resolve their difficulties at this level must have 
been a relief to many local men, but even so a number of 
powerful neighbours put pressure on Eglinton and Glencairn 
to join them in a bond agreeing to settle any differences 
among them by arbitration among themselves. 7 The bond was 
5. R.P.C., iii, P 1. 
6. ibid., P 1. 
7. Brown, ''Bonds of Manren"f1' ,appendix, p 544, no 65. 
192. 
essentially intended to prevent any violence in the locality 
and is a good example of lordship working to maintain community 
peace at a local level, but it did not prevent Montgreenan 
lobbying against Eglinton in Edinburgh and only days later, 
a month after capturing the abbey, Eglinton appeared before 
the council and was ordered to vacate it, both sides being 
warned not to utilise its buildings as a~ kind of fortification. 8 
Six weeks later Eglinton was back at the c~uncil complaini~g 
that the commendator had had him horned in spite of his 
having vacated the abbey, and after lord Boyd had given 
surety in £1,000 for his behaviour, the letters against him 
were suspended and the earl had Nontgreenan in his turn 
horned for fortifying the abbey in contravention of the 
council's orders. Once again the commendator returned 
to defend himself and was given twelve days in which to 
remove the offending defences, following which caution was 
also given for his cond~ct.9 
The restraint shown thus far by both sides, especially 
the Cunninghams,is important end ought to be borne in mind. 
Men were violent but they did not necessarily think of 
violence first. Botb Montgreenan end his brother, the 
earl of Glencairn, were doing all they could to avoid any 
further trouble, perhaps because they were confident of 
tbeir legal position or because Glencairn was baving 
8. R.P.C., iii, P 1 • 
. 
9. ibid, P 11, p 23, P 24. 
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10 difficulties with a number of his dependants, it does not 
really matter why, the point is that they did not immediately 
reach for their swords. Tactically their decision to keep 
within the law paid off and l'Iontgreenan did regain possession 
of the abbey, thus inflicting a rather telling defeat on 
Eglinton who had chosen to make an issue of the abbey in 
the first place. Frustrated by this Eglinton sought to 
regain some prestige by picking a jurisdictional quarrel 
with the commendator. 
Vlithin a year of his defeat over the abbey, in the 
summer of 1578, Eglinton struck back at the corr'mendstor 
by charging and arresting Hugh Girvan, one of Montgreenan's 
servants, for some crime of which we remain ignorant. 
Eglinton did so as bailie principal of the re~ality of 
Kilwinning and made it quite clear that Girvan would be 
tried for his life before an assize which the latter 
complained would be "ane verray s~pect assyis", composed 
of those "that dar not utherwayis declair except that 
they knaw it to be his (Eglinton's) pleasour". This, 
declared Girvan with unconscious humour, would be unfair 
because a weighty matter like his life deserved better 
consideration as "in caise it be taiken fra him be their 
weikit moyne and pretences, can nevir be recoverit'be nB. 
reductioun of thair proceedings." His arrest,he claimed, 
had. follm-1ed a slander against him which had subsequently 
10. See below vol 1, p 229, P 231, P 237. 
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been withdrawn before the church to the satisfaction of 
everyone but Eglinton who would already have executed him 
but for the cornrnendator's intervention. From Girvan's 
plea one learns a little more about the trial of strength 
which was developing bet\.Jeen Eglinton and Hontgreenan for 
" ••• it is notourlie knawin quhat inimitie standis 
batuix the said Erll and the said Commendatar, the 
said cornplineris maister, quha hes the said Erlls 
pretendit infeftment of the said baillierie 
presentlie under reductio~n befoir the Lordis of 
.Counsale and Sessioun, lyke as alsus the said 
·Commendator, for sindrie ca~sis baith of deidlie 
feid and utheris hes obtenit his haill tennentis 
and 3ervantis exemit fra the said Erll's jurisdictioun 
in all civile and criminale caussis." 
One CBn then suggest that following the events of 1578 
the cornmendator had himself and his dependants etc., 
exempted from Eglinton's jurisdiction and had furthermore 
challenged the earl's rights to the office of bailie to 
the abbey regality, an office which he bad held since 1552. 
Whatever the reason, it had sparked off this trial of 
power over Girvan, a trial which l-Iontgreenan was willing to 
accept. The commendator let this be known to the privy 
council through Girvan's complaint, warning them that 
both he and the earl were likely to raise their men, 
"quhairby greit inconvenienties may fall to the trubi11 
of the he ill cuntrie, specielie bet~ sa greit surnames, 
being a deidlie feid of auld ••• " which, he reminded them, 
had been continued by a proxy feud between G1encairn and 
Eg1inton's dependant, Muir of Ca1dwell. The commendator 
lq5. 
had thus made it very clear to the council that the feud, 
yhich Yas yhat Girvan yas calling it, was on the point of 
exploding and that he yould not be responsible for what 
folloyed. It is also very clear that the Cunnin~hams 
yere evoking old memories· of the 1520's and 1530's in 
preparing themselves for a likely showdoyn. The privy 
council took the hint hoyever and assigned the matter to 
11 the lords of council and session on the lOth of May. 
In fact this was the end of the affair and one does 
not know what happened to Girvan, thongh one can assume 
that he yas not executed or more yould have been heard 
of it. On the terms Eglinton had set for himself the 
affair has to rank as another defeat for the earl in his 
attempt to keep the Cunninghams out of the administration 
of the district. Why the tyO sides cooled down in 1580 
after more than three years bickering is ~nclear, perhaps 
the wider political context at the end of the decade had 
some bearing on this, but in November 1580 Montgreenan 
gave Eglinton infeftment in his heritable offices in the 
KilYinning regality.12 This infeftment in 1580 throws a 
slightly different light on the feud up until this point 
for the suggestion so far has been that it was Eglinton 
who was the aggressor, but if the commendator had been 
trying to oust him from any influence in the abbey by 
wit~holding his infeftment over the last nine years then 
11. R.P,C., ill, p 143. 
12. S.R.O., Eglinton J.1uniments, G.D., 3/1/80/739. 
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his behaviour can be explained as attempts to put pressure 
on Mont~reenan to co-operate. Even after 1580 the commendator 
remained obstructive, and it was not until 1583 that a more 
satisfactory settlement was reached with the commendator 
promising to maintain the tolbooth at the Newhall with the 
irons at the Bellhouse and a gallows for use wherever the 
earl required it.13 Furthermore,he appointed two of 
Eglinton's servants as directors of the chancellory and 
chapel of the regality.14 Fl~ther signs of stability between 
the two men appears in the granting of tacks for teindsheaves 
to the earl in 1581 and a grant of land which was made out 
in 1582.15 It all added up to a compromise in which the 
two men recognised that for either of them to be able to 
exercise their offices, they would have to co-operate with 
one another. 
In the decade 1573-83 the earl of Eglinton and Montgreenan 
had thus brought their families to the brink of feud, but on 
more than one occasion they had stepped back and allowed 
themselves to be persuaded to take another course. Peace 
in the locality had been preserved in spite of some real 
provocation from Eglinton, and while the relationship 
between the two sides had been one of feud, a settlement 
had been relatively easy because no violence of a~ 
significance had taken place. In the wider scale of 
13. S.R.O., Eglinton Muniments, G.D. 3/1/80/740, 3/1/80/743. 
14. G.D., 3/1/80/747. 
15. G.D., 3/1/20/205, 3/1/87/834. 
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relations between the Cunninghams and Montgomeries events 
were also leading towards a reinforcement of peace. The 
death of Glencairn in 1580 and the succession of James, 
the 6th earl, a more aggressive man than his father,did, 
however, bring a degree of uncertainty back into the 
situation and his dislike for the Montgomeries persuaded 
Eglinton that he ought to seek an obligation from Glencairn 
not to harm him. The assurance which Glencairn gave for 
himself and all his kin, friends and servants etc., not 
to pursue Eglinton 11 in law or besyde the law" for anything 
which had occurred between them was witnessed by tne king, 
Lennox and Arran and suggests very strong court pressure on 
him t? conform to an agreement.16 Shortly afterwards both 
earls were ordered to seek ways to bring a more lasting 
conclusion to their feud. 17 What in fact was mea~t by 
their feud is not clear and one must assume it is simply 
referring to the Eglinton-Montgreenan dispute. This 
interference in the affairs of their locality may in fact 
have angered both earls against the Lennox regime enough 
for it to be the cause of their uniting with the other 
Ruthven raiders in bringing it down within weeks of this 
order being issued. 
Neither earl suffered following the collapse of the 
Ruthven regime itself in 1583, though the settlement 
16. Fraser, Memorials of the l-brtgomeries, ii, p 223-24. 
17. R.P.C., iii, p 508. 
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between Eglinton and Montgreenan in November of that year 
may have reflected some hesitation on their part about the 
future which could be better guaranteed if the locality 
presented a united front to the new Arran government. As 
it was Arran kept his fingers out of north-Ayrshire, though • 
he was to have them burned elsewhere, and it was another 
thirteen years before the crown agai~ interfered in the 
politics of the locality in such a manner: It was during" 
these years that the simmering rivalry between the two 
families turned to violence. 
One contemporary writer tells us that in 1583 "bayth 
the parties semit fullie"to be satisfeit and aggreit in 
all poyntis ••• 11, but in fact the peace was superficial-18 
The Cunninghams "be the inventioun of a wicked instrument 
of that surneyme, kindlit up a new rancor in the hart is of 
the rest of that famelie ••• 11 and one Sunday morning a 
party of them banded together and rode off to the 
19 Montgomeries local kirk and attacked them. '{by they 
did this is not clear, but as one has already seen a feud 
settlement was at its most vulnerable immediately after it 
had been agreed and it would have been fairly easy for a 
malcontent to stir up the others by suggesting that the 
settlement was unjust or dishonourable. ~"hatever the 
motivation, the attack took place and 8 Mont~omery was 
18. Historie, p 238. 
19. ibid., P 238. 
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shot and wounded while one of the CUnninghams was killed 
before they were driven off. The Cunninghams then tried to 
take the matter to law, claiming that their kinsman had 
been murdered, but the justice general dismissed the 
20 . 
accusation out of hand. 
This killing changed the nature of the feud. During 
the 1570's it had essentially been about property and 
influence in the locality. With the killing of one of 
the Cunninghams, their aims at least shifted to a 
determination to satisfy their honour and extract revenge. 
Blood and the pOv/er struggle it represented, not office or 
wealth, became the focus of local politics. The peace had 
thus only lasted from 1583-85 in which year the earl of 
Eg1inton had died and had been succeeded by his son, a 
relatively young man, for whom Glencairn had his own 
personal hatred. When his kinsmen then approached him 
with a plot to "be avenged upon the fattest of the 
Montgomeries" he agreed. 21 
Details of the plot devised by the C1lnninghams have 
survived in papers which later fell into the hands ot 
the l1ontgomeries.22 Both Spottiswoode and the "Historie" 
relate that a band was drawn up l.lIlder which "whomsoever 
weld tak the t'lrne in hand and performe it, he s'.lld not 
20. Historie, p 238. 
21. ibid., P 238. 
22. The documents were copied by a servant of the Cunninghams 
and passed on to the Hontgomeries though at what date one 
does not know. 
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onlie be sustenit upoun the common expensis of the rest, 
bot suld be menteyni t and defendi.t be thayme all from 
23 danger and skayth". The bond was in fact signed by 
Gloncairn himself, " ••• upoun the fayth of ane nobill 
man ••• II , Alexander C:mniilgham of Craigends for himself 
and his friends, David Cunningham of Robertland, the man 
suspected of instigating the attack on the Hontgomeries, 
Alexander Cunningham of Aiket, JohnCunningham of Ross, 
the earl's younger brother, Montgreenan and John Cunningham 
in (or possibly of) Corsewell. In the bond Glencairn 
declared that if any of these men would be 
"·.mhurt, unharmi t, llnperseit, criminallie or civillie, 
in the law, or by the law, bei ony actioun intendit or 
to be intendit be me, or ony of my name, Dnd that 
quhill the settilling of mater is succeidant upoun the 
said interpryse, or farther as my saidis freindis 
pleisis to burding me with: Bot be the contrair, I, 
the said nobill lord saIl assist, fortefie, and msntene 
the said Laird of Craganis, as l1.theris my freindis, 
interprysaris of the said caus, to be hasart of my 
lyfr~ landis, and the lyffis of all that will do for 
me:II~4 
Glencairn was thus giving his followers carte blanche in 
the prosecution of the feud. The document shows something 
of the shadier side of lordship and to bonds which have 
perhaps been painted a little too white recently. The fact 
that few such bonds have survived should not allow one to 
think that they were uncommon for they were not the kind 
of evidence that men would keep any longer than was 
23. Historie, p 23S. 
24. Fraser, Memorials of the Hontgomeries, 1i, p 226. 
From the bond it would appear that Craigends was 
in charge of the operation. 
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desirable, even this one yas not preserved by the signatories. 
Glencairn's intentions yere made even more clear in a 
letter he wrote from his estate at Fyndlaston to his kinsmen 
in Ayrshire. 
"Cusingis, I haue ressauvit zour letteris, and persaweis 
that ze ar reidie with zour commownaris anenttis the 
lytill particulare pertening to me: and willis me to 
haue myne reddie, quhilk, I assure zow sall be; for I 
pray zow put me to sum poynt, and appoint me ane tyme 
of meitting to t.hat effect. I am glad of our freindis' 
gud mening in that caus, quhilk salbe rememberit be me, 
. incaise he haue to do quhairin I may pleasoure zow.,,25 
The more cryptic parts of the letter were explained.by the 
annonymous Cunningham traitor. 
,j ••• becaus it is sum thing mistie and generall, this 
far I will avow and abyde be: to wit, that it yas 
concludit amangis us, that the ErIe of Eglintownis 
slauchter sou1d be ter~it, in all our letteris.and 
missiues from ane till ane uther, The lytill 
particulare; and also it wes concludit t.hat thais 
that wes suorne and promeissit to be executoris 
thairof sould be lykawayis stylit in all our missiues 
Commowneris: swa I will qualefie, be Godis grace, 
suafar as I am in power, that thir foirsaid wordis 
contenit on the first missiue, wes menit to be the 
ErIe of Eglintownis slauchter, and theis that sould 
haue bene the doeris thairof, and thai that wes 
suorne and participant thairof: and this wes 
inventit, feiring leist lettres mycht be tene be 
the yay.,,26 . 
These preparations for an attack on Eglinton took part 
in the late winter of 1585-86 but difficulties in executing 
it soon developed. The commendator Montgreenan wrote to 
Glencairn telling him that he had been keeping Eglinton 
under surveillance but that he had met with his friends 
25. Fraser, Memorials of the Mont~omeries, ii, p 226. 
26. ibid., p 225-26. 
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in Irvine and they were sure that Eglinton suspected something, 
having possibly received some information from lord Semple 
whom he had arranged to meet. He felt that it would be 
unwise of him to visit Glencairn as his own movements were 
being watched with some suspicion, and he revealed that a 
Gavin Naissmith had failed to keep some promise to them and 
"I sie nothing bot this mater is oppini t up be sum to thame, 
or elli8 thai suspect the saymn; and leist thai suspect me;". 
Furthermore, the important laird of Glengarnock, John Cunningham, 
had chosen to disassociate himself from their plans, Montgreenan 
himself was poorly attended and he finished by repeating the 
warning about the Hontgomeries preparing themselves for 
trouble and asking for some decision on what was to be done. 27 
Other letters informed Glencairn that the laird of Caprington, 
another of the more powerful Cunningham cadets, had been 
absent from the last tryst and one from Glencairn's brother, 
Ross,also suggested that the Montgomeries were sllspicious, 
though he continued to report Eglinton's movements.28 
Yet in spite of the problems they were having in keeping 
the plot secret and in getting' the full backing of their 
kinsmen, the Cunninghams were able to carry it out with 
remarkable ease. In the last week of April 1586, Eglinton 
set out on a journey to join the court at stirling. He 
had with him only a few servants, having chosen to disregard 
27. Fraser, Hemorials of the }lontgorneries, ii, p 226-27 
.28. ibid., P 227. 
\ 
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the warnings that the Cunninghams were planning something 
against him. One source suggests that the reason for this 
was that the laird of Robertland had since the 1583 agreement 
become quite friendly with the young earl, and had assured 
him that his kinsmen intended no harm against him in spite 
of the recent clash between them. On route from Eglinton 
castle, near Kilwinning, the earl and his small party 
stopped at the house of Neil Montgomery of Langshaw and . 
dined there. However, Langshaw's wife was a Gunningham, 
being tpe aunt of the laird of Aikett - which like the 
friendship of Robertland and Eglinton suggests that feuding 
kindreds were not cut off entirely from one another but 
interacted at various levels29 - and while the earl was 
dining she sent word to her kinsmen who lived close to 
Langshaw house and who were waiting upon such intelligence. 
Thus, when the earl left Langshaw he was shadowed for a short 
distance and then ambushed as he crossed a burn. His 
servants deserted with suspicious haste, and "The horsemen 
ran all on him, and unmercifullie killit him with shots 
of gunnis and strokis of swords." John Gunningham of 
Glonbeith finally finished the messy business, delivering 
the coup de grace at close quarters with his pistol. A few 
-
of the fleeing servants were surrounded by the larger party 
29. Thus one also finds for example that in 1585 Langshaw 
set in wadset in a five mark piece of ground Patrick 
'Cunningham in Bordland. Feud was disruptive but not 
to the extent that all other social and economic 
relationships were excl~ded. S.R.O., R.D., 1149/63. 
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of Cunninghams and l1hewed to piecesl1 without mercy)O 
Glencairn and his kinsmen had had their revenge, but within 
days of the murder Randolph had "lritten with prophetic 
ins:i.~ht that "This is likely to stir up some new mischief 
among those in the west parts, so they are free from no 
part, if this revenging world continue.,,31 
At this point one can turn from the narrative of the 
feud to take a closer look at what is meant when one 
writes about "the Cunninghamsl! and "the Montgomeries". 
It is too easy to pres ent a picture of t,-/o monolithic 
families bestriding the land, covering it with one another's 
blood. Y~1ile it has been argued above that blood-feud was 
violent one has to be careful not to sensationalise that 
violence or to over-simplify the degree to which a 
locality was caught up in a feud. Thus both the 
pattern of revenge and the anatomy of the corporate 
interests headed by the earls of Glencairn and Eglinton 
deserve more careful consideration. 
The locality of C~nningham in north-Ayrshire was 
dominated by the landed nobility. The alternative centres 
of power in this society were the church and the towns 
which in CUnningham meant Kilwinning abbey and the royal 
burgh of Irvine. The abbey, as has been seen, was no 
30. Noysie, Hemoirs, p 57; Historie, p 240; Robertson 
Ayrs\lire Families, i, p 295-96. 
31. C.S.P.Seot., viii, p 329. 
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longer able to exert any independent authority having been 
since the 1550's increasingly Qnder the control of the earl 
of Eglinton. The Heformation further reduced the abbey's 
religious significance and after the tussle described above, 
its economic Dnd jurisdictional power was divided between 
Eglinton and the C~nningham commendator Montgreenan. As 
for the burgh of Irvine, it was only a modest sized town 
in which Eglinton held the offices of chamberlain and 
coroner and in effect dominated it. Other settlements 
in the locality were no more than villages dependent on 
the local laird or lord, the nearest large town, Ayr, 
being more involved in the politics of Kyle and Carrick. 32 
Three noblemen held lands in the locality; .}lencairn, 
Eglinton and lord Boyd. None of them were great territorial 
magnates like Argyll, Huntly, Cassillis or }~xwell, though 
the sum total of Glencairn's scattered estates were of a 
significant size. However , within Cunningham there was 
no question that they far outstripped any of the other 
landowners who all in one way or another looked to them 
for protection and patronage. Of their neighbours in 
adjacent localities, Lennox and Hamilton had no interest 
in Ayrshire, and Wallace of Craigie and Campbell of Loudon 
to their south were not powerful enough to challenge them, 
besides which they were too concerned with the affairs of 
their own locality of Kyle. 
32. S.R.O.,' Eglinton Huniments, G.D. 3/1/15/27. 
'. 
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~Jhile the Boyds had fou3ht a bloody feud with the 
Hontgomeries during the mid years of the sixteenth century 
they had made their peace with them, and as the peace held 
the two families drew close together. Nor did lord Boyd 
have al~ quarrel with Glencairn for while his lands along 
the western slopes of the Kilbirnie Hills, protected by his 
castles at Portencross and Vest Kilbride, and the other block 
of land around Kilmarnock with his principal seat at Dean. 
castle, lay alongside the estates of both C~nninghams and 
Hontgomeries, he succeeded in remaining at peace with both 
families. He was not quite neutral as one shall see, but 
his largely middle of the road position made him an attractive 
lord for other petty lairds who wished to stay out of the 
CUnningham-!'iontgomery dispute. Thus one finds Blair of that 
Ilk in 1576, and Crawford of Ki1birnie in 1577, giving him 
their bonds of manrent, while other men like the lairds of 
Hunter, Fairlie, Boy1e and Fraser whose lands were all hemmed 
in against the sea by him, all looked to lord Boyd for 
protection and also avoided any participation in the 
principal pOlitiC~l questions of the locality.33 
This is not to say that all these men were peaceful. 
In 1577 Blair and Kilbirnie were involved in a shooting 
incident which reached the ears of the privy council. 
Some·men may simply have wished to get on with their farming 
and .the bringing up of their families in peace and qUiet, 
33. For the bonds see Brown,"Bonds of Hanrentll , appendix, 
p 396-97. 
but for some the ties which developed in a small locality 
could create enormously complex questions about their 
loyalty. John Blair of that Ilk, for example, found himself 
in a predicament over the Cunningham-Nontgomery feud. His 
grandmother had been a daughter of the first earl of E~linton, 
his mother however WElS a daughter of one of the Ct.mningham 
lairds of Glengarnock, his sister was married to Hontgreenan 
and his own wife was a daughter of lord Semple's,an ally of 
Eglinton's.34 Here, then, one certainly finds the community 
allegia!lces of which Gluckman wrote about, those which 
inhibit the spread of feud and create cohesion. 35 ~t did 
not always work that way' and Blair may have kept out of 
the feud whatever his kin relationships were, but the 
complications they made for him, and were possibly intended 
to create for him by a policy which linked his family to 
all the powerful families in the locality, reduced the 
likelihood of him being drawn into a feud within the locality. 
The position of the earls of Eglinton in Cunningham was 
an impressive one. Their principal seat, Eglinton castle, 
was situated just outside Irvine, they held all the 
significant offices in the locality and the majority of 
34. 
35. 
Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, i, p 71; Accounts 'of the 
Lord High Treasurer of Scotland, (eds) T.Dickson and 
Sir J.Balfour Paul (Edinburgh, 1877-1916), vol xiii, 
P 116, which suggests that one of the Crawfords wos 
. actually killed by the Blairs. For the genealogical 
details of this and other Ayrshire families discussed 
below, see W. Paterson, Historl ef The Country Of Ayr, 
(Paisley, 1847-52), vols i1 and iii. 
Gluckman, Custom and Conflict, p 18. 
THE HOUSE OF BLAIR 
John B1air of that Ilk, d. late 1560's 
ID 
Lady Elizabeth Montgomery (1st earl's dtr.) 
· 
· ................................................. . 
John B1air of that Ilk, d. c1570 
m 
Margoret m John Crawford of Crawfordland 
~rgaret Cunningham (Glengarnock) 
• ...................................................................... 
John B1air of that Ilk d. 1609 
m 
Grizel Semple (lord Semple) 
vlilliam dtr 
m 
Knox of' 
Ranfurly 
Jean 
m 
Alexander Cunningham, corr~endator 
: of K'ihJinning 
James Cunningham of i10ntgreenan 
.................................................................... 
John 
m 
Bryce of that Ilk 
m 
Isobe1 Boyd (Lord Boyd) Annabel1 Wal1ace (Craigie) 
· .. 
· dtrs. i) Grizel m Maxwel1 
of Pol10ck 
ii) Isobe11 
iii) Anr~ m Porterfie1d 
of that Ilk 
iv) Crawford of Ki1birnie 
Other children: 
i) Alexander m Elizabeth Cochrane (of that Ilk) 
ii) James 
iii) Robert of Bogtoun 
iv) Jean m i. stewart of Bute 
ii. Cunnin~ham of Hontgreenan? 
v) Hargaret m Ker of Kers18nd 
vi) Grizel m i. Blair of Adamton 
, ii. Haxwell of Nethir Polloe 
vii) Anna m Brisbane of Bishoptoun 
I\) 
o 
~ 
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their lands were in Cunningham, the others being at Eaglesham 
in Renfrewshire. The lands themselves lay north of Irvine, 
sweeping around to Ardrossan and cutting a wide swathe in 
a north-easterly direction through the parishes of stewarton 
and Beith. Further north, the Montgomery lairds of Skelmorlie 
beld more land petween the Kilbirnie Hills and the sea. Apart 
from Skelmorlie in the north and the Eaglesham estates the 
Montgomeries held a single cohesive block of Cunningham 
comprising most of the central portion of the district. 
Yet the Montgomery kindred was not particularly large. 
The third earl of Eglinton, Hugh Montgomery, had no children 
by his first wife, while his second, Margaret Drummond, bore 
him two sons and two daughters. The daughters will be 
considered below under affinal relations while of the sons, 
the- eldest, Hugh, the fourth earl, was murdered in 1586, 
a year after his father's death, leaving only a baby son 
to succeed him. His brother, Robert Montgomery of Giffen, 
who on the earl's death became master of Eglinton and 
tutor to his nephew, was to become the most prominent 
figure on the Montgomery side daring the feud until his 
own death in 1596. He was married to a daughter of Campbell 
of Loudon, but he had no sons and left only a daughter whom 
he married to her cousin, the fifth earl. Of that marriage 
there was no issue so that with this earl's death in 1612 
the Montgomery ~ine of earls of Eglinton strictly ended, 
though his Seton successor was persuaded to change his name 
Hugh, Jrd earl d. 1585 
m 
THE HOUSE OF EGLINTON 
i) Lady Jean Hamilton - no issue 
ii) Margaret Drummond (Innerpeffry) 
........................•..............•........•..............••• 
Hugh, 4th earl k. ~586 Robert of Giffen d. 1596 1) Margaret m Robert Seton, 1st earl of Wintoun 
m 
1) Giles Boyd (lord Boyd) 
ii) Helen Kennedy (Bargany) 
· • 
Hugh, 5th earl d. 1612 
m 
lA.argaret }'lontgomery (Giffen) 
· • 
no issue 
m 
1) Jean Cempbel1 (Loud on) 
· 
• 
. 
Jrd son Alexander, 6th earl of 
Eglinton 
11) Agnes m Robert, 4th lord Semple 
Margaret m Hugh, 5th earl of Eglinton - no issue 
m Robert, 7th lord Boyd - no issue 
• 
two other daughter died unmarried 
I\) 
..... 
..... 
• 
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in order to remain chief of the Montgomeries. After 1586 then, 
there \oIas only one adult male member of the Eg1inton family . 
and by the time the young earl had come of age his uncle had 
died. 36 
. 
The other Hontgomery lairds could all trace their ancestry 
\ back to the Eglinton line at some point in their history. The 
oldest cadet branch was the Skelmorlie family \oIhile the other 
more important lairds were those of Langshaw, Braidstone 
and Hessilhead. The lairds of Sevenacres, Brigend, Stane, 
Smistoun and Blackhouse made up a second group of less 
significant men 'Who did not own their o\oln tower house and 
whose families were really sub-cadets. One can now look at 
these men and their families and analyse to what extent each 
of them participated in the feud alongside their lord and 
chief. 
Hugh Montgomery of Hessi1head first appears in the records 
of the feud in 1586 when he took part in an attack on the 
lands of some of Eg1inton's ki~lers. In 1591 he twice acted 
as Giffen's c8utioner in matters related to the latter's 
oppression of various Cllnninghams. Twice in 1599 he was 
charged by the privy council to appear with other Montgomeries 
and settle the feud with Glencairn and his kinsmen, and in 
1606, while Hugh himself was dead, his son Robert was 
charged to appear on similar grounds. In 1607 Robert was 
again before the council and caused some stir when it was 
36. Scots Peerage, iii, p 440-44. 
, 
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discovered that he had a separate feud of his own with the 
Cunningham laird of Glengarnock. However, he reappeared 
in 1608 and was present at the final reconciliation of the 
two families in 1609.37 
Neil Hontgomery of Langshaw was of course placed in an 
intolerable position by the circumstances surrounding 
Eglinton's slaughter. According to one tradition Langshaw. 
sent his wife to safety in Ireland until his kinsmen had 
cooled down a little, but he himself \Jas EG committed to 
revenge as they were. Like Hessilhead he was involved in 
the 1586 raids, during 1587-88 he appeared· before the 
council on charges relating to plots to kill Hontgreenan. 
In 1591 he was one of Giffen's cautioners and in the 
following year Glencairn brought charges against him for 
failing to disband his forces and observe the peace BS 
instructed by the king. He was included in the 1599 lists 
of Hontgomery lairds thought to have been involved in 
the feud, his son being included with him in the first 
one. Yet Langshaw did not entirely drop his earlier 
connections with the Cunninghams. In 1593 he stood 
caution for two men by the name of Mure that they would 
not harm Jean Blair, the wife of the late commendator 
of Kilwinnin~and in a sense became the protector of the 
wife of a man he had pursued to his death. Furthermore, 
37. R.P.C., iv, p 94-95, p 675, p 709; v, p 539, p 543; 
vii, p 233, p 324; viii, p 252, p 262-63. 
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in 1600 he granted lands in the lordship of Stevenston to 
Alexander Cunningham of Corshill whose father had been slain 
by the Montgomeries for his part in Eglinton's murder. One 
does not know whether the transaction was a compensDtion 
payment or not,but it points to some easing of relations 
between Langshaw and the Cunninghams. He was again included 
in the 1606 summons, refused to submit the feud to arbitration 
a year later, but was persuaded to change his mind by the 
earl of Abercorn, appeared on the 1608 list and had his 
son present for him at the 1609 settlement. 38 
In Sir Robert Montgomery of Skelmorlie one finds a 
similar level of sustained involvement in the feud, but 
Sir Rohert's politics were complicated by an additional 
feud with the Maxwells of Newark and Stanelie, fr~ends of 
Glencairn. In the 1570's the ~fuxwells had been friends and 
allies of the Montgomeries, there being a marriage between 
a previous Hontgomery of Giffen and a daughter of Maxwel1 
of Stanelie, and Newark had taken sides with the laird of 
Houston against Glencairn in another feud. However, when 
this Giffen laird died, the third earl of Eglinton removed 
his wife from the estate and put in his own son, Robert 
Montgomery. A quarrel between the two families soon broke 
out from the court room and into open feud. Some time in 
1582 the laird of Stane1ie was killed by the Skelmorlie 
38. Robertson, Alrshire Families, i, p 298-99; R.P.C., if, 
P 94-95, p 234, p 256, p 704, p 709; v, p 539, p 543, 
p 584; vii, p 233-34, P 296-97; viii, p 138-39, p 252, 
P 262-63; S.R.O., Glencairn MUniments, G.D. 39/5/72. 
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Nontgomeries, but within months the 11axwells had their revenge 
and slew Sir Robert's father, the old laird of Skelmorlie, 
and his .elder brother. Faced with the greater power of 
the Montgomeries, the MBxwells turned to Glencairn for help 
and increasingly became his clients, tying their own feud 
with the Hontgomeries in with that of the Cunninghams. 
In fact there is evidence to suggest that at least the 
Cunningham laird of Craigends may have been involved in 
some way in the Skelmorlie killings. As for Sir Robert, 
he too was one of Giffen's cautioners in 1591, a few years 
later his younger brother took part in raids on the lands 
of Cunningham of Clonbsi th, he \Olas named in both the 1599 
lists, he submitted his feud with the Cunninghams in 1607, 
was included in the 1608 list and was present in 1609. 
By 1613 the feud with the ~fuxwells was still not yet 
concluded and one does not know when it was ended. The 
Skelmorlie family were thus deeply involved in both the 
war and the peace of the feud, and according to some 
traditions, Sir Robert was the most feared of all the 
Montgomeries, having a reputation for violence and bloodshed.39 
The last of the more important Montgomery lairds was Adam 
Montgomery of Braidstone. Unlike the other three, he played 
39. S.R.O., Eglinton Huniments, G.D., 3/1/30/303, G.D. 
3/1/31/313; Fraser, Hemorials of the Eontgomer~, i, 
p 156ff; Robertson, Ayrs~ire Families L i, p 297; ii, 
.p 329; S.R.O., Craigend Hrits, G.D., 148/215, 148/216; 
Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, i, part 2, p 133; R.P.C., 
v, P 271, P 539, p 543; vii, p 296-97; viii, p 138-39, 
P 252, P 262-63; x, p 112. 
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very little part in the feud and certainly had no part in 
any of the violence of the feud. He was listed in the 
second of the 1599 charges and died in 1602 with there having 
been no other reference to him. His son Hugh was charged 
to appear along with his kinsmen in 1606 and in 1608, though 
not as a principal, but "to assist the said agreement". 
In 1609 he was specifically ordered not to appear which 
suggests very strongly that he and his family did not 
have a feud to settle but had only been asked to participate 
in the mediation procedures in the hope that a moderate 
voice would exert an influence favourable to peace. 40 
Tracing the activities of lesser men is even more 
difficult as one is less likely to find them named but 
included in the broad term "the Montgomeries". Even for 
these men above one is only recording their minimum 
involvement and one just does not know whether they or 
their men performed any of the murders and killings 
which followed Eglinton's own. Of the others, one finds 
Eglinton's deputy bailie of Kilwinning regality, 
Hugh Montgomery of Smistoun,and his son in trouble in 
1596 for oppressive acts against a Cunningham neighbour 
in contravention of an act of caution they had given 
to G1encairn. Smistoun then appears in the 1599 charges 
but then no more is heard of him.41 The remaining lairds 
40. li.P.C., ~, P 539, p 543; vii, p 233-34; viii, p 138-39, 
p 252, p 262-63. 
41. ibid., v, p 271, P 539,· p 543. 
, 
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thus lord Boyd had no reason to be concerned for the sake of 
his daughter while his grandson was not his responsibility 
at all but that of his own Montgomery kinsmen. In other 
words l one ought not to expect cognatic relations to have 
any responsibility for one another and even had Giles lived l 
\ Boyd's responsibility would have been for her, not for her 
son.43 
Another neighbouring lord whose affairs overlapped 
, 
somewhat into Cunningham wes lord Semple whose lands lay 
along the marshy cDstle Semple loch in 'oJest Renfrewshire. 
The Semple family and the earls of Glencairn had a history 
of feud stretching back to the l530'sl and while the two 
had worked together in an uneasy alliance during the 
civil war, their's was among the first feuds to be re-
. opened at its conclusion with a violent exchange taking 
place between the 3rd lord Semple and the 4th earl of 
Glencairn in 1573. Not surprisingly lord Semple allied 
himself to the earl of Eglinton and three marriages took 
place between the two families. Of lord Semple's daughters, 
one married Robert Nontgomery of Skelmorlie who was slain 
by the Maxwells, another was married to the elder Hessilhead l 
and Semple's son, the 4th lord, rr.arried the younges~ daughter 
of the 3rd earl of Eglinton so that he was brother-in-law 
43 •. Scots Peerage, v, p 161-63 1 and Paterson's History of 
AIrshire for the geneologies of lesser families; 
Brown,"Bonds of l-fanrentlt ,appendix, p 544, no 65; 
R.P.C., iii, p 11; iv, p 704; vii, p B. 
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or substantial tenants of Scottistoun, Auchinhude, Broomlands 
and Small Acres_all make fleeting appearances in the lists 
~hile the lairds of stane, Brigend, Blackhouse and Sevenacres 
are never mcntioned. 42 
One can see then that the term "Nontgomeries" is a fairly 
meaningful one in the context of this feud. The Eglinton 
family and three of the four principal Montgomery lairds a"ll 
made the feud an important issue in their lives ~hile a 
scattering of petty lairds ~ith the name of Hontgomery can 
also be identified at some point in the feud. Remembering 
that his is a minimum assessment one has to be impressed by 
the degree of kin responsibility ~hich the feud aroused, 
both in seeking blood revenge and in participating in the 
feud settlement. When one realises that the Skelmorlie 
Montgomeries had been an independent cadet branch since 
the late fourteenth century then the degree of kin cohesion 
looks even more strong,than one might have expected in the 
late sixteenth century. 
Evaluating the support given by cognatic relations is 
more difficult and one is never very sure ~hether it is 
the marriage relationship ~hich inspires political support 
or whether it is the reverse ~hich is true. In the case 
of lord Boydts relations ~ith the Montgomeries the marriages 
42. R.P.C., v., p 539, p 543; vii, p'233-34, p 296-97; 
viii, p 138-39, p 252, P 262-63. 
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of his daughters with Montgomeries were part of the settlement 
of his Olfm feud with them in the pre-Reformation period. One' 
daughter, Helen, married the elder Hesselhead and her younger 
sister, Giles, wa~ mnrried to the mur1ered earl of Eglinton 
and was mother to the young fifth earl. Lord Boyd Was thus 
the grandfather of both the earl and of the younger Hessilhead 
and one might argue that he had a very clear interest in the 
affairs of the Montgomeries. In fact his only activities in 
the feud was to be one of the men responsible for getting the 
older earls of Glencairn and Eglinton to sign the 1578 bond 
and to be one of the latter's ca'ltioners daring the Kilwinning 
abbey crisis. He died in 1590 having, as far as one knows, 
taken no part in the fighting against the Cunnin~hams. The 
only other suggestion of Boyd influence being at wo~k between 
1586 and 1590 is that one of his dependants, Boyd o~ Badenheath, 
may have held the Eglinton tutorship for a while before Giffen 
got his hands on it. His son, Thomas, sixth lord Boyd, did 
hO'-1ever participate in the violent episodes of 1591 and was 
summoned to answer for keeping the peace,while in 1604 he 
had to give caution that he would not intercommune with some 
outlawed Hontgomeries. Chronic ill health may have been the 
reason for him playing no further part in the feud, but 
whatever the reason, the Boyds really made the affairs of 
their affinal kinsmen a low priority in their list of local 
p01it~ca1 concerns. One possible reason for this may have 
been that Giles had died before her husband's murder and 
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to the murdered earl. Like lord Boyd, Semple's first known 
participation in the feud was in the fighting of 1591 when 
he too had to find caution for his behaviour. In 1604 he 
appeared before the council with the young earl of Eglinton 
to plead for certain concessions related to their feud with 
\ Glencairn, and in 1606 he declared his willingness to submit 
his feud with the earl. However, in the following year it 
was he who proved obstinate and who h~ld proceedings up. 
The determination of both sides to procrastinate finally 
persuaded the crown to treat the two feuds independently 
as Glencairn had asked, and peace between Semple and Glencairn 
had to wait a few months longer than that with Eglinton. 
Semple's involvement thus looks very much like that of a 
man who was playing for his own stakes, his allianGe with 
the l-iontgomeries being formed in order to strengthen his 
hand against Glencairn, and affinal obligations being of 
little concern in his calcl.llations. 44 
Marriage brought a few other families into the Hontgomery 
orbit. A daughter of Hessilhead's was married to William Muir 
of Rowallan, a neighbouring Renfrewshire laird, and while 
44. Hay wrote of the Samples "They be allyed with th' er les 
of Eglinton, and have bene sometyme in controversy with 
the Cunnyhames, and overmatched with that surname; men 
sufficient hardy, their lyvinge not greate, and of late 
hurte." E timate of the Scottish Nobilit Durint7 the 
Hinority of Jemes the Sixth, ed. C.Rodgers, London, 
1873), p 23. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, i, p 164; 
R.P.C., ii, p 12, p 155; vii, p 160, p 233-34, p 296-97; 
viii, p 221-22. 
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Rowallan himself had no part in the feud, Muir of Ca11well, 
whose father was slain by the Cunninghams in 1570, was 
acting as another of Giffen' s cautioners in 1591 and was 
charged with having his men in arms that year. He \.las 
regularly included in the peace negotiations. Rowallan 
\ himself may have been put off too close an alliance with 
the Montgomeries because of his mm ill fe~ling to'Wards 
lord Boyd with whom he had been at fe~d, and in fact a 
Muir of Thornton and a brother of either Rowa~lan or 
Ca1dwell are listed as friends of Glencairn. 45 The marriage 
of the 3rd earl of Eglinton's elder daughter to a younger 
son of lord Seton brought a closer identity since Alexander 
Seton became the sole heir to the EgLinton earldom and thus 
had a large interest in the affairs of his Montgomery 
kinsmen. In 1606 he and one of his brothers were involved 
in some fighting in Perth with Glencairn.46 Giffen married 
a daughter of Carnpbell of Loudon and both he and Campbe11 
of Terrinyeane are referred to as being at feud with the 
Cunninghams in 1588, they were both charged to keep the 
peace in 1591 along with others in the feud and in 1608 
Loudon was asked to assist in the negotiation procedures. 47 
45. R.P.C., iv, p 98, p 704, p 747; v, p 543, vii, p 233-34, 
p 296-97; viii, p 138-89, P 252, p 262-63; Worma1d, 
"Bloodfeud, Kj.ndred and Government", p 77. -
46. R.P.C., viii, p 221-22. 
47. B.R.O., Glcncairn Muniments, GD 39/5/68; R.P.C., iv, 
p 704, v~ii, p 138-89. 
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In a small locality such as this most men were either 
one's friends or one's enemies and marriage was thus restricted 
to a fairly narrow number of socially and politically acceptable 
people. The only case of marriage between families who were 
not at peace brought disaster as the kin loyalties of a wife • 
remained fixed with the family of her birth. Generally then, 
men made safe marriages into the families of their friends 
and only feud settlements forced them to depart from this 
pattern; that and perhaps love. Few of the nobility of 
north A~shire were men of the court, most of the time they 
lived in their locality and married the women who lived 
there, and the same was true of the lairds. In their 
determination to pursue suitable marriages within the 
selective social class of significant landowners i~ a 
small locality, the tendency would be to reinforce the 
kin group; hence the repeated interrelationship of 
Montgomeries, Boyds and Semples. Thus the political 
implications of these marriages remained limited to the 
self-interest which had brought the two families together 
in the first place and responsibility for another kin was 
not one of the duties consequent of the marriage. 
A few other figures appeared on the Montgomery side 
during the feud. These were men who were dependants or 
simple friends of the earls of Eglinton and their kinsmen. 
Houston of ·.that Ilk, another west Renfrewshire laird, was 
the most important of these. In 1576 Houston's brother 
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led a party of men in an attack ~hich left one of Glencairn's 
servants dead and led to a feud ~ith the Cunninghams. The 
master of G1encairn, the future 6th earl, responded by gathering 
three hundred men and ambushing Houston near to his own house, 
killing two of his servants, wounding another of his brothers' 
and taking a number of prisoners including the laird himself. 
The incident caused ruptures within Glencairn's own supporters 
since Cunningham of Glengarnock and Porterfield of that Ilk 
were both friends of Houston's and took his side throughout 
the earlier years of the feud. In 1582 the government ordered 
both sides to make peace, but the feud persisted, am. ~hen the 
Cunningham-Hontgomery fetld broke out again, Houston was a 
~illing ally of the latter and was consistently involved with 
the Montgomeries in the pacification procedures. 48 James Howat 
of Busbie was a dependant of Eg1inton's, took part in raids 
against the Cunninghams and was included in the latter stages 
of the settlement. 49 John Pollok of that Ilk, also from west 
Renfrewshire, may have been Langshaw's son-in-law and was 
certainly a rival of the l~ells of Pollok, kinsmen to the 
Maxwells who supported Glencairn. It was he who murdered 
Clonbeith, Eglinton's killer, and he ~as charged in 1591-92 
for his part in not keeping the peace of the locality.5O 
Robert Cunningham of Whithirst joined Montgomery of Sreistoun 
48. 
49. 
R.P.C., ii, P 576; iii, p 503; iv, p 248. 
S.R.O., Eglinton Huniments, G.D. 3/1/51/514; R.P.C., iv, 
p 94-95; vii, p 233-34, p 296-97; viii, p 252, p 262-63. 
50. Robertson, Ayrshire Families, i, p 298, R.P.C., iv, p 747. 
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on the attack of lady Corsehill's property in 1595, and 
while this was probably nothing more than opportunism on 
his part, it does show some crossing of the kin lines of 
battlo. 51 Others who put in fleeting appearances were 
Ralstoun of that Ilk, Dunlop of that Ilk, Fergushill of 
Fergusland and Lindsay of Crevock, all small men with 
a very limited interest in the feud and possibly with 
axes of their own to grind against Glencairn. 52 
The Montgomery kin alliance was thus a fairly strong 
one even if it was not large or powerful in the wider 
political scene. It was not without its problems. 
Montgomery of Scottistoun was slain by members of the 
Hessilhead branch of the kindred, but it was cohesive 
enough to sustain a feud against a potentially much rr.ore 
powerful adversary. The relative smallness of the geographic 
unity may have been an advantage in creating this cohesion, 
that and Eglinton's murder which gave the Montogomeries a 
strong ideological position to rally around. The degree 
of involvement by affinal kinsmen, the limited number of 
non-Montgomery dependants and the non-participation of 
some Montgomery lairds in the feud as anything other than 
arbitrators shows that one has to be careful when speaking 
about the Montgomery kj.ndred in general terms, but its 
cohesion was greater than that of the Cunninghams. 
51. R.P.C., v, p 271. 
·52. R.P.C., v, p 543; vii, p 296-97; viii, p 138-39, P 252, 
P 262-63. Dunlop had given a bond to the earl of 
Eglinton in 1559, Brown, "Bonds of :t-:Ianrent" ,p 447. 
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Unlike Eglinton, Glencairn's lands and supporters were 
dispersed throughout the country. Historically the Cunninghams 
and Glencairn as their chief, had deep roots in the bailiery 
of Cunningham and they had been there as long as the 
Montgomeries, but by the sixteenth century it was only one 
\ of three districts in which Glencairn had an interest, 
the earl having extensive lands in Dumbartonshire, where 
he had his principal castle at Finlaston, and in Jalloway 
from where he took his title. Thus, while the "Estimate" 
says of EJlinton, that "his power of himself is not greate", 
of the Cunninghams the writer reports that they were "men of 
fayre landes and of greate pO\Jer of their owne surname ••• ".53 
The parts played by the third and fourth earls in the politics 
of the 11arian minority, the Reformation and the civ~l war 
had further enhanced their influence and power outside of 
their inmediate local environments and put them on a par 
with the greatest magnates of the kingdom. 
In Cunningham itself the lands of the earl of Glencairn 
and his kinsmen were broken into three tracts. In the north 
they held lands which stretched from Glengarnock over the 
Ki1birnie Hills into Renfrewshire and down to the shores of 
the Clyde as well as cutting eastwards into Renfrew~hire. 
On the very south of the bailiery and in Kyle their la~s 
swept in a north-easterly arc through Kilmaurs and up towards 
stewarton. They held five castles or tower houses in the 
53. Estimate, plO, p 12. 
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Irvine Valley and surrounding district and others at 
Glengarnock in the north and Caprington in the south. 
Finally, there was a third area between Ardrossan and 
Irvine which they owned. With their Renfrewshire allies 
they thus surrounded the l1ontgomeries on all sides. 
The immediate Glencairn family wes also much larger 
than that of Eglinton. Both Alexander, the famous fourth. 
earl, and the fifth earl, also Alexander, were tough men 
of action, though the latter certainly appeared to play 
down the Kilwinning abbey dispute and leave it to his 
younger brother to handle as best as he could. James, 
sixth earl of Glencairn was a more tempest-ious man who 
had, even while his father was alive, responded with 
immediate violence to Houston of that Ilk's challenge. 
Eglinton's murder may not have been his idea, but he 
certainly approved it and directed its prosecution from 
afar. He never attained the political significance of 
his grandfather, but he was a~ home with most of the 
governments and factions of the day and was one of the 
more regular noblemen at court and to sit on the privy 
council. Of his two brothers, John of Ross was involved 
in the plot against Eglinton and was guaranteed p~otection 
by Glencairn, being actually present at the murder for 
which he acquired a re~ission in 1595-96 and he was 
Wil1iam, 3rd earl, d. 1548 
ID 
THE HOUSE OF GLENCAIRN 
i) Catherine Borthwick (lord Borthwick) 
i~) Elizabeth Campbell (~est Loudon) 
. . .................................. . 
Alexander, 4th earl, d. 1575 
m 
Janet Hamilton (Arran) 
ii) Janet Cunningham (Capringtan) 
ii) Andrew of Corsehill - the house of Corsehill 
iii) Hugh of vlatterstoun - the house of Carlun:; and 1.Jatterstoun 
iv) Robert of il.ontgreer.an 
v) l-Jilliam, bishop of Argyll 
vi) Elizabeth rn Sir John Cu~~ingharn of Caprington. 
vii) Jean ID .R.obert Fergusson of Craigdarroch 
Aie~~d~;:·5th·~~;i:·d:~i580········ii) also by first marriage AndrN of Syid 
rn iii) James, prior of Lesmahagow 
Janet Gordon (Lochinvar) iv) Hargaret rn 1. John Wa11ace of Cra'igie 
• 
v) 
vi) 
ii. Lord Ochiltree 
and by second mar~iage 
Andrew of Hontgreenan, cOIl'mendator of Kilwinning ID Jean B1air 
Janet m Archibald, 5th earl of Argyll 
ii) H·.unphrey Colquhoun of Luss 
.................................... 
James, 6th earl, d. 1631 
m 
daughter of Carnpbell of Glenorchy 
ii) Agnes Hay (Kingask) 
ii) John of Ross 
iii) \Hlliam, rector of Inchcai1leoch 
iv) Jean rn i. Hald::!ne of :ileneegles 
ii. Kirkpatrick of Closeburn 
v) I~therine m Fergusson Craigdarroch 
vi) Margaret m Sir Lachlan Hore Haclean of Duart 
vii) Elizabeth m i. CravJford of A!lchinarnes . 
ii. Alexander C!lnningham of Crai~ends • 
viii) Sus2nne m Napicr of Kilmahew 
I\) 
I\) 
-.J 
• 
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throughout consistently involved in the feud. 54 The earl's 
other brother, William, rector of Inchcailleoch, took 
no part in the feud at all. 
Of Glencairn's three .uncles, Andrew of Syid and 
James, prior of Lesmahagow are never heard of in the feud 
and their families did not live in the locality. Their 
younger brother, however, was Nontgreenan, the comJ!'.enaator 
of Kilwinning, who was, as one has already seen, at odds 
with the Montgomeries from the 1570's when he took over 
at Kilwinning. He was in cOffimand of the murder of Eglinton 
while Glencairn directed it from elsewhere and was himself 
later to be murdered by the revenging Hontgomeries. His 
son JDmes continued to identify with Glencairn and was 
prominent in all the negotiations leading up to the 
settlement in 1609. 55 
Moving another generation back to the brothers of 
Glencairn's grandfather one finds that of the two families 
settled in the locality, both gave support to the Cunnin1ham 
cause. The Cunninghams of Corsehill were involved in the 
plotting against Eglinton and the laird of Corsehill him-
self was present at the slaughter. Consequently Corsehill 
was denounced and he became an outlaw, his lands being 
54. Fraser, Memorials of the Montgomeries, ii, p 227-28; 
Robertson, Ayrshire Families, i, p 295-99; R.P.C., v, 
. p 269; vii, p 296-97, viii, p 138-39, p 252, p 262-63. 
55. For James, see R.P.C., v, p 539, p 543; vii, p 296-97. 
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ravaged in his absence and one of his sons, Patrick Cunninghal"l, 
was killed by the Hontgomeries between 1586-88. He was dead 
by the time the crmm began to push for peace in 1599 but 
his son Alexander appeared at every stage of the procedures 
thereafter. 56 
The other family was that of Carlung and Watterstoun. 
In 1582 a Cunningham of Watterstoun was charged to find 
assurance that he would not harm the Montgomeries, and the 
heir to the laird, Archiba1d Cunningham, was slain by his 
enemies though the date of this killing is unknown and 
may have preceded Eglinton's own. Watterstoun appeared 
on one of the 1599 lists, in 1604 Glencairn was relieved 
of any responsibility for him, he appeared only as a 
friend and assister in 1608 and was not present ino1609. 
One can surmise then that this branch of the Cunninghams 
were less eager to pursue the feud and possibly made 
their own peace with the Nontgomeries while there may 
eVen be some doubt as to whether Archibald Cunningham 
was killed, the sources being a little lacking on authority 
on this point. 57 
56. Fraser, Hemorials of the Nont?;omeries, ii, p 227-28, 
P 266; Robertson, Ayrshire Families, i, p 295, P 298; 
R.P.C., iv, p 94-95; v, p 543; S.R.O., G1encairn 
Huniments, G.D. 39/5/68. Note Corsehi11 or Corsewel1. 
57. R.P.C., iii, p 503; v, p 539; viii, p 1, p 138-39, P 549. 
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Glencairn's family, which included all his great-
grandfathers decendants,was fairly committed to the feud 
when one considers the extent of kinship one is dealing 
with here. Of course the fact that Glencairn was their 
lord may have brought more influence to bear than kinship 
alone could, but to find the sons and grandsons of great-
uncles joining with Glencairn in the feud is very impressive 
and S:lggests that a very wide sense of kinship was still 
recognised. Of Glencairn's own sons, however, one finds 
that none of them are ever known to h8ve been active in 
the feud which perhaps is not surprising as none of them 
were particularly inspiring men. 
Of the older established cadet branches of the Cunnin~ham 
kindred, the Cunningham lairds of Glengarnock had held their 
lands since the late thirteenth century. Given that fact 
one is not surprised to find them following what was 
essentially independent looal politics of their own. 
Glengarnock was described in 1577 as "a greate man of 
the Cunnghames", and of his children, the eldest son 
married a daughter of lord Sinclair, his daughters were , 
married into the houses of the lairds of Blair, Kilbirnie, 
Fullwood and Duchall and his grandson and heir was married 
to Glencairn's eldest daughter in what looked like an 
attempt by the earl to pull Glengarnock more closely to 
. 58 
his side. As has already been deen he opposed his 
58. ~stimates, p 22. 
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chief between 1576-82 in the feud with Houston of that Ilk, 
but something happened to sour their relationship and in 
1589 the Houstons killed one of his grandsons and his own 
bastard son" in feid!!. 59 This persuaded G1engarnock to 
move back his lord's protection, but his feud with Houston 
remained to some extent separate and he was not usually 
included along with Glencairn and ot~er principals on 
the Cunningham side during the pacification procedures. 
In 1595 he was denounced for not appearing before the 
council along with the others, he gave caution for Houston's 
safety in 1602, his appearenace in 1607 was because of the 
separate feud with Hessilhead, something he denied, unless 
Hessilhead " ••• weld qualifie a feid", he appeared in 1608 
as a friend of Glencairn's and he was not there in 1609.60 
To expect the same level of kin obligation from a man 
whose kinship with Glencairn in the male line had diverged 
along different paths some four hundred years before as 
one might expect from Hontgreenan would be foolish, and 
it was as his lord that Glencairn had more influence over 
Glengarnock. 
The laird of Caprington was also one of the older 
cadets, a man of substantial means, and like Glengarnock 
he had his lands on the periphery of the area of worst 
feuding. He had already been mentioned as knowing about 
59. Pitcairn~ Criminal Trials, i, part 2, p 182-83. 
60. R.P.C., v, p 248; vi, p 731; vii, p 324; viii, p 138-39. 
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the Eglinton plot but as remaining apart from its execu.tion • 
. In 1586 he accompanied Glencairn before the privy council on 
a matter relating to remissions and in the second of the 
1599 charges he ~as listed. On the whole then the limit 
61 
of his involvement ~as that of a distant advisor. 
The same cannot be said of Alexander C~nningham of Aiket 
and his son James. Aiket was a close conspirator in 1586,. 
was one of the murderers and was outlawed for his crime. 
His family and his lands suffered badly from the ravaging 
of the Hontgomeries and he himself was killed some time 
around 1602 after he had allegedly received a remission 
from the king. Both he and his sons, James and Alexander, 
and from 1607 his grandson, i.filliam C1.lnningham of Aiket, 
were regularly included in the pacification procedures 
and there can be little doubt about t.he extent of his 
family's commitment to the feud. 62 
David Cunningham of Robertland was something of the 
hero and the villain of the piece. It was he the "Historie" 
tells ~s, who was responsible for lulling Eglinton into a 
false sense of security while plottin~ his murder. He too 
took part in the killing, was outlawed, his lands were 
raided and his house occupied by Giffen.63 However", 
61. Fraser, !·femorials of the Montgomeries, ii, p 227; 
~.P.C., v, P 269, p 539, p 543. 
62. Fraser, Memorials, ii, p 226, P 227-28; Robertson, 
Ayrshire Fa~ilies, i, p 295; Historie, p 240; R.P.C. 
iv, p 94-95; v, p 269, p 543; vii, p 233-34, P 296-97; 
viii, p 138-39, P 252, P 262-63. 
63. As note 2 and Historie, p 239-40. 
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Robertland fled abroad Dnd ended up in Denmark where he 
became something of a favourite of Anne of Denmark, 
returned to Scotland with her, '.Jas granted a remission, 
was knighted and appointed as the queen's master stabler.64 
In 1599 he was objected to as an Dssessor at the trial of 
Sir James Edmonstone of Duntreath as the latter was third 
of kin to Eglinton and as one might expect he was present 
throughout the pacification stages until his death after 
which his son continued to appear with Glencair~.65 
John Cunningham of Clonbeith was not mentioned in 
any of the plotting and first makes his appearance in 
the records as the man who delivered the killing blow 
to Eglinton. Revenge was not slow in catching up 
with him and a few years later he was brutally do~e 
to death at the home of lord Hamilton where he was 
sheltering in his outlawry. His son James appeared or 
was sl.lIDmoned twice in 1599, but in 1604 Glencairn asked 
to be relieved of further responsibility for him and he 
did not reappear in the Cunningham ranks until 1609. 
Whether this was because he made his own peace with 
the l'~ontgomeries or, as seems more likely, that Glencairn 
was unable to control him, one does not know, but his 
64. Historie, p 240. 
65. PitcDirn, Criminal Trials, :l.i, p 3f£; R.P.C., v, 
p 543; vii, p 233-34, P 296-97; viii, p 138-39, 
. P 252, p 262-63. 
. 66 family's part in the feud cannot be doubted. 
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Of the six major Cunningham lairds in the locality three 
of them then made the feud a matter of principal importance. 
Of the others, Glengarnock largely pursued'his own policies, 
Caprington was not terribly interested and the sixth man, 
the laird of Auchinharvie was even less so, being summoned 
as one of Glencairn's friends in l60S and not appearing. 67 
The reasons for such diversity of loyalty may be as individual 
as the men concerned, Auchinharvie may simply have been a 
man of peace and Robertland a young trouble-maker. However, 
the position of the estates of Aiket, Robertland and 
Clonbeith in the Irvine Valley, where Cunningham-Montgomery 
competition was at its strongest, is perhaps some indication 
of why these lairds were so committed to feuding •. Apart 
from these a further twenty Cunningham lairds make some 
appearance in the records of the feud, mostly in the peace 
procedures. Again it is an impressive list even if some 
of them appear only once while many of them were from other 
localities and it continues to point to far greater kindred 
responsibility than one might have initially expected. 68 
Among the families connected to Glencairn by marria~e, 
66. Robertson, i, p 295-9S; Fraser, ii, p 22Q-30; ~.P.C., 
v, p 539, p 543; vii, p 233-34, P 296-97; viii, 
P 138-39, P 252, p 262-63. 
67. R.P.C., v, p 539, p 543; vii, p 549; viii, p 138-39. 
68. References to these other lairds are found throughout 
the privy council entries concernin.g this feud between 
1599-1609. 
by far the most important 'Was that of lord Hamilton. The 
~fifth earl of Glencairn's mother had been a Hamilton, a 
daughter of the earl of Arran, while one of t.he sixth 
earl's daughters married the second marquis of Hamilton, 
and Hamilton of Libberton was married to another of his 
69 daughters. On two occasions lord Hamilton verged on 
the edge of entering the feud on his'cousin's side. 
The first arose over a quarrel with Giffen about 
Robertland's escheat, the second and more dangerous 
occurred when Clonbeith was killed in Hamilton's house 
by friends of the Nontgomeries who exploited his 
hospitality to get at their enemy. In 1589 the king 
gave the Montgomeries a licence to excuse them from 
attending Hamilton on the borders as after this killing 
he "consauvit and beris ane deidlie haitrcnt, malice 
and inimitiell against them and IIhes manifested him selff 
oppin enemey" to them, and in particular to Giffen, 
having become an "assistair and partaker with the Erll 
of Glencarne in all his Bctionis and querrellis aganis· 
70 thame". However, Hamilton's interests were too 
diverse for him to sustain an interest in this feud 
for long, and while he fought Giffen in the courts his 
support for Glencairn seems to have been largely a 
morale booster. The other reference to Hamilton 
69. Scots Peerage, iv, p 241, p 245-46 • 
• 
70. Fraser, !:jemorials of the ~1ontgomerie!h ii, p 229-30. 
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involvement ~as in 1608 ~hen the earl of Abercorn promised 
- to use his influence ~ith both sides to speed up the 
negotiations. 71 Other families ~ith marriage alliances 
to Glencairn ~ere the Gordons of Lochinvar from ~hom 
his mother came and the Campbe11s of Glenorchy from ~hence 
his o~n ~ife came, but both these marriages had been made 
~ith an eye to their influence on the other localities in 
~hich Jlencairn's family had a stake and ~ere too distant-
to be of any help in north Ayrshire. 72 
Four other families appeared ~ith Glencairn at some 
point in the feud. The Maxwells have already been 
referred to in their feud ~ith Skelmorlie. Apart from 
~hat has already been said about them, ~fuxwoll or Ne~ark's 
brothers took part in the killing of Eglinton and'were 
outla~ed for it, and the Maxwells were regularly present 
throughout the peace negotiations in various capacities.73 
Porterfield of Douchall was another Renfrewshire laird 
who had been a client of the fourth ~arl but who 
quarrelled with Glencairn and his father and in fact 
Glencairn destroyed Douchall's house some time around 
1582.74 However, the old wounds heeled and Porterfield, 
71. R.P.C., viii, p 138-39. 
72. Scots Peerage, iv, p 242, p 244. 
73. R.P.C., v, p 269; vii, p 296-97, p 324; viii, p 138-39, 
P 252, P 262-63. 
74. S.R.O. Glencairn Muniments, G.D., 39/~62, 39/1/112, 
39/1/118; E.P.C., iii, p 195, P 556. 
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or his son, drifted back into Glencairn's favour and he 
. appeared as one of his friends in 1609. Boyd of Clerkland 
and Arnot of Lochrig also appeared as his frienda. 75 
The impression one has of the Ounningham kindred and 
Glencairn's lordship \oIas that it \oIas less tightly knit 
than that of the Hont.gomeries. The reasons for this have 
already been hinted at. Glencairn's kinsmen and friends 
\oIere less geographically united than his enemies and he 
himself did not even reside in the locality; at least t\olO 
of the Ounningham lairds in the locality, Glengarnock and 
Oaprington, \oIere men of substantial standing in their o\oln 
right and had their o\oln affairs to attend to; the kindred 
\oIas much larger aOO thus there \oIas more room for dissen't; 
and one even finds Glencairn at feud \oIith the laird of 
Craigen1s or at least to have bitterly quarrelled \oIith 
him in a rift \oIhich lasted for over twenty years; and the 
marriage alliances of the Glencairn family \oIere even less 
76 likely to bring support than those made by the }fontgomeries. 
One can perhaps suggest that Glencairn was not a particularly 
good lord and became involved in quarrels with too many 
people, including men who would under less strained conditions 
have been his friends. Even his failure to really protect 
his kinsmen in the events following 1586 suggest that he 
75.,R.P.O., vii, p 233-34, P 296-97; viii, p 138-39, P 252, 
P 262-63. 
76. S.R.O., Glenceirn l1uniments, G.D., 39/1/91; S.R.O., 
Craigend \~rits, G.D., 148/27/205; R.P.O., iv, p 415; 
v, p 649. 
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was a man not exactly to be trusted. He was a strange wixture 
of cold calculation and blustering action and his lordship 
may have "ieakened the cohesiveness of his followers. On the 
other hand to feud with the Hontgomeries the Clmninghams did 
not need to be fully mobilised and their strength was such 
that they could afford a few malcontents. Even so, one is 
still talking about a large-sized body of kinsmen and allies 
taking part in the feud and in no way could one suggest that 
either the Cunningham kindred or Glencairn's lordship were 
too seriously in question. 
In analysing the anatomy of just two of the many 
corporate interest groups which formed the opposing sides 
in each of the feuds of this period one can see that it 
was a more complex business than a mere reference to 
Cunninghams, Hontgomeries, Campbells or Gordons often 
suggests. Both contemporaries and historians have too 
often ll~ped men together without thought for their 
individuality. ·It is a convenience to do so and one will 
continue to do it, but at least one ought to be more aware 
of the subtleties involved in the relations between lords 
and their men and among kinsmen, subtleties which were 
even greater than the rather course analysis which 
sparse records have permitted in this case study. With 
these facts and impressions in mind one can follow the 
feud in the years which followed Eglinton's death with 
a degree of more critical insight. 
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One traditional account of ~hat happened after the murder 
of Eglinton in 1586 runs as follows: 
"The horror of the fact struck every-body ~ith 
amazement and consternation, and all the country 
ran to arms, either on the one side of the quarrel 
or the other, so that for sometime there ~as a 
scene of bloodshed and murder in the ~est, that had 
never been known before ••• the friends of the family 
of Eglintanflocked to the Master of Eglinton, his 
brother's death, from all quarters; and in the heat 
of their res entment, killed every C '.mninghame, 
~ithout distinction, they could come by, or even 
so much as met on the highways, or living peacably 
in their own hous es. " 77 
In trying to assess just ho~ true thi~ interpretation 
of the feud is one encounters a number of problems already 
touched on in the above discussion on violence. 
Contemporaries ~ould certainly not neglect to tell of 
the killing of an earl and even a laird was unlikely 
to be missed, but the slaughter of a servant or tenant 
could all too easily be covered up with generalisations. 
On the other hand accounts which tell us that "the 
Montgomeries of Eglinton had ridden, like a destroying 
angel, over the lands of the C~nninghames in North 
Ayrshire, and in fire and rapine and slau~hter, had 
left the place a blackened desolation;" must be - . 
approached with more suspicion than the author of these 
~ords approached his evidence. 78 What one can do is 
try to look at the pattern of revenge both in the 
violent response and in the attempt to extract formal 
77. Robertson, Axrshire Families, i, p 296-97. 
78. From Ayrshire's stort, o.~idlothian, 1977). 
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legal redress. Hopefully one can then analyse more carefully 
what form the feud took after 1586. Certainly if the above 
accounts are true then C~nningham must have been a truly 
terrible place to live at this time, and if other feuds were 
like it, the kingdom must have been filled with men whose 
necks were twisted with having to constantly look over their 
shoulders. 
Examples of this sort of indiscriminate violence are 
in fact quite rare. Widespread trouble throughout the 
locality did not take place until five years after the 
murder, in 1591, when it was reported that ".-0. between these 
two, twenty or thirty persons slain in one day and nothing 
accounted of". 79 The source which reported this can be 
shown to have exaggerated its accounts of Huntly's -feuding 
_ in the north, and as it was written in Berwick one might 
reasonably assume that the tale had grown in the telling. 
However there certainly was considerable trouble in the 
locality throughout the summer and autumn months of 1591 
and ~affen, Langshaw, Hessilhead, Skelmorlie, lord Boyd, 
lord Semple and Mure of Caldwell on one side, and Caprington 
and ~~xwell of Newark on the other, had to give caution 
that they would keep the peace. FUrthermore, Glencairn 
was warded for a short while. In the following spring 
Glencairn on one side arn Langshaw, Semple, CAldwell and 
Pollok of that Ilk were all in trouble with the council for 
79. C.SoP.Scot., x, p 574. 
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failing to disband the forces which they had kept in 
arms throughout the winter. The unrest continued during 
that summer with both G1encairn and the Montgomeries 
assembling more men in November before matters quietened 
down in the winter of 1592-93.80 One probable casualty of 
this period was Mont~reenan who was shot dead at the door 
of his house and it may in fact have been his murder \oJhich 
sparked off the fury of the following months.Sl 
. That a number of people were killed during these months 
seems very likely, indeed , other feuds saw eq'la11y 1a.rge 
numbers killed in such encounters. A reaction to Hontgreenan's 
death seems the most likely explanation for it, especially 
when one considers Glencairn's temperament in such matters, 
and the murder of his uncle would have been especially 
hard for him to accept lightly. Another factor to be t3ken 
into account was that the Nontgomeries legal case against 
the Cunningham lairds who killed Eglinton had collapsed 
in the spring and in their frustration they may have thus 
82 . 
killed Montgreenan. The period was olso on the wider 
political map one of extreme instability with the breaking 
of the Bothwell scandal, Huntly's war with the 3tewarts 
in the north, trouble in the south-west and economic 
depression. This may explain why the crown was less 
80. R.P.C., iv, p 701, p 704, p 709; q.S.P.Scot., x, p 812, 
P S19. 
Sl. He was dead by August 1591, see below voli, p 243. 
'S2. See below vol,i, p 243. 
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concerned with north Ayrshire than it might otherwise have 
been. How many poor men were slain or hurt and how many 
lost homes and livestock or produce one does not know, 
the violence of these months remains clouded. Uhat is 
certain is that it was unusual and that on the whole the 
revenge of the Nontgomeries was much more select.ive. 
An exact list of Eglinton's murderers does not exist 
but one can be compiled of most of the more important 
men there. Glencairn himself was not present and in 
fact managed to avoid any suspicion from the authorities 
and neutral observers. However, he did this at the 
expense of some of his friends who received less protection 
than they had been led to expect in the bond the earl gave 
them promising that as "it is fallen out that the said ErIe 
of Eglintoun is slane" he would protect them in la'-1 and out 
of it.S) Those who did take part in the killing were 
Robertland, Clonbeith, Ross, Aiket and his brother, Corsehill 
and his son, the Maxwell brothers, Cunningham of Bordland 
with his son or a servant, one is not sure which, CUnningham 
of Polquhern and a servant, and John f'1burn of that Ilk. 
Of these, all but Clonbeith and Ryburn are known to have 
been outlawed.84 Hontereenan was not implicated in the 
killing but the Hontgomeries were very suspicious of his 
8) •. Fraser, Memorials of the Montgomeries, ii, p 227-28. 
8~ .• Hoysie, Memoirs, p 57; Robertson, AYrshire Families, 
i, p 295; Historie, p 240; Fraser, ~emorials of the 
Nontgomeries, ii, p 227-28; R.P.C., iv, p 94; v, 
p 269. 
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part in directing it, and as we have already seen their 
suspicions were well founded. Obviously many more men 
were at the killing with their masters but their names are 
not recorded. 
Selective revenge was to fall fatally on four of 
these men. Corsehill's son was killed within two years, 
possibly by Langshaw as was suggested above or by Giffen.85 
Clonbeith was killed within the same time period, being 
dragged out of a chimney in Hamilton's house snd hewn to 
pieces by Pollok of that Ilk and his Montgornery friends. 86 
As early as 1587 }!ontgreenan complained that Giffen and 
his men were pursuing him and a year later he complained 
that servants belonging to Giffen and Langshaw had been 
lying in wait near his home to kill him and the cowmendator 
seems to have lived under constant fear 'l!ltil he was in fact 
killed outside his house by the Montgomeries in 1591.87 
Finally, Aiket, whose lends were attacked a munber of 
times during his outlawry, was also shot down close by 
his house. 8S These are the only men for whom there is 
85. S.R.O., Glencairn Huniments, G.D., 39/5/68 and above p 214. 
86. Fraser, Hemorials of the Mont\jomeries, ii, p 229-30. 
87. Robertson, Ayrshire Families, i, p 297. The commendatorship 
was granted to the senator of the college of justice, 
Mr William Melville, who in 1604 resigned it in favour 
of the fifth earl of Eg1inton so that the Montgomeries 
finally got their hands on it after all. S.R.O., . 
E&llinton Muniments, G.D., 3/1/77/689, 3/1/77/6?9, 
3/1/77/701; Reg. MaR. 3i~., vol v, part 2, p 709-10, 
no 2085. 
88. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 812, P 819. 
individual evidence that they were slain. As far as one 
knows Eglinton wa s the last importa nt Hontgomery to die in 
the feud though some may have been killed in 1591-92. 
Violence of course need not be fatal for it to hurt. 
Most of Eglinton's killers were horned o.nd thus had to 
flee abroad or take refuge with powerful friends as Clonbeith 
tried to do. In doing so they left their families and 
properties defenceless and vulnerable and the Montgomeries 
were not slow to exploit this weakness. In August of l5S6, 
four months after Eglinton's death, the wives and children 
of Aiket, Corsehill and Bordland with their tenants and 
labourers complained that Giffen, Langshaw, Hessilhead, 
Mowat of Busbie and their friends and accomplices were 
systematically oppressing them in the name of the 
commission they had against the murderers of the earl. 
What they suffered was by no means untypical of the period 
but it is an insight into the less dramatic incidents of 
the feud. l1any of their houses had been burned including 
that of Corsehill which had in fact been delivered up to 
the Hontgomeries when the laird of Corsehill was horned. 
Their goods had been stolen and the corbels, gates and 
even the stones of their homes had been smashed. These 
raids had" ••• alluterlie wrakit and distroyit the pure 
tennentis and labouraris of the ground ••• ", taking away 
all their goods and forcing them to pay their males, fermes 
• 
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and duties to the Hontgomcries for the immediate term am 
the Hartinmas term to come. It was also feared that they 
intended to cut the standing corns and take them away thus 
totally ruining them. Now to add to the miseries of these 
Cunninghams and their tenants the donators of the escheats 
of their husbands were looking for their cut and were 
expected to take anything that was left. The privy council 
ordered Giffen not to destroy any of the houses he had in . 
his possession and ordered him to put a garrison in them 
to see that they were properly maintained. However, the 
cost of the garrisons of six men in Robertland and four in 
Aiket was to be borne by the livings of these estates at 
a total cost of £60 a month so that the complainers were 
even worse off after their cornp1aint. 89 In fact in 1592 
parliament decided that the council had gone too far in 
this action, exceeding its legal powers and causing the 
destruction of the house of Aiket which was lying ruined 
amidst wasted lands.90 
Ten years later lady Corsehill was still complaining 
of raids she suffered between 1593-96. In one of these 
her daughter had almost been killed and was only saved 
by Glencairn's timely intervention. However, more 
houses had been burned and looted and her tenants had 
been warned not to work for her again or the Montgomeries 
89. R.P.C., iy, P 94-95. 
90. A.P.S., iii, P 611. 
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would "mak thameselffis to repent it".91 This time the crown 
took a harder line against the Montgomeries, time having made 
the king less sympathetic to their cause. 
How does one measure such violence? Over the period 
from 1586-1606 when the last act of violence took place 
some thirty or more men may have died as a result of Eglirtton's 
murder. However, only four are known to have been killed·so 
that the number of deaths could be anything from over thirty 
to less than five. The intensive raiding on the Cunnin3ham 
estates in the Irvine Valley did not, as far as one knows, 
result in any deaths, but the misery and suffering inflicted 
on the poor labourers who worked for these lairds and even 
on their wives who had to face these hardships without 
their support, and with only minimal protection from 
Glencairn who was too busy trying to keep his own hands 
clean, made their lives considerably less secure for over 
ten years. This was a society more able to cope with 
suffering than our own, where bad weather, bad harvests 
and the Hontgomeries were all of a orie to the struggling 
farmer, but while life went on one cannot underestimate 
the effect of the feud on the locality, particularly in 
the economic and climatic conditions of the 1590's. 
What one can soy with a reasonable degree of certainty 
is that the l{Iontgomeries did not go around killing everyone 
, 91. R,P.C. l v, p 271. 
.. 
... 
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of the name of CQnningham. They never attacked the lands 
or the- families of the Cunninghams of Glengarnock, Capringt0n 
or Auchinharvie, but confined their attacks to the murderers 
and their estates. Even there, while they devastated the 
property of these men, they did not seek out and kill 
anyone but the principals themselves, except in the 1591-92 
period when a state of civil war appeared to exist in the 
locality. Furthermore, the Cunninghams made no attempt 
to take the issue any further and again with the exception 
of 1591-92, accepted their losses rather stoically. Perhaps 
the changing political context of the 1590's had something 
to do with this or Glencairn was just getting older and 
had lost his old passion for blood-letting. In a sense 
then the locality and its competing families established 
their own ~round-rules and contained the feud at a level 
which was acceptable to them both. The local economy 
and local justice continued to function and the crown 
was only involved at a very modest level. Feud did not 
reduce men to anarchy, at least not in this feud. Had 
Glencairn been more determined to accept his role as 
protector of the killers, had Eglinton's heir been an 
adult male, had lord Hamilton decided to lend a hand, 
all might have been different; such is the uncertainty 
of human affairs. Yet if an unthinking violent response 
had,always been men's response to their foes then society 
would never have progressed from the cultivation of a few 
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fields around a fortified camp protected by a war-lord and 
his fighting men. There may be analogies for this in the 
sixteenth century Scottish lord with his attendants, 
retainers and tovler-house, but it can be exaggerated and 
the evidence of this feud points to a form of conflict 
which, though still boody, and fatally SO for quite a 
number of people, was nevertheless limited in its 
destructiveness by unwritten rules of conduct which were 
themselves the product of an evolved common sense and 
. 92 
self interest. 
\\'hile pursuing this bloody campaign of revenge, the 
11ontgomeries did not neglect to exploit the formal organs 
of the law. Giffen quickly established himself as the 
leader of his kinsmen, fended off an attempt by the Boyds 
to acquire the tutorship of his nephew and paid the two 
great court brokers, chancellor t~itland and treasurer Glamis, 
for the ward and non-entry of his brother's lands and 
offices.93 He also took the matter ~o the king who had 
the killers of Eglinton outlawed, ordered that they be 
brought for trial before the justice and gave Giffen the 
right to intromit with Robertland's and Aiket's houses 
and lands.94 This led to his first clash with lord Hamilton 
92. This tendency to create mytholo1ieS from violence has 
been discussed by J.A.lnciardi, A.A.Block, L.A.Hallowell, 
A-tlistorical Approach to Crime, p 91-115, where, for 
example, they have analysed the 1931 Hafia murders and 
discovered that the evidence points to the killing of 
four men not sixty as claimed. 
93. S.R.O., Eglinton Huniment, G.D., 3/1/20/204. 
94. Historie, p 240; R.P.C., iv, p 94-95, p 9Sj v, p 269. 
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who claimed that he had the escheat of these lairds, but 
Giffen was able to beat him off by having his rights confirm'ea. 
in parliament in July 1587.95 During 1587-88 Giffen and 
Montgreenan took their cases before the privy council with 
the latter asking that Giffen and his friends be made to 
assure Hontgreenan and stop harrowing him and his friends. 
However, Giffen retorted that he could not be asked to 
assure Eglinton1 s killers, the council agreed with him and' 
the commendator finally lost his case.96 Shortly afterwards 
Giffen was granted a commission giving him all his brother 1s 
offices in the bailiery of Cunningham and the regality of 
K'l' i 97 1. W1.nn ng. 
In the two years following Eglinton 1s death Giffen had 
been able to count on the sympathy of the king, his council 
and on parliament 1;.]ho had all been angered at the murder of 
an earl. Glencairn1s reluctance to get involved had also 
prevented any blocking of his moves through a rival court 
faction. However, March 1588 was th~ high water mark in 
his legal campaign for justice and thereafter the Cunnlnghams 
began to rally back as the memory of Eglinton1s death receded 
from the minds of all but his kinsmen. In 1589 Hamilton 
re-opened his case against Giffen and this time won, 
98 Giffen being ordered to give up the houses in his possession. 
95 •. R.P.C., iv, p 215; A.P.S., iii, P 479. 
96. R.P.C., ~v, p 223-24, P 226. 
97. S.R.O., Eglinton ~1uniments, G.D., 3/1/15/129. 
98. R.P.C., iv, p 387. 
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However, Giffen irgnored the order and it was not until Nc'lrch 
1591 that he was given a discharge for handing over Robertland 
house. By this time Robert1and had also returned with the 
queen and had been promised the kins's protection while that 
same year Giffen was obliged to give lady Aiket caution for 
her safety thus bringing to an end the period of oppression 
which had the tacit approval of the crown.99 
This set-back in the courts may have been the reason 
for both sides taking to the fields in 1591; Giffen because 
of frustration and Glencairn because he could now identify 
more closely with his Ayrshire kinsmen without suspicion. 
During 1592 the 1-1ontgomeries even found themselves in 
trouble with the crown when they were slow to respond to 
the order to de-escalate the conflict in the locality and 
Giffen was himself horned for having failed to pay his 
100 . brother's debts. ~~at was happening was that there 
was after 1591 a gradual shift on the crown's part away 
from punishing the Cunninghams ~o bringing about peace in 
the feud. In June 1592 parliament fully restored Robertland, 
allowing him to return to his house, and Giffen was discharged 
from Aiket's house which he was still exploiting. In an 
exchange between the king end Glencairn in parliament it 
also became apparent that a number of other murderers had 
had remissions from the king for when the latter said that 
99. R.P.C., iv, p 601, p 675. 
100. R.P.C., iv, p 760; S.R.O.', Eglinton Nuniments, G.D., 
3/1/20/207. 
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he had not granted any other remissions to any of Eglinton's 
killers, Glencairn immediately protested that this declaration 
should not prejudice the ri~hts of any of his friends who in 
fact held any. Clearly the king had given privy remiscions. lOl 
The next few years in fact revolved around Giffen's 
attempts to keep his enemies at the horn, thus making them 
more vulnerable targets for revenge, and Glencairn's effor,ts 
to have their hornings suspended. In 1593 Giffen had Aiket 
and Ryburn summoned to answer concerning alledged remissions 
they held.102 In 1596 he and his kinsmen complained to 
the council that a number of the killers had recently 
acquired remissions with which they hoped to put an end 
to the legal case against them. Giffen cited the king's 
promise that this would not happen and reminded th'e 
.. 
councillors of the recent legislation on remissions, adding 
that if they were It ••• frustrat of justice, it will 
discourage all men to se1.k redress be ordour of justice 
heirefter, bot rather to seik thair privat revenge at 
their best advantage ••• ", something which he and his 
friends had been doing for the last ten years anyway. 
No decision was given and the matter was remitted to 
the justice and his deputies. l03 One suspects that 
Glencairn and his friends were winning the battle by 
101. A.P.S., iii, P 610-11. 
102. R.P.C., v, p 105. 
103. ibid, p 269-70. 
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this time because of their ability to exploit the king's 
laxity in the matter of remissions, and because with the 
shift towards pacification of the feud it became necessary 
to restore the kiJlers. TIlis was certainly the case by 
1599 when many of them were summoned with Glencairn to 
appear before the council and begin peace talks. 
It is difficult to be sure whether in their use of the 
law Giffen and his kinsmen were only manipulating it so 
that blood vengeance was made easier or whether ~hey were 
just making the best of a system that was not really able 
to bring these men to justice anyway. Certainly not one 
of the killers ever reached the justice courts and even 
the pr'ivy council has very little to say on the killing 
when compared to those of a similar nature. The 
. ~lontgomeries did not even try to pin the blame on Glance irn 
and thus set up a show-down trial with Glencairn determined 
to clear his name as happened in other feuds. All Giffen 
seemed to want was the outlawing of t~e better known 
killers so that he could enforce his own brand of local 
justice. Similarly the Cunnin~hams did not bring the 
fact of Hontgreenan's murder to the central government 
but left the matter to be resolved in the locality. On 
the whole there was a great reluctance to let the feud be 
handled by the crown and a determination to allow local 
politics to be fought out and sett.led in the locality. 
253. 
Eglinton's murder precipitated the locality into a 
period of violence and litigation which was longer than 
would normally be expected. It would be too easy to see 
this as inevitable but in the 1570's the men involved 
in the Kilwinning abbey dispute were able to settle 
their affairs without bloodshed and earlier in the 
century their forefathers had even settled a very violent 
blood-feud. However, the tensions between the two families 
were too intense for.any kind of re3lly lastin~ settlement 
and once blood was spilled such a likeJihood became even 
more remote. The crown's intervention in the locality 
in 1582 had produced the lSg3 settlement, though not in 
the way the Lennox faction had expected. Until 1595, 
thirteen years later, the crown kept its distance and left 
local men to find their own local solutions to their 
problems. ~'Jhy a settlement could be found in the 1530' s 
and not in the 1590's is not a question one can answer; 
the men in control were different, so were the issues, the 
politics and even the society in which the feud was taking 
place. Unlike in 1576, no well meaning neighbours tried 
to intervene, neither of the leading men on either side 
wanted peace and nor for a while did their kinsmen. Both 
sides still had too many scores they wanted settled. Thus 
in Cunningham, as in so many localities throughout Scotland 
at this time, James VI's government decided to make it 
their business to bring peace. 
254. 
While the cro\01n had made some minimal effort to intervene 
in the affairs of north-Ayrshire politics j.n 15S2 and 1591, 
it was not until 1595, as part of a general assault on the 
feuds, that the kin~ made a more serious attempt to intervene 
again. Observers at the time reckoned the Cunningham-HontgomeOry 
feud to be one of the three major feuds of the country and one 
in which the king himself had an interest.104 Thus on the 
23rd of January 1595 charges YJer.e sent out to the young 
earl of Eglinton and,Houston of that Ilk on one side to 
appear with retinues of no more than sixty and twenty-four 
men respectively on the 15th of January, YJhile Glencairn and 
Glengarnock had to appear with similar numbers on the 17th. 
The two sides were ordered to submit their feud in accordance 
with the 1595 act against feuding which provided f~r private 
arbitration within a framework of governmental control.105 
However, despite the king's very public resolution to 
have the feud ended, the Montgomeries sent their excuses 
and failed to appear.106 Any sign that they were willing 
to negotiate while Eglinton's killers remained unpunished 
would, in their eyes and in the eyes of their enemies, be 
taken as a sign of weakness, and therefore they refused 
to be compromised. The kin&however," ••• is very earnest 
because he thinks, if he pass over this first order and 
104 •. Q.S.P.Scot., xii, p 99. 
105. R.P.C., v, p 248. 
106. C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 102. 
255. 
suffer himself to be disobeyed, he ~ill find difficulties 
hereafter in others." Immediately the case had become a 
test or trial of strength between the crown and the localitip~. 
'Hord was sent to the Nontgomeries that they would all be 
horned if they did not appear within eight days and that 
th k • h" If Id id t d t k th· h 107 e lng lmse wou r e ou an a e elr ouses. 
-
Glencairn was no more compliant than his enemies and shared 
the view that the feud was none of the king's business and 
he did not even bother to send any excuses for failing to 
turn up C~ the seventeenth~8\{hen one did arrive a week 
later it merely enraged the king and court rumour expected 
that James intended to make an example of the two earls.109 
Hhen these impressions filtered through, Glencairn decided 
to put in an appearance on the 29th and was taken ipto ward 
while the Hontgomeries went up to the house of their 3 eton 
kinsmen near Edinburgh and awaited the king's wi1l. 110 A 
week later G1encsirn was freed having been punished 
"bV the purse" which "is kept quiet", thus suggesting that 
the king settled for a private deal with the earl. Assurances 
from both sides were supposed to follow but there is no record 
of them being made and one has to conclude that the first 
111 
round was something of a draw. 
The collapse of the 1595-96 initiative against the feuds 
107. C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 122. 
108. R.P.C., v, p 261. 
109. C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 134. 
110. ibid. , p 136. 
111. ibid., p 142. 
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resulted in a retreat by the crown from the problem and 
it was another two years before it returned to it with 
the 1598 legislation. 112 On the 6th of Februa!y 1599 
Glencairn and Eglinton were charged to appE'ar Rnd settle 
their feud on Harch the 6th and to assure one another 
until the following April. 113 Again nothing seems to 
have come of this and on the lOth of Narch a t'lore specifj.c 
charge ordered Eglinton and a comprehensive list of 
Hontgomery kinsmen to appear on the 22nd of Harch. On that 
date a second list, composed essentially of the same men 
were ordered to appear on the 19th of April, suggesting 
either that the first charge had been ignored again or 
that on the 22nd the time had simply been used as a 
preliminary hearing in which the principle of attendance 
was established. This theory can be borne out by the 
Cunningham lists for these two dates for in the first one 
finds that while the list of Cunningham lairds was very 
extensive, G1encairn, Robertland, Aiket, Corsehtl1 and 
Bordland were not included. The crown was thus arranging 
a meeting between the two kindreds to establish some sort 
of relationship but was trying to ease the proceedings by 
excluding those ~ost closely associated with the murder 
of Eglinton. The inclusion of the sons of the dead . 
Clonbeith and Montgreenan adds furt~er authority to this.114 
112. "For the legislation see vol ii, chapter 8. 
113. R.P.C., v, p 523. 
114. ibid., p 539, p 543. 
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Yet the crOlm had not worked out the machinery to take 
the issue much further, and having brought the two sides 
together on at least one occasion, one does not know if 
the second order of 1599 was obeyed, it retreated end left 
them to follow the procedures of the 1598 act. In fact they 
went back to their locality'and continued the feud. In 
1601 Glencairn had the burgh of Irvine co~firm his men's 
exemption from their jurisdiction as he thought that the 
town was too much in the hands of Eglinton and a year later 
Aiket was killed. 115 It was not until after the 1604 act on 
feuding that another attempt was made by the crown to 
intervene with the privy council taking precognition from 
both earls within a month of that act being passed. 
Furthermore, from an order in December 1605 that assurances 
were to be renewed between Glencairn, Eglinton end Semple 
one can deduce that they were in operation for at least a 
116 year before that date. 
Not surprisingly both earls had trouble convincing their 
men that they should give in to cen~ral government pressure. 
In March 1604 Eglinton and Semple were relieved of 
responsibility for any of their men who broke assurances 
if they brought the offenders before the council and in 
the following months Glencairn freed himself of any 
responsibility for a number of Cunningham lairds who may 
115. R.P.C., vi, p,698. 
'116. ibid., P 600,; vii, p_l53. 
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have made their own peace with the Hontgomeries. However, 
when he tried to get the same general terms as Eglinton 
he ran into difficulties. The council debated his request 
and a number of the nobility present argued that "it wes 
not reasonable to snaire the nobilitie of Scotland with 
sik bands as mich draw thame to sik inconvientis", but 
lord advocate Hamilton was less sympathetic and managed 
to block Glencairn's request though he agreed to discuss 
individual applications for exemptions on their ow~ merit.117 
The sort of incident which worried Glencairn and other 
noblemen occurred on the 1st of July 1606 in Perth during 
the sitting of parliament. Glencairn and his friends were. 
walking along the high street when they encountered George, 
master of Seton and his brother Sir Alexander Seton, 
Eglinton's heir. The principals passed one another without 
incident, but then some of the servants began to jostle one 
another and a fight broke out in which one of Glencairn's 
servants was killed and a number of men hurt. The Setons 
received most of the blame for the incident and the lord 
advocate blamed some "rascall 'servandis", but it was just 
the sort of incident which could spark new life into the 
feud. lIS The king certainly feared that this would revive 
"that new mortifei t monster of deidlie feud", ordered the 
117. R.P.C., vi, p 604, p 818-19; vii, p 549~ p 557 
. "[though this was suspended, p 9), p 160. 
118. R.P.C., vii, p 221-23; Spottiswoode, History, iii, 
p 175-76; Helrose, i, p 17; Balfour, Annales, ii, p 17. 
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council to be severe in dealing with the culprits and to 
block any private proceedings G1encairn had opened up 
against the Setons.119 The incident was to be treated as 
a crime against the king and the public peace and was not 
to be allowed to feed private resentments. The contrast 
with 1586, twenty years before, are impressive, even if 
neither side was prosecuted by anyone and mutual assurances 
was the most that each was asked to observe.120 
. More significantly this spark of life in a feud which 
some thought might just fade away spurred the privy.council 
to a new determination to end it. The fact that Eg1inton 
was at last no longer a minor removed one of the obstacles 
to a solution and both sides were again summoned, this time 
to Stirling, where arrangements were made to keep them 
apart while they were there, except of course when they were 
negotiating.121 Both earls, their kinsmen and friends did 
turn up, but G1encairn upset the proceedings by refusing to 
submit his feud with Eglinton on the grounds that there 
was no feud, he being completely innocent of his father's 
murder. Eglinton was equa1ly'obstructive claiming that 
as he had only just attained his majority he had not had 
time to consult with his kinsmen, a lame excuse if ever 
there was one, and only lord Semple was willing to submit 
his feud with G1encairn. Faced with this the council 
119. ll.P.C., vii, p 498, p 247. 
120. ibid., p 646, p 288. 
121. ibid., p 233-34. 
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appeared to be at something of a loss, gave Eglinton a month 
in which to do his consulting and wrote to the king for advice. 
In effect no one was a~ nearer to a solution than they had 
been in 1595.122 
The intervention of the earl of Dunbar brought a firmer 
hand to the proceedings and in January 1607 both sides capi-
tulated and submitted their feud. The earl of Abercorn 
promised to get the submissions of the few malcontents on 
the Montgomery side who held out, lord Semple, Muir of 
Caldwe11 and Langshaw, the Cunningham lairds of Clonbeith, 
Flatt and Blackstoun were all given a further six weeks to 
make up their minds, G1engarnock and Hessilhead were ordered 
to submit their own feud and the Montgomery laird of Braidstone 
was given sixty days from the receipt of his letters to return 
home from the continent and also sign the submission. The 
intention was to be as comprehensive as possible and thus 
the very wide number of men included in it. No one could 
be allowed to revive the feud by having avoided the 
b . . 123 s u mJ.ss J.on. 
By the end of February the negotiations at last began, 
twelve years after the king had first called for them and 
twenty-four years after the last agreement between the two 
families in 1583. By that time all but Hessilhead, who had 
122.R.P.C., vii, p 249. 
123. Balfour, Anna1es, ii, p 16; R.P.C., vii, p 296 •. 
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refused to submit his feud with Glcngarnock, had submitted 
and he was denounced. On the 24th of February the 
arbitrators also subscribed.124 For Glencairn they were 
lord Cathcart, Porterfield of Duchall, Blair of that Ilk, 
Maxwell of Nether Pollok, Otterburn of Reidhall and Fleming 
of Berrochane. Of these only Blair was a local man and 
had kinship with both sides, Porterfield was one of 
Glencairn's clients and his daughter WAS married to 
Corsehill, Nether Pollok represented his ll.axwell kinsmen 
and one can only assume that the others were friends. On 
Eglinton's side one finds Sir James Douglas of Drumlangrig, 
a distant cousin and brother-in-law to Skelmorlie, Sir 
William Grier of Lag whose wife was the sister of 
Braidstane's wife, and Sir John Bruce of Kincavill, 
Sir John vJallace of Cornell, and a younger brother to 
the earl of Lothian, Andrew Kerr. They were thus a mixture 
of distant kinsmen and friends who had no direct involvement 
in the feud and would be acceptable to both sides.125 
Unfortunate1ythe committee brok~ up within a week 
of its sitting. A deputation' went to the council and 
told them that an agreement was impossible as G1encairn 
had instructed that IIthis subn:.issioun concernit not the 
ErIe of Glencairne allane, bot everie ane of his freindis 
had their awne particulair interesse and had gevin thair 
124. R.P.C.,.vii, p 324. 
125. These kin connections can be found in The Scots Peera~e, 
iv, p 238; iv," p 413;'v, p 498; vii, p 125, p 129. 
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clarnes hinc inde ••• ", and that they could not therefore 
agree on a general oversman but would have to have one for 
each interest. Eglinton's side refused this condition, 
withdrew the submission and broke off discussions. 126 
Whether Glencairn was intent on wrecking the ne50tiations 
or not one does not know but that was certainly the immediate 
effect. 
However, the 1598 legislators had anticipated just such 
manoeuvres and according to the terms of the Act, the king 
now became sole oversman. Assurances were renewed again 
and both sides were ordered to come in on the lOth of 
August 1608 to hear the king's decreet. It was on this 
occasion that a number of friends were included to 11 assist 
the said agreement", it being hoped no doubt that they would 
help smoothe over any remaining problems.12? In fact the 
decision was not made public :mtil Harch 1609, during 
which time assurances were again renewed. On the 16th of 
March, G1encairn appeared with his brother Ross, the lairds 
of Aiket, Robert1and, Hontgreenan, Corsehill and C1onbeith, 
all of whose fathers had been killed or had died since they 
first plotted with G1encairn twenty-five years before, the 
Cunningham lairds of Craigends, Cunninghambead and, Tourlands, 
the Maxwells of Newark and Stanelie, Porterfield, Lochrig 
and a number of brothers and uncles of these men. Only 
126. R.P.C., vii, p 328. 
127. R.P.C., viii, p 138-39. 
Glencairn, Ross and possibly some of the l.faxwell brothers are 
known to have been principals in the plotting and the murder 
of 1586. On the other s:tde Eglinton was joined by Skelmorlie, 
Hessilhead, Langshaw's son, BUsbie, Dunlop, Scottistoun and 
Crevock, but not by Semple whose feud with Glencairn had been" 
separated from his to facilitate an agreement. 
The decreet itself can not be found in spite of a search 
of both the Registers of Deeds and Acts and Decreets and the 
private papers of both families and one is only able to know 
the form of what happened that day. Having arrived at the 
council house and a list of those present naving been taken, 
each party was led in t'xrn into the council chambers where 
they were lectured on the trouble they had caused and on the 
great len6ths the crown had gone to settle their feud. An 
explanation of the king's right to act as sole oversman was 
also given to ensure that there was no doubt on this point. 
Each party was then asked to declare their willingness to 
forgive the other and to submit to whichever decision the 
king had reached. When this had been done both sides were 
then brought into the room together and had to repeat the 
declaration, the terms of the decreet were made known to 
them and they shook hands, declaring that "thair chopping 
of handis sould be als sufficient for all those of ather 
side quho wer absent and were guiltie of the said bloodis 
as glf thay were present and had choppit handis with thame." 
.Further handshaking took Elace between Glencairn and the 
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Setons to ensure that no trouble could follow from the 
events of 1606 and arrangements were made to conclude the 
f d °th' 1 ibl 128 eu Wl· ~emp e as soon as poss e. 
vlhen he heard the news the king wrote to the council 
acknowledging the "very speciall and acceptable service 
done to'us". As usual he went over the top and told them 
that this feud was "the last thB.t remainit. in that whole 
129 kingdome of ony consequence". In the lowlands it .'Was, 
and one has to recognise that while it took a lo~g ti~e, 
its conclusion was a victory for the crown, its legislation 
and the workinz relationship forged a~ongst the crown 
officials by the king. It was also a victory for central 
government over local politics for there was no doubt that 
the men in the locality did not want a settlement at this 
time and held out as long as they could to avoid one. Kings 
had intervened in localities before but only really where the 
magnates in a particular locality were a threat to the crown 
or had something the king was jealous of. Never before had 
Scottish kings made local politics their business in this 
-
sort of a manner. A further difference with previous reigns 
was that here the king and his government were not simply 
involving themselves in a locality, but as a matter of policy 
were repeat.ing this process of the extention of royal power 
throughout the' kingdom. As one can see the crown was not 
128. ~.P.C., viii, p 262. 
129. ibid., P 569. 
efficient about it and took fourteen years to brin~ this feud 
to A settlement,but it was only just learning about the job. 
as it went along and cannot be faulted too much on that point. 
Given the number of feuds and the number of other pressing 
problems James VI's government faced, the crown did not do 
too badly at all in changing the balance of pOl-ler between 
central and local government and in making society safer and 
more just in the process. 
This analysis of one local society tempts one to make 
all sorts of general conclusions,but one ought to point out 
that it was only one locality and differences might be apparent 
in others. Having said that one con,however, conclude "dth three 
significant points which are derived from this study of north-
Ayrshire. Firstly, one has to be careful to recognise the 
complexity of local society, and in particular local politics. 
One is not simply dealing with large monolithic power blocks 
which domlnated localities but with a m'.lch more fragmentary 
picture in which lordship and kinship did give enormous 
coehsion and strength to lords and kindreds, but in which 
individual men followed their own courses,defined their own 
politics and set their own ambitions. ro identity the 
mavericks, the obstinate and the indifferent kinsmen and 
dependants is not to say that lords were weak and ties of 
ki.nship equally weak1;>ut the opposite,since those who were 
loyal to these ide~ls, the majority of men, were so if not 
. 
always voluntarily, with more free will than one often 
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gives them credit for. Secondly, local politics were very 
much the politics of conflict as has. already been argued, 
and 'the tool of conflict is violence. ,,:hether society was 
more violent than today is questionable, but political 
life certainly was and this was as true in the locality 
as at the court. Because there was violence did not mean 
that life for everyone became intolerable, for some it 
almost did,but for most it went on and local society did 
not dissolve. The violence of the feud in this case was 
highly ~elective most of the time and was a far cry from 
the terror traditional accounts are fond of relating. 
One cannot argue the violence out of the feud but neither 
can one allow one's self to be carried along by the 
mythology which violence so often creates. Final~y, it 
is clear that local society did not have the means or the 
will to end feuding. On occasion it could find the 
resources to punctuate feud with peace and even more 
rarely the peace did hold, but there was an enormous 
difference between this tinkering with a feud which men 
had become bored with or had decided was becoming too 
costly,and the crown's new ideolo~ic91 position of 
wishing to eliminate the feud entirely and with it the 
means of conducting politics in a society which had not 
developed a suitable alternative. Yet it was not only 
in the localities that the feud was both a medium 
through which men expressed their power and tried to 
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attain their objective, but at the highest levels in the 
court, in the government and in the politics of the kingdom 
it was the dominant means of expressing those politics. 
POLITICS AND THE FEUD . 
268. 
Politics in late sixteenth century Scotland ~as more 
commonly about power rather than ideals, about men rather 
than about principles. The cynical will no doubt argue that 
there is nothing unusual in that, politicians being what they 
are. This may be so, but one ~ould probably be underestimatihg 
one's fellow men a little too much if one could not recognise 
their idealism, and in the sixteenth century there were times 
when certain men, and at times even the majority of men, . 
thought that religion, the legitimacy of government and the 
rule of la~ and order ~ere important issues. However, at 
the court of James VI it ~as personal advancement and the 
bettering of one's kin or faction - ~hich had as one has 
seen a very strong ideology of its own - ~hich so often over-
rode these other questions. This is not to say that the 
sixth earl of Huntly ~as not a deeply committed catholio 
or the eighth earl of Angus a sincere protestant, that the 
, 
master of Gray did not sincerely want to see Mary restored 
to her throne or that Morton was not convinced that Scotland 
was better off without her, that lord advocate Hamilton did 
not have an almost absolutist concept of monarchy and that 
the earl of Caithness did not genuinely believe that the 
king had no business interfering in his local affairs. 
The dominant political figures of the age, Morton,the 
sixth earl of Argyll, Lennox, Arran, Gowrie, Maitland, the 
master of Glamis, Huntly, Both~ell, Mar and Montrose, all 
had varying opinions on political issues, but the great 
majority of the time they spent in political life - and 
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for most of them that meant all their lives - yas taken up 
yith increasing their own wealth, status and power, yith 
advancing the careers of their kinsmen, friends Bnd dependants, 
and with local politics, the feuds of which they carried on 
. 
through into the life of the court and the central government. 
" Politics was thus a hotch-potch of interest groups clustered 
around kin chiefs, lords and patrons all interacting in co-
operation or conflict as the needs of the time dictated. 
Vlhere conflict occurred the political feud yas born. 
There is nothing novel or unique in this. \~ri ting of a 
society which existed fifteen hundred years before Jacobean 
Scotland, Rona1d Syme explained 
"Roman political factions yere yelded together, less 
by unity of principle than by mutual services (officia), 
either between social equals as an alliance, or from 
inferior to superior, in a traditional and almost 
feudal form of clientship: on a fabourable estimate 
the bond yas called amicitia, otheryise factio. Such 
alliances either presupposed or provoked the personal 
feud - yhich to a Roman aristocrat, yas a sacred duty 
or an occasion of just pride. 
The family YBS older than the State; and the 
family yas the kernel of a Roman political faction. 
Loyalty to the ties of kinship in politics yas a 
supreme obligation, often imposing inexpiable 
vendettas." 
With the minimum of qualification one could apply this 
analysis to sixteenth centlll7 Scotland and indeed to other 
European states at this time. Of the Oxford-Knyvett feud 
in E~izabethan England it has been said that "Thanks to 
,1. R.Syme, The Rqman Revolution, (Oxford, 1974), p 157. 
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the studied neutrality of the Queen, two great courtiers were 
allowed to commit murder after murder with complete imunity~ •• " 
and. while the Essex-Cecil feud was less violent, Elizabethan 
politics should be seen against "this sinister background of 
rival court factions with their hired killers and "cuttersl1 , • 
of sporadic murder and violence in the countryside ••• ,,~ In 
France,Flandrin has pointed out that· 11 family solidarities 
formed the thread of those clienteles which, in their 
struggles for power, formed the structure of political life 
as do the parties to-day.,,3 At the time of the Religious Wars 
the Venetian ambassador recorded that "these civil wars are 
born of the. Cardinal of Lorraine to have no equal, end the 
Admiral (Coligny) and the house of Montmorency to have no 
superiorl1, Vlhile even among the religious parties "They 
openly help each other; the one group holds the lamb and 
the other cuts its throat.,,4 Henry III himself complained 
of his court "We are nearly alVlays ready to cut each others 
throa ts • We carry daggers and wear mail shirts, even breast-
plates, under our cloaks ••• " ~ Elsewhere it was the folloVlers 
of the duke of Alba and prince of Eboli in Spain, the 
Gudon~vs and Romanovs in Russia, the Butlers and Fitzgeralds 
in Ireland and in Poland the incessantly feuding nobles of 
the szlachta whose divisions ~inally ruined the state. In 
2. stone, lh~ Crisifl_Q.t_theJj.ristoQ,rscl, p 112. 
3. Flandrin, ramil~~_i!L~g,~~~imes, p 48. 
4. Quoted in·J.H.Elliot, Euro~e Divided, (Glasgow, 1977), P 108 • 
. 5. Quoted in D.Stewart, ~e _~~r:fttJIQ.~!h (London, 1971), p 34. 
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discussing feud B1ack-Michaud yrote that "feud, that is the 
strllgg1e itself, is identical yith the social systemU6 and 
yhi1e one might disagree yith the full implications of such 
an analysis, feud in Scotland YSS identical yith the 
political system. 
That great Elizabethan official lord Burghley, once 
advised his son to "let thy kindred and allies be yelcome 
to thy table, grace them yith thy cOllntenance, and even 
further them in all honest actions", as to do so yould 
"double the bond of naturett • 7 Patronage yas thus very much 
at the heart of politics as poyerful men sought to increase 
their power through a system of clientage which they built 
onto the ties of kinship and lordship existing between 
them and their dependants. The groyth of government in the 
early modern period increased the amount of patronage 
available at the courts of kings and great princes and 
attracted men to them. The bureaucracy of government thus 
became prey to what Anderson has called "colonization by 
grandee houses competing for the politioal privileges and 
economic profits of offioe, and oommanding parasitic 
clientages of lesser nobles who were infiltrated into 
the state apparatus and formed rival patronage networks 
within it:n~ As eaoh magnate or oourt broker fought to 
maintain his credibility to clients and prospective clients, 
6. Black-Michaud, ~~!_Force, p 207. 
7. Quoted in R.Lockyer, Buckin~ham, (Ney York, 1981), p 35. 
8. P.Anderson, L)ne~~~~t-the_Absol~tist state, 
(London, 1979 , P 48-49. . 
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qQestions of marriage, ward, tutorship, office and commissions 
became of vital significance as did their ability to intervene 
in their clients interests in a locality. Thus the Alba-Eboli . 
femI in Spain" involved every quarrel Qv'er a sheep-run in the 
pOvler politics of the court of Madrid". 9 The same was true of 
England where what mattered was "a lord's ability to secure or 
guarantee offices and emoluments for'his clients either in his 
own employment or in that of some greater man, possibly the 
king himself", and where "the authority of the magnate over 
the local gentry was now coming to depend less upon his terri-
10 torial power than upon his influence in London". Lords and 
officials thus spread out the gravy of central government 
among their followers and they in turn gave them the support 
they needed to control both their own localities a,nd the court 
itself. Office holding was, as Stocker observed for France 
lithe best. form of maintenance".ll This has led stone to 
describe the English nobility as "a set of shameless 
mendicants,,12, a description which would certainly be far 
too severe for Scotland where lordship and kinship had a 
9. H.G.Koenigsberger, "Western Europe and the Power of Spain", 
in The New Q.~I!lQl:~c!g~ModernJi~stocrJ._yol_~!L-The Q.~\!n~flt 
Refol:mation ~nd_~he ~~!QJ!J!evQlution1._1222-l61Q (ed.) , 
R.B. Wernham,-rCambridge, 1971), p 243. 
10. R.B.Smith, Land and Politics in the Reign of Hern:L.VIII, 
(Oxford, 1970r;-pr53;Stone;-Crrs~or £he'TrIStocrBci, 
p 124. 
11. C.Stocker, "Office as Maintenance in Renaissance France", 
,in 9.al)Bdi~B.J0Hrnal of Histor:,{, vi, 1971, p 33. stocker's 
main argument is that in France the nobility became clients 
of the state beoause of the expansion of the royal bureaucracy. 
·12. stone, Qris~s .of_the Aristocrag.x, p 217. 
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great deal of vitality of their own without the added incentives 
of the patronage available. At an even more obvious level 
there just was not the ssme amount of crown patronage around 
as there was in France and England, and of what there 
was local patronage and influence were most sought after. 
The danger of this was in the long term that men's loyalties 
were drawn out of their localities to the court and the king, 
'13 but in Scotland at least that was some time in the future. 
While the spoils of the system may not have been so 
great in Scotland they were sufficient to attract the S8me 
sort of competition. The king himself complained that after 
the first rebellion against him in 1585 he had to "make a 
great alteration among my servants" which had "made mee 
long'to be troubled there-after with solliciters, recommending 
servants unto me more for serving in effect their friends that 
. U 
put them in, then their master that admitted them •. ~ Perhaps 
James was being a little idealistic if he thought it could 
have been otherwise, but one ~an understand his frustration 
and every other early modern ruler would has sympathised with 
""'" 
13. Other authorities which I have found useful on this 
question are Harding's discussion of the brokerage system 
at the French court in !~oml of ~ Power Elite, p 31-37; H.G. 
Koenigsberger and G.L.Mosse in ~uroR!_in the Sixt~nth CenturY, 
(London, 1979), p 234-37 gives a wider European discussion 
of it while for the early'seventeenth century Flandrin in 
Famili~n.F~er T~, p 20-21, shows that even as great 
an advocate of royal absolutism as Richelieu continued to 
. practice such a careful distribution of the patronage 
available to him. See too for a more detailed examination 
of court brokerage R.Lock,yer in Buckin~ham. 
14. Basilikon Doron (ed.) Macllwaine, Poli~1c~~ Works, p 32. 
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him. In 1609 the privy council, whose own members were 
embroiled in a network of clientage .and patronage, wrote 
to the king about the farming of the customs by the late 
comptroller, lord Scone, who had been accused of corrupt 
practices by his enemies. Having investigated the matter 
they had indeed discovered that certain unnamed men had 
approached Scone and II made sute for the last tak of the 
customes lt offering him a thousand crowns "to be thair 
freind ll and buy them a new tack for payment of the old 
duty. Cons equently, with their cons ent, he had 11 eiked" 
the money into the duty of the tack. Furthermore, they 
offered him a partnership in the deal and agreed to pay 
him, as "their new undertaker", five thousand marks a year, 
a similar amount also being payed to the king. 15 Here 
. 16 . 
indeed was the oil of "The New Monarchy'. Similar 
corruption can be identified in a case in 1601 when, 
after the earl of Cassillis killed Kennedy of Barga~, 
he sent his wife, the widow of chancellor MBitland and 
a lady well acquainted with co~t life, to Edinburgh where 
she set up a meeting between herself and treasurer Hume, 
the future Dunbar. Oossillis followed, a meeting took 
place and shortly afterwards the council was convinced 
that B8rga~ was killed while at the horn as a rebel, 
the earl having a commission tor his capture. "Bot yit 
how evir", declared the writer of the Kennedy history, 
15. Melrose, i, p 69. 
16. G.Donaldson's phrase, see ~cotland: James V to James VII, 
part 11, for which it is the title. 
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"the ten thousand markis gewin to the Thesaurare was that quhilk 
did the turnell .17 Whether in great and lucrative government 
contracts like the customs farm or in specific needs to bend 
18 the course of justice, money, as always, talked. 
As important as money was "favour" or mutual backscratching. 
In 1576 the then treasurer lord Ruthven wrote to one of the 
session judges, Waus of Barrandaroch, about a servant of his 
in a case before the session, asking that "ye will gif 
attendance that I get na'wrang, As I salbe reddy to acquyte 
your with plesor quhen your occasioun saIl sense", and on a 
different occasion the earl of Erroll asked him for "Justice 
with fauvoris".19 In 1618 Sir Andrew Kerr wrote to the 
clerk of the privY council about a drunken fight in which 
some of his men had become involved and for which they were 
, to be tried. After explaining why he thought this unjust 
he asked for the case to be tried not by the session,but 
by the border commissioners from which he would himself stand 
down but in which he clearly had some influence. He asked 
the clerk to see what he could do to influence the president 
of the session and promised that if this was done "I will be 
17. Pitcairn, Kennedy, p 51-52. 
18. Again this was a problem for all European govermnents and 
societies. G.Parker, "Corruption and Imperialism in the 
Spanish Netherlands: the Case of Francisco de Lixa1de, 
1567-1612" in Spain and the Netherlands, (Glasgow, 1979), 
p 152-61 throws some light on the issue in Phi1ip II's 
empire • 
. 19. Correspondence of_Sir Patrick W~ (ed.) R.Vans Agnaw, 
i, p 137, p 140. 
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myndfull of it in what I carr,.20 Men thus sought one another's 
good favour promising whatever returns they could and on this 
basis factions evolved as men became bound together by these 
relationships. Of course favour to one man was injustice to 
another and from that enmity and in time feud was born. 
Unlike the more solid groupings already examined in the 
localities, factions were an ever changing whirlpool of 
alliances and rivalries since here the basis of the 
relationship was less constant. Loyalty was not a question 
of allegiance or of proximity of blood, though these factors 
were very important, but also of the magnate's or broker's 
ability to deliver the gOOds. Thus if one could get a , 
better deal elsewhere one changed one's investment to 
another man or faction. With the pie never being big enough 
to go around there were always those striving to upset the 
status quo, to get in on the act or increase their slice of 
it, and hence the ever shifting ground, the distrust, the 
web of intrigue and corruption. In ~he midst of this there 
were the brokers, le they magnates, courtiers or officials. 
The first group claimed a natural right to dominate the 
court and the localities and with their natural support and 
po~er they were at a great advantage, but they too had to 
strive for their place. The courtiers were those younger 
brothers and lesser kinsmen who made their way up the greasy 
pole by syncophantic service to some magnate who they hoped 
20. R.P.C. xi, p 630-31. 
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would get them a job in the royal household. There as, 
for example, a gentleman of the bedchamber, they preened 
themselves, extended their contacts and began to do favours 
themselves while hoping that one day the king would notice 
. 
them. Thus men like Alexander Lindsay, who became lord Spynie, 
Sir George Hume, whose career soared until as the earl of Dunbar 
he dominated Scottish politics, and David Murray of Gospetrie, 
the lord Scone of whom one has already heard, were all successes 
of this system. Others like MBitland, lord advocate Hamilton 
and Alexander Seton, earl of Dunfermline, were crown officials 
who exploited their office to build up the clientage they 
needed to hold onto that office and to become rich men in the 
process. This was the maelstrom of the Scottish court, a 
jungle of family, faction and feud. 21 
Yet if the Jacobean period was characterised by such an 
emphasis on men and the ideology of kindred and teud, it 
began amidst one of a quite different ideological debate. 
The civil war of 1567-73 was about the great issues of 
the day, religion, the nature of the monarchy and the subjects 
right to resist, even sbout foreign policy. It was also 
21. For a discussion of faction in England during the Tudor 
period see E.W. Ives, Faction in Tudor England, 
(Historical Association, 19'79); D.Starkey, "From Feud 
To Faction, English Politics circa 1450-1550", Historx 
To-DaI:, vol 32, Nov 1982, p 16-22; S.Adams "Faction, 
Clientage and Party, English Politics, 1550-1608", 
Histoty To-DaI, vol 32, Dec 1982, p 33-39. On the 
whole Ives' interpretation of faction appears more 
conVincing than that of Adams who imposes too rigid 
a definition on what is meant by the term. 
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about Bothwell or Moray, Hamilton or Morton and Lethington 
or Buchanan, but to a much greater extent than in the age 
which followed these men fought for ideals as much as for 
themselves. That they did fight for themselves cannot, 
however,be entirely ignored. Thus one finds that the 
civil war in the north-east was not simply about queen Mary 
or king James, but also about GeorgeoGordon, fifth earl of 
Huntly and John, seventh lord Forbes and their kinsmen. 
There had for long been a history of compet~tion and 
22 feud between these two unequally balanced kindreds. In 
this period the earl of Huntly was one of the principal 
political figures of the war "An ErIe of greate power, 
and of the most revenue of any ErIe in the lame", who 
was the leader of the queen1s cause in the north a°nd a 
firm Roman catholic.23 Most of Huntly's operations during 
the war were concentrated in the north, beyond the Tay, 
which he largely held for the queen with considerable 
osuccess. Lord Forbes, however, chos~ to join the 
king1s party and though his kindred was smaller and more 
divisive than the Gardons, he continued to represent the 
focus of local opposition to the Marian forces for as 
long as the main part of the king I s party were ti!3d up 
22. Gordon, Sutherland, p 164-65; there had been a decreet 
arbitral between them in 1543, S.R.O., Gordon Castle 
.Muniments, G.D., 41/11/7/4. 
23. ~timateJ p 7. 
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in the south.24 Yet it was not just politics which divided 
them as both families were, even before the war began, 
"harbouring deadlie fead, of long rooted betuin them". 
Earlier quarrels had been patched up with a, settlement 
which included marriage alliances between them but rivalry 
continued to exist and the war gave them their opportunity 
to take up arms against one another again.25 
The feud between the two was in fact re-activated for 
a mixture of political reasons both national an~ local. 
The marriage between the master of Forbes and Huntlyls 
daughter failed and the master was persuaded to put 
Margaret Gordon aside by one of his more militant kinsmen, 
Black Arthour Forbes. Apparently there were religious 
differences between the couple besides which the lady 
26 
was later to be divorced in 1573 on the grounds of adultery. 
Whatever the reasons were this treatment of HUntly's 
daughter was bound to upset him, and given the context 
of the marriage in the first place c~u1d only be 
interpreted as a breaking of the alliance between the 
24. In 1577 Hay wrote of the Forbes that they were "enemyes 
of th I erles of Huntley, whome they have manfully withstood 
consideringe his greatnes", Estimate, p 25. They were 
however a family also troubled with internal divisions, 
"the Forbesses were at warre with another, daylie impairing 
ther owne strenth by their owne slaughters, and in the end 
wrought ther owne confusion by preassing to stryve against 
the Gordouns", Gordon, Sutherland, p 164; Spottiswoode, 
,Histoty, iil, p 169, confirms this. 
25. Gordon, Sutherland, p 164-65. One marriage which can be 
identified was that between the master of Forbes and 
Huntly's daughter, Sco~s Peerage, vol iv, p 59. 
26. Scqts Peerage, vol iv, p 69; precept of divorce, S.R.O. 
Forbes Collection, G.D., 52/1087. ' 
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two families. At the same time, Huntly had by 1570, finally 
settled down on the queen's side after some flirting with 
her enemies and had been appointed her lieutenant for the 
north. However, the regent Horay W3S a bitter enemy of 
Huntly's and had been trying to replace Gordon power in 
the region with his own, but he and his allies were forced 
to concentrate on defeating the Hamiltons in the south and 
it was left to lord Forbes and other lesser men to try and 
keep Huntly occupied in the north. 
Skirmishing between the two escalated in October 1571 
when Gordon of Auchindoun; Hunt1y's brother, led an attack 
on the Forbes at Tulliangus where they had met with other 
local men to consider how best to oppose Huntly and the 
Gordons. In the battle which followed over a hundred men 
were said to have been slain, including Black Arthour, 
lord Forbes's brother, and John Gardon of Buckie, but the 
Forbes were routed and fled. 27 Naturally their enemies 
followed up this victory and pursued them to their. homes 
burning and slaughtering as they went. 28 Tulliangu.s was 
a victory for the queen but more significantly in terms 
of local politics it was a crushing defeat for those who 
-
27. Gordon, Sutherland, p 165; Spalding Miscellany~ ii, 
p 38; Spottiswoode, gistory. ii, p 169. 
28. From "Chronicle of Fortingill", Chambers, Domestic Annals, 
i, p 75; Auchindoun followed up his victory by advancing 
to Black Arhour's house at Towy and demanding its surrender 
but when his wife refused, he had it fired and burned her, 
her servants and in all some twenty-seven people to death. 
"This inhuman and barbarous cruelty made his name odious, 
and stained all his forrer dOings", Spottiswoode, !!istorY, 
ii, P 169-?O. 
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had tried to oppose Huntly as the leading magnate in the 
north. 
The master of Forbes went south to the regent l/.ar and 
and obtained a commission-confirming him as the king's 
lieutenant in the north, making him chamberlain of the 
bishopric of Aberdeen and allowing him to levy more men 
with which to fight Huntly again.29 _ Forbes was thus 
playing for high stakes and before him had the prospect 
of completely ousting the Gordons and making his own family 
dominant in the region, a prospect which had been made even 
more possible by the death of Moray without any male heirs. 
However, while his powers were impressive on paper, the 
king's gO'lernment had no authority in the north. Wi thin 
two weeks of leaving Mar, the king's lieutenant had again 
been defeated, this time being ambushed as he marched his 
forces north. The defeat at Crabstane was even more severe 
with heavy losses being inflicted on the Forbes themselves 
while the company of king's soldiers suffered the worst 
casualties, their captain being among the dead. Furthermore, 
the master of Forbes was captured and taken prisoner to 
Strathbogie where he was held until he swore never to take 
up arms against the queen or Huntly agaitl.30 As a result 
of the battle Huntly was able to extend his authority as 
far south as Angus and the Mearns, and while minor hostilities 
29. Gordon, Sutherland, p 166; S.R.O. Forbes Collection, G.D. 
. 52/29, 52/30; Spottiswoode, HistorY, ii, p ?O. 
30. Gordon, Sutherland, p 166; Spaldin~ Miscellany, ii, 
p 38-39; Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 170. 
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continued - one of Huntly's younger brot.hers was shot in the 
head by the Forbes - the Gordons remained in control in the' 
north for the remainder of the war. Unfortunately for them 
it was a war in which they still ended up on the losing side. 
The Pacification of Perth in 1573 which concluded the war 
was the sort of settlement one would expect in a feuding . 
society. It was more than just a recognition that the kin~ 
had won, contained within it were clauses which bound the 
signatories to forget about all the blood which ,had been 
spilt during the war. In other words no-one was to use 
the war as an excuse for carrying on private feuds thereafter, 
and what blood had been shed during these years was in effect 
31 to be considered shed for political reasons, not private ones. 
However, Huntly had no intention of allowing this political 
defeat to affect his local power, nor did he like being told 
how to settle his feuds, and thus even as the conference 
was taking place in Perth, Auchindoun attacked the king's 
lieutenant in Aberdeen and once Bgai~ defeated the Forbes, 
32 . 
wounding lord Forbes himself in the process. It WBS clearly 
meant as a demonstration to the government that Gordon power 
in the north was not broken whatever may have happened to 
the Hamiltons in the south. It was also meant to signify 
to the Forbes and their friends that while they may have been 
on the winning side in the war, they had still to recognise 
.\ 
Huntly's dominance in the region. 
31. R.P.C. ii, p 193-200. 
32. Historie, p 139. 
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Yet whatever the balance of power in the north-east, 
Huntly had still lost and was very much out of favour with 
the new regent, the earl of Morton. Huntly himself suspected 
that Morton wanted him murdered,33 and he sent Auchindoun 
and Sir George Gardon of Gight to France for safety and to 
avoid being forced into confrontation with Morton over 
disciplining them for the Aberdeen raid. There they became 
guests of Charles IX and attained some degree of favour with 
him, but while they may have left Morton behind them, one 
of lord Forbes' younger sons followed them there with some 
companions. In Paris he hired some contract killers, the 
ItEnfans de la Mat", and ambushed Auchindoun one night in 
the street. Auchindoun was shot in the leg, but his 
companions rallied and the assailants fled, Arthour Forbes 
among them. Unfortunately he dropped his hat in the chase 
and in it was found a note containing the details of a 
rendevous between Forbes and some of his friends. Auchindoun's 
servants found the note and he took it to John Gordon of 
Longormes, a gentleman of the French king's bedchamber, who 
in turn informed the king. The latter gave Auchindoun a 
company of archers from the guard and with these he stormed 
Forbes' house, killing Arthour Forbes and capturing his co-
plotters who were all later executed, Forbes's own body 
being broken on the wheel.34 The incident is a telling 
33. Historie, p 150-51. 
34. Gardon, Sutherland, p 170-71. 
r 
comment on the strength of feeling in the feud which made 
a man go overseas in pursuit of his enemies and of revenge •. 
The extent of Morton's power in the north during these 
years is questionable. Certainly he was able to carry out 
a successful expedition to Aberdeen in 1574 and the burgh 
was, among other things, fined for resetting Achindoun.35 
Furthermore, Huntly himself accepted·Mort~n's order that 
he should ward in Galloway for a short while, and as one 
has seen, he thought it wise to send Auchindoun and Gight 
on a continental holiday. However, his own power remained 
largely unshaken and Morton did not dare to try to reward 
Forbes for his loyalty during the preceding years.36 In 
1576 Huntly died after over-exerting himself at a game of 
football and a year later the frustrated Forbes' were 
again in open feud with their enemies. 37 Six months later 
the regency was at an end and during the weeks of Morton's 
temporary eclipse parliament made the first attempt to 
bring peace to the feud. 38 
The questions to which parliament addressed itself were 
both local and national. The master of Forbes was in the 
middle of proceedings against the now young sixth earl of 
Huntly over the rights of a number of kindly tenants on 
35. Hewitt, Scotland Under Morton, p 39-40. 
36 •. ~.P.C., ii, p 381. 
37. C.S.P.SCQt.; v, p 253. 
38. A.P.S., iii, P 112-14. 
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the lands of Craig and Monymusk. Huntly had ordered their 
eviction and had taken them to the session court for 
refusing to leave, but the tenants, who were Forbes' , 
had argued that this was only being done because of their 
stance against the Gordons during the war. Furthermore, 
they pointed out that they had suffered greatly for the 
king's cause without reward, even after the Leith 
agreement in 1572. Nor had they been compensated for 
those losses sustained between that agreement and the one 
at Perth as was agreed, but instead Huntly had been confirmed 
in all his rights. The Forbes' were thus raising very 
difficult problems not only about how one would decide on 
why Huntly was evicting his tenants and what the crown 
could do about it anyway, but about the entire rev~lutionary 
_settlement. A year later Morton and Argyll were to interpret 
the settlement in such a way as allowed them to initiate 
an attack on the Hami1tons, but in 1578 the possibility was 
there for settling old political debts with the Gordons. 
The context of the July 1578 parliament in Stirling,.attended 
by Morton and his friends while a rebel faction held power in 
Edinburgh, points to an attempt by Morton to buy lord Forbes 
backing at a time when he was desperately in need of supporters, 
but all that could be done at this stage was to set· up a 
commission to investigate the feud. 39 Four months later 
Morton was in a stronger position and when the commission 
39. A.P.S., iii, p 112. 
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reported back to parliament in November the Gordons were found 
to be in the wrong and to have brought dishonour on the king 
by breaking the peace terms which ended the war. A final 
decision was suspended until the spring, but it was largely 
expected that Huntly would face at least a heavy fine and 
compensation for the Forbes. 40 
In the meantime mutual assurances were given, but the . 
peace did not hold. Shortly afterwards Gordon of Gight and 
a servant of his were slain on the shore near Dundee by 
the master of Forbes and his friends following an argument 
between Gight and lord Forbes. Worried that this might 
escalate what was a politically very embarrassing feud, 
the privy council was determined to find "sum mid and 
indifferent way" to prevent "the trubling of the gUde 
"and quhiet of the haill cuntrie".41 However, when a new 
arbitration committee was announced in April 1580 it 
reflected anything but indifference. By this time the 
Hamiltons had emerged as the regime's scape-goats and 
Huntly, or at least Auchindoun who was in charge of him 
during his minority, had secured the Gordons position 
by drawing close to the chancellor, the earl ,of Argyll, 
now Morton's uneasy partner in the ruling faction. The 
Gordons' arbitrators were thus composed of Argyll and his 
40. A.P.S., iii, P 164-65.' 
41. Gordon, Sutherland, p 174-75; R.P.C., iii, P 261, P 262, 
P 275, P 278. Forbes of Tollie was also killed in this 
skirmish. 
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friends while lord Forbes nominated Mortonand a number of 
his political allies. In effect each side was appealing 
to>one of the two major political factions which had emerged 
during 1578.42 
Like most arbitrations however, there was no immediate 
decision on the questions before them and by the time the 
government again turned to the feud Morton had been executed 
and the Gordons' friends were in control of the king and the 
court. In the intervening period more killing had taken 
place between the two sides and the privy council initiated 
some investigation into who.had started it,43 but more 
importantly in November 1581 parliament gave its final 
decision on the questions raised by the Forbes in 1578. 
Two acts were passed; an "Act anent the debatable cause 
between the Gordons and Forbeslt and an "Act of compromise 
between the Gordons and Forbeslt • Without the backing they 
had had from Horton, Huntly was able to gain agreement from 
parliament that the claims of the Forbes family were 
completely against the tenor of the 1572 agreement, and 
parliament in fact reversed itself and forbade lord Forbes 
to ever raise the matter again. Huntly never denied the 
substance of their claims, but was able to have the 
attacks by the Gordons on them included within the 
pacification terms of 1572 and 1573. In other words 
42. R.P.C., iii, P 278. 
43. ibid., p 401-02. 
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parliament ~as re~riting history to suit the Gordons. 
FUrthermore, the session ~as ordered to proceed with the 
case against the kindly tenants of Craig and Monymusk, 
parliament having declared that the 1579 suspension had 
been a frustration of justice by the parliament of that 
year. This radical about turn in parliament, ~hich 
followed within seven months of Morton's death, can only 
be seen in the context of a change in the balance of 
power in the court and the government.44 
The Gordon-Forbes feud was by no means ended in"158l, 
it was simply de-politicised. A decreet followed in 1582, 
was altered in 1583 and in 1589 the Forbes were still 
looking for better terrns. 45 There was further fighting 
in 1589 and this continued throughout the years of 
Huntly's intense political activity until 1597 when peace 
was again made.46 Yet parliament's decision in 1581 was 
an important stage in the feud because it represented a 
recognition by the political community that whatever the 
feud had been in the past, from now on it was a local 
problem. Throughout the 1570's there had been the 
potential there to use the feud to unseat the Gordons 
'. 
in the north, but Morton had never had the will or the 
resources to do so and thus his, or the regime's supporters 
44 •. A.P.S., iii, p 230-31. .' 
45. S.R.O, R.D., 1/20/386, R.D. 1/2?/49 ; S.R.O., Forbes 
. Collection, G.D., 52/1089. 
46. ~.S.P.Scot., x, p 186-87; xiii, part 1, p 56. 
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remained unre~arded and its enemies undefeated. When in 1578 
lord Forbes was able to exploit Morton's weakness and get the 
question aired in parliament, it was already too late, 
Argyll's splitting of the old king's party having offered 
the Gordons a ~ay back onto the political stage. The 
inability to settle the questions raised by the Forbes until 
1581 reflected the equal balancing of po~er between Morton 
and Argyll, and it was only with the latter's victory, 
carried through by the intervention of Esme stewart at the 
court, that it was resolved in the Gordons' favour. 
This interaction of local and personal,feuds with the 
affairs of the state is central to an understanding of 
Scottish politics in the years after 1573. Morton may 
have chosen to ignore the qordons, but he was less'willing 
to forget the other great enemies of the war years, the 
Hamiltons. This feud has been described elsewhere, but 
like the Gordon-Forbes case it too was a combination of 
a clash of political ideals with personal vendettas. In 
this instance Morton himself was involved, the Douglases 
having a long history of feud with the Hamiltons which 
the war had accentuated. Victory in 1573 allowed Morton 
and his kinsman, the earl of Angus, to exploit their 
position. In 1575 the Hamilton brothers, lord John and 
lord Claud were forced to make a humiliating surrender to 
Angus by way of assythment, something which could never 
have happened had Morton not been regent. In the next few 
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years the regent "continued to persecute the Hamiltons" and 
in 1579 actually drove them out of the country in a ruthless 
attack designed to destroy their great political influence 
forever and to satisfy the Douglases' desire for revenge 
on the sworn enemies. 47 This has been described rather 
crudely as "a somewhat primitive and barbaric way to 
govern a country", but that is to mis.s entirely the nature' 
of Scottish politics. 4B It was the way men expected 
politics to work. The clash between Morton and Argyll 
was a feud of less significance outside of court politics, 
but the "deadlie inimitie" between these two men was 
nevertheless a feud, their rivalry having spanned Morton's 
entire period of rule. In this instance there were no local 
issues at stake, at least not initially, and power at the 
centre was the bone between them. As early as 1574 Argyll 
was being seen as Morton's successor should he fall and in 
the following four years the latter did all he could to 
keep Argyll out in the cold, finally trying to intervene 
in his locality and thus spurring Argyll to join with 
Atholl in the coup which toppled him from the regency. 
After Morton's arrest there was no doubt among English 
observers that Argyll had been "the chief instrument" in 
47. Hewitt, Scotland Under Morton, p 64-71, describes most 
of the details of this feud. For the 1575 settlement 
it is described by Calderwood, iii, p 346, and the 
terms can be found in S.R.O., R.D. 1714/40; ~istorie. 
p 155. 
48. Hewitt, Scotland Under }'1orton, p 69. 
,-, 
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his fall, and that his motives had largely been Norton's 
"hard dealingslt with him.49 
Morton's execution was thus not simply a political act. 
Argyll died a few years after Horton and his low profile 
throughout the proceedings spared the Campbells a political 
feud with the Douglas kindred, but others were less 
fortunate. The earl of Montrose became the sworn enemy 
of Morton's nephew Angus because "the sentence of gyltenes 
was prononcit aganis him be the said Montrose, as Chancellor 
of that jurelt • 50 This feud was cleared up in 1587 but 
another between Montrose and the earl of Atholl continued 
until 1590 because of the part l'wlontrose played in the 
execution of the first earl of Gowrie in 1584. Atholl 
had married Gowrie's daughter, "and with her he entred 
the feades of her father".51 The spilling of blood in 
scottish politics was thus a dangerous matter which on 
the whole discouraged executions and explains why so many . 
traitors and rebels usually walked free. Following the 
Brig O'Dee conspiracy it was said that chancellor Maitland 
"had rather the noblemen of this conspiracy would fly, that 
they might put them to the horn and banish them, than to 
try them and shed their blood, whereon will grow everlasting 
feuds. The example of Arran and others makes them doubt 
49. Again most of this is accounted in Hewitt but for these 
'points see C.S.P.Scot. v, 27, p 473, p 623. 
50. !!.is~2rie, p 229. 
51. Q~!.~Scot., X, P 271, p 276. 
(, 
292. 
thnt dealinglt • 52 Others had made slmilar observations. 
Hudson thou6ht that the nobles constantly let the king down. 
~hen "it came to an extreme point against any of their 
faction" 53 , and Fowler thought the nobility "SO linked by 
blood or allied one with another" that the king could 
never get the support he wnnted to punish them properly.54 
Assassination and murder were thus more common in Scottish 
politics than the use of the state machinery to kill one'a 
enemies. 
The exception to this was, as ¥~itland himself pointed 
out, captain James stewart, earl of Arran and chancellor of 
Scotland during 1584-85. It was said by Arran's enemies 
that he was "a man full of violence, and when he was in 
place of rule executed. it with m'.lch cruelty". The. king also 
claimed that "I did never like that man's violence".55 
Some thought that Arran ~as raised to power to "counteract 
some of the nObility',56, others that he was "by the practisse 
of the nobility and ministers, raissed. to grate favor with 
the King". 57 As usual there was truth in both ass essments. 
He was the younger son of lord Ochiltree, was given a good 
education in Scotland and then left to take up military 
service in France and Sweden before returning to Scotland 
52. C.s.P.Scot., x, p 4. 
53. ibid, P 77. 
54. ibid. , p 52. 
55. Spottiswoode, History, iii, p ~, p 11, 
,56. Q~~.P.Scot., ix, P 167. 
57. Balfour, !!!nalf!~, i, p 370. 
p 333. 
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in 1578 to take up service with the king. He was described 
as "a young man of a busy brain, a quyet tanter, with mirry 
conceatis, and had ane aspyring spirit", and as "a man eager 
to win credit by what means soever". 58 This he did by first 
attaching himself to the service of the treasurer, lord Ruthven, 
later earl of Gowrie, and it was probably his influence which 
allowed stewart to be appointed to the court as a gentleman 
of the king's bedchamber and to be gifted former Hamilton 
lands in Lanarkshire. Ruthven's rift with Norton in 1580 
over a feud with lord Oliphant was followed by his alliance 
with Argyll and Esme Stewart, and James Stewart quickly made 
himself useful to them by agreeing to take the risk of 
confronting Morton with t.he charge of treason in the council 
59 chambers. It was an act which propelled stewart .into the 
political limelight where he was to remain for the next five 
years until his downfall in 1585. 
James stewart had his own reasons for hating Morton. 
In 1574 his elder brother, the master o~ .Ochiltree, had been 
pursued by Morton for making an attack on John Crawford of 
the Shaw, and after some pressure from the regent he had 
finally agreed to come into his will in 1576.60 What 
punishment Morton inflicted is not known but when the master 
died a year later Morton continued to harass the family by 
58. Melville, Memoirs, p 263. 
59. For his relationship with Ruthven see below p 
for Oliphant's case see e.g. Spottiswoode, Hist0rY,ii, 
p 269; the arrest of Norton, !-~oysie, Memoirs, p 28. 
Also Scots Peerag~ i, p 394ff. 
60. A.P.S., iii, p 90; ~.P.C., ii, P 531. 
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persuading his ~ido~ to part ~ith her lands in return for 
a pension. The lands ~ere then gifted to one of Morton's 
kinsmen, but she never received the promised pension. 
In 1579 the lady complained to the council that Norton had 
continued to obstruct her in her rights, and ~hile she 
temporarily regained her lands, they ~ere seized back fro~ 
her in December 1580 by Robert Douglas, cpmmendator of 
Whi thorn. 61 Norton' s fall vii thin ~eeks of this altered 
the Douglases ability to control the patronage of the 
court, and ~ith James stewart's rise to power, it was they 
~ho soon found themselves on the receiving end of the feud. 
Aside from the political advantages of joining in 
~ith the vultures gathering around Morton, Stewart thus 
had something of a_personal feud of his own. Morton's 
fall ~as quickly follo~ed with due reward and captain stewart 
was able to steal the earldom of Arran from the ousted 
Hamiltons. It.eanwhile the Douglases were driven out into 
the political wilderness along with ·their old enemies. 
Apart from Morton who was beheaded, Angus was outlawed, 
as were many others of the former regent's kinsmen, while 
Arran put two of his servants to the torture and had another 
executed.62 Arran was recognised as "Norton's special enemy" 
61. R.P.C., iii, p 89-90, p 141, p 206, p 275-76, p 292. 
62 •. ibid., P 348-49, p 351, p 365, p 368, p 369, p 377, 
p 378-80, p 389-90, p 415, p 425, p 624; Spottiswoode, 
~g!z,' ii, p 280, P 343; Moysie, Memoir~, p 31. 
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who had made his trial and execution his own personal business63 
and when Morton was told that Arran was to be in charge of . 
his case he was said to have uttered that "l knowe then what 
I may look for ll • 64 However, on the day of his death Arran 
visited Horton and asked to be reconciled to him saying that • 
his execution was.a matter of state and not a personal affair. 
Norton rose to the occasion and repl:i,ed, 11 It is no tyme to· 
remember quarrelles. I have no quarrell to you or any oth~r. 
I forgive you and all others as I will you forgive me.,,65 
Forgiveness, however, was many decades in the future. 
Arran continued to oppress the Douglases with Angus being 
driven out of the country along with Morton's bastard sons 
and others of their kinsmen. A Mr Archibald Douglas, 
former constable of Edinburgh Castle, was executed· in 1584 
along with Gowrie, two more Douglases were put to death 
before the end of the year and in 1585 Douglas of 14ains was 
sent to the block when colonel Stewart, a man employed as 
a kind of intelligence chief by Arran, uncovered a plot 
. 66 
against the chancellor, an office Arran acquired in 1584. 
In the meantime Arran also bloodied his hands with his old 
patron Gowrie. Again there were personal reasons for Gowrie 
continued to remind Arran of his former position, "and dispyet 
his insolent pryd, oppression and misbehavour planly in 
63. C.S.P.Scot" vi, p 12. 
64. Spottiswoode, tlistotI, ii, p 276. 
65. ibid., p 278-79; C.S.P. Scot., vi, P 22. 
66. Moysie, J.iemoirs; p 48-50; Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 314; 
Birrel "Diary, p 23. 
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consaill, quhilk few utheris durst do." Arran thus hated. 
Gowrie and it was also said that he had an eye on the earl's 
lands. The two thus drifted apart and Gowrie began plotting 
with Arran's enemies, seized control of the government himself 
in the famous Ruthven raid, but spared. Arran and lived to 
regret it when, in another attempted coup in 1584, Arran out-
manoeuvred him, had him arrested and brought to trial for 
treason. Gowrie was in no doubt that personal feud was at 
the basis of his misfortune, telling the court that he was 
the victim of those "who thirst for m! blood by this warldly 
revengell • He alluded to Arran as "my malicious adversarie", 
but asked him to "remember of faren years" when he sensed 
all was lost.68 Like Morton he was stoic about his end, 
praying that limy blood may satiate and estinguish the 
bloodie rage and ire of the courteours". 69 However, both 
his execution and that of Morton three years earlier, were 
to continue to haunt Scottish political life for some year~ 
to come. 
Arran's own fall came in 1585. Following that he 
was saved. from the block by the king who always retained 
a liking for him. He fled to the highlands and then 
returned south, to the home of his nephew lord Ochiltree, 
67. Melville "Diary", p 324-25. 
68. "The Manner and Form of the Examination and Death of 
·William Earl of Gowrye, May 1584", fu!!matzne Miscellanz, 
vol i, Bannatyne Club, 1827-55), p 91, no 92; p 100-01, 
no 9. 
69. Bannatyne Miscellany, i, p 100-01, no 92. 
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from where he tried unsuccessfully to talk his way back into 
the confidence of the king.?O On the second of November 1596, 
captain stewart, as he was again known, was met on the road 
by a nephew of Morton's apd two other Douglases whose fathers 
he had had executed, and they ttkilled the same Captain and 
cut him in pieces for the deaths of the Earls of Morton, 
Gowrie and others their friends ll , carried his head on the 
end of a lance throughout Douglas country and left his body 
for the dogs. 71 In 1608 Arran's own nephew had his revenge 
on lord Torthorwald who had carried out this murder, stabbing 
him to death in an Edinburgh street.72 Not until 1613 did 
lord Ochiltree and lord Torthorwald's heir finally lay the 
feud to rest before the privy council. 73 
While there were suspicions that Arran's murder had been 
political, Haitland having died and his name having been 
suggested as a possible chancellor, the feud lost its real 
political significance in 1585.74 Yet it was almost thirty 
years before the kinsmen of Morton and Arran had stopped 
feuding with one another. Both families and their localities 
thus continued to be affected by the politics of the 1570's 
70. Chambers, Domestic Annal~, i, p 274; Me1ville, M~moir!l, 
p 405. In 1587 he had tried to accuse Angus of treasonable 
activities, R.P.C., iv, p 157-58, p 169. 
71. C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 360; Pitcairn, Qriminal Trials, iii, p 66. 
72. g.P.C., viii, p 128, p 144, p 543 and many others. 
73. R.P.C., x, p 1, p 45; Melrose, i, p 104. 
74. Spottiswoode,History, ii, p 40; Moysie, Nemoirs, p 98-99; 
Melville, MemQ1m, p JJJ5. 
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and l580 1s and one can see ~hy, on the ~hole, political 
executions ~ere not a common occurrence in Scottish politics. 
Arran ~as something of an exception, and in a sense ~as 
risking all on the gamble that he ~ould never lose power, 
his survival after 1585 being thought "passing strange 
that he ~as left so lang on lywe, in respect of his insolent 
behavour when he held the court". 75 An astute politician 
like 11aitland was thus much more careful and any blood-
letting that had to be done was distanced as far from him 
as ~as possible. Why Arran was so ruthless is impossible 
to answer, it may have simply been part of his rough soldier's 
nature, he may have been more insecure because of his own 
lack of nobility or he may just have lacked any fear as 
to the consequenc,es of his actions. However, he did not 
act alone and it was his partner in these dealings ~ho 
inherited the feud of the Ruthven family for Go~rie's 
execution. 
In 1584 at the time of Gow~ie's execution James VI 
was seventeen and thus no longer a child. Clearly he 
had agreed with Arran in seeing the need to have Gowrie 
put to death, at least this was how the earl's sons, 
John the third earl and Alexander master of Gowrie,. 
saw their father's death. Their plot in 1600 to kill the 
king was nothing more than an attempt to inflict revenge 
on their rather's killer and really there is nothing 
75. Melville, MemQ.!r.§., p 405. 
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mysterious or surprising about it. The "malice and deidlie 
haitred" they had in their hearts was no different from that 
held by the Douglases for Arran. 76 Spottiswood actually 
suggests that the king tried to compensate the brothers for 
the loss of their father which though not a formal assythment 
was a recognition on his part of some responsibility for 
GOlolrie's kin. Unfortunately, "benefits are no benefits to 
the malicious, and those that are set for revenge", and 
hence Alexander's cry to the king, that "Iou remember how 
used my father and now you must answer for it.,,77 Though 
there is no question of the king reciprocating any feelings 
of feud in the Ruthven case, his treatment of Bothwell at 
times borders on feud. The king had an almost pathological 
hatred of Bothwell, he refused even the most reasonable 
conditions for his reinstatement, their 1593 agreement was 
very similar to a feud settlement, the king hunted down 
Bothwell's follo\oIers and· kinsmen and Bothwell was reckoned 
to be the man "best able to doe him hurt It .78 One may not 
wish to make too much of this, but there is at least enough 
evidence to speculate on the king having a blood-feud with 
the earl who was in fact one of his own kinsmen. 
76. Birrel "Diari', p 49. 
77. Spottiswoode, HistorI, iii, p 84. 
78. Q.,.,B.P., i, p 475. There is a great amount of material 
on Bothwell which cannot be referred to here but is 
. easily accessible in the C.S.P.Scot. and C.B.P. 
() 
I 
300. 
. ~fuether the king was involved in a feud or not, his 
servants certainly were as they fought to hold his favour. 
The demise of the old revolutionary politicians and the fall 
of Arran had not brought a new peace to the kingdom. 
Commenting on the way the Scots conducted their politics, 
Fowler made the exaggerated remark that 
lilt is, the accustomable fassyon of this contry, (and) 
specyally amonge the best sort,to styk or sh(oot) with 
a pece or pistoll such one as the Chaunce(lour) if he 
. give them cawse of offence, and not to r(aise) an army 
to charge and molest the whole r(ealm), and to bring 
in forrayn forces to the syde ••• 1179. 
In fact on the 17th of l-1arch 1578 the chancellor, lord Glamis, 
was shot dead in a street battle between his own Lyon kinsmen 
and the Lindsays led by their chief, the earl of Orawford. 
The killing was not premeditated and was in fact w~thout 
political motive at all, there having been a feud over local 
issues between the two Angus families for some time. ~at 
happened was that both men passed one another in a narrow 
stirling street and while the chancellor and the earl had 
studiously avo~ded an incident "thair servands in pryde strave 
for the pest part therof", and a fight followed in which lord 
80 Glamis was shot through the head from an upstairs window. 
79. O.S.P.Scot., x, p 68. 
80. Calderwood, !:!;i;,s.1~.ocr, iii, p 397; Melville, Memoirs, p 264; 
Historie, p 148-49; Spottiswoode, liistorz, ii, p 206; 
Balfour, Annales, i, p 364; Moysie, l':emoirs, p 4; Spalding 
Miscellany, ii, p 44. Some thought Orawford had done it for 
"envyenge his felicity" J ~stimate, p 26. Two weeks later 
Juan de Escobedo was assassinated in Madrid by agents of 
Antonia Perez, an indication that Fowler's analysis was not 
in any way pecl~liar to Scotland, Lynch,J. SEain Under the 
Hapsburgs, (Oxford, 1981), vol i, p 323. 
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The feud between the Lindsays and the Lyons was an old 
one, the two being unreconciled "for auld bludeeshed betuix 
thais tua houssis", but this killing blew new life into it.8l 
There were no political repercussions, it being widely 
accepted that unlike the death of the last chancellor, the 
earl of Atholl, there was nothing suspisious about it: 
Glamis was the victim of a blood-feud. However, Crawford was 
arrested on suspicion of having killed G1amis himself, or at 
least of stage-managing the whole incident, and it was a 
worried man who wrote to his friends from ward in Stirling 
castle that this is "the maist vechtie mater that ewer I haif 
haid or is hable to haif ado syanding upon'my honour, leif 
and heritage".82 Crawford was a political light-weight 
though consistently a conservative who had backed Mary to 
the end, was a catholic and had been quick to flock to 
Stirling in 1578 to join the provisional government which 
overthrew ~!orton. His influence in the government was not 
great, but he had friends in the Argyll faction, besides 
which he was a powerful magnate and unlikely to suffer urduly 
even if evidence could be found against him. Not surprisingly 
the earl was soon released, and.·after a brief appearance in 
court, failed to turn up for the second hearing and wes 
given a licence to go abroad in what would be a voluntary 
81. Historie, p 149. 
82. S.R.O., Inventory of Scottish l-funiments at Haigh, N.R.A. 
237/1, box 0, Crawford to Ross, 9/May/1578. 
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'I 83 eXl e. It is uncertain whether he actually went, but clearly 
the affair was being swept under the carpet. 
Obviously the Lyon family were far from satisfied with 
this neglect of their interests. Glamis's son was a minor 
and thus the leadership of the family fell to his brother, 
Thomas, master and now also tutor of Glamis. For the rest 
of his life, the master of Glamis was to make revenge for 
his brother's death one of the two great objectives of 
his existence, so much so that it was said that "Crawford 
all his life was glad to stand in a soldier's post~e".84 
Not very long after lord Glamis's death, Crawford was in 
fact complaining to one of his friends that the master had 
sent one of his "mest speciall interpryssouris to haiff 
murderit us in our bed", had opened proceedings against 
him, and had had him horned.85 It was now the master's 
turn to feel threatened and he was able to persuade the 
privy council to have CraWford assure his safety in 
£10,000, and this was renewed in 1580 as "ns finall 
resolutioun nor ordour being yit taikin for removing 
of the grudgis, variance, andcontraverseis, standing 
amangis thame".86 Arran attempted to effect some sort 
of reconciliationbet.ween the two in the months which 
83. Pitcairn, Criminal Trials, i, part 2, p 79, p 85; 
S.R.O. Heigh, N.R.A. 237/1, box C, Licence, 5/Nov/1579 , 
Warra nt 1580. -
84. Chambers, Domestic Annals, i, p 118. 
85. Spalding Mlscellanl' il, p 62. 
86. R.P.C., il1, p 233, P 288. 
followed, but nothing came of it and they remained at 
feud. 87 
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In fact while Crawford was a natural ally of Esme stewart, 
now duke of Lennox, and of Arran, the master of Glamis was 
beginning to be recognised as a political dealer of some 
skill. In 1578 he had achieved some prominence in helping 
.. 
negotiate Morton's resignation of the reg~ncy, but had failed 
to attract the confidence of either Morton when he recovered 
power of the Argyl1-Lennox-Arran faction which replaced him. 
In fact he himself had no love for a regime which had ignored 
the claims he felt his family had against Crawford, but which 
fined him a massive £20,000 for killing one of the earl's 
dependants in revenge.88 Therefore, when in 1582 the earl 
of Gowrie began looking around for allies with which to 
topple the regime he found G1amis willing to join him, and 
following the subsequent success of the Ruthven coup, Glamis 
became a privy councillor.89 It was now his turn to exploit 
his political friendships to further the feud with the 
Lindsays. In April 1583 he comp1ain~ to the council of 
"a grei t nO\..!IIler of gentilmen and utheris slaine" by Crawford 
87. Noysie, Memoirs, p 36. 
88. C.S.P. Scat., vi, p 477. 
89. Scots Peerage, viii, p 284-87. It was during the 
Ruthven Raid that 31amis mad such a strong impression 
on the young king and reputedly dismissed the royal 
tears with the words, "No matter for his tears: better 
-children weep than bearded men". Certainly thereafter 
he never ~ea11y quite convinced the king that he ought 
to have his confidence. 
and his kinsmen and friends in local skirmishes between 
both families. 90 One knows little more of these incidents 
but it was not as one-sided as Glamis suggested and another 
source tells us that in 1582 Crawford's power was "tyed 
shorte by the feade he hath with the master of Glamis and 
his frendes." 91 However, Glamis went on to complain that 
while he had made numerous complaints about Crawford's 
. 
attacks on him and his friends nothing had been done about 
it, the king had avoided the matter, and his "owersycht 
and deluY usit in justice" had caused him and his kinsmen 
great hclrt. Furthermore, Crawford had another licence to 
go abroad in order to avoid being brought to court to answer 
charges against him during which time his Lindsay kindred 
would come under the king's protection. This rev~als the 
extent of protection Crawford had been getting from the 
Lennox regime. Not surprisingly Glamis's friends in the 
new Ruthven government swept it aside and granted him 
permission to pursue the earl before the ordinary courts.92 
The Ruthven regime only lasted another few months until 
June 1583 when the king escaped and rejoined Arran who had 
the support of a number of noblemen including Crawford. 
Once again the power fo central government was used to 
good effect in interfering in local political feuds and 
90 •. R.P.C., iii, p 563. 
91. Estimate, p 32~ 
92. R.P.C., iii, p 563. 
one heard no more of the case being prepared against Cra~ford. 
Yet neither Arran nor the king wanted Glamis completely 
alienated, and within a month of Arran's return to power 
efforts ~ere being made to persuade Crawford and Glamis 
to be reconciled. Blanks ~ere drawn up for both men to 
sign, but Glamis refused and asked to discuss the matter 
~ith the king ~ho in turn refused his request, a sure sign 
that Arran was handling the affair himself.93 Throughout 
the summer Arran continued to put heavy pressure on Glamis 
to agree ,,,ith Crawford, an indication that he ~ould have 
preferred some sort of accommodation with Glamis, but 
the master consistently refused, pres~ably because the 
terms ~ere unacc·eptable.94 The chancellor, Argyll, opened 
up his own negotiations ~ith the two sides, but Arran ~as 
suspicious and blocked it so that this initiative also 
collapsed.95 However, Glamis was still in league with 
Gowrie and with the earl of Mar, a personal enemy of 
Arran's, and in April 1584 the latter two attempted yet 
another coup at Stirling. The plot failed to gather the 
expected support and Glamis and J.far were forced to flee 
the country, leaving Gowrie and one of Glamis's kinsmen 
to face the block.96 
93. a.s.p.scot., vi, p 566. <: 
94. ibid. ,p 575. 
95. ·ibid. ,p 686. 
96. ibid. ,p 597; g.B.P., i, P 136. 
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When Glamis returned with the exiled lords in 1585 he did 
so as a recognised political weight with debts to collect. 
Yet as one has seen his opposition to Lennox and Arran was 
not entirely ideological. There were policy differences 
between Glamis and these two, but he could have lived with 
these, and what really drove him into opposition was 
Crawford's close identification with. both Lennox and 
even moreso with Arran. Crawford's politics were very 
much in harmony with the ideals of these two men and these 
were reinforced by the manipulation of patronage and 
protection in his interests. Faced with this G1amis had 
no option but to look for an alternative political 
arrangement which would allow him to pursue his feud more 
easily. Political lines were being drawn by the needs 
of local political interests, not by firm convictions 
on broad questions of policy. G1amis thus returned as 
one of the principal members of the anti-Arran faction, 
was re-admitted to the privy council, appointed captain 
of the king's guard and lord treasurer with a pension of 
£1,000 a year. In 1587 he became one of the commissioners 
for considering grants from the crown lands, a position 
of considerable patronage potential, and in 1588 was 
appointed an extraordinary lord of session. Next to 
the chancellor he had become the most powerful member of 
the royal administration.97 
97. Scots Peerage, viii, p 285-86. 
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However, he was to be sorely disapPointed if the thought 
that his position would allow him to wreck Crawford. The earl 
was temporarily warded, but the 1585 settlement was largely 
a reconciliation of the political factions of the day, at 
least in the sense that apart from Arran there were no 
political victims, and even he was spared his life.98 
Thus throughout 1586-87 the two men were kept under 
assurance, and both the king and chancellor Maitland 
personally participated in negotiating between them.99 
Much of the time of the June 1587 convention of the nobility 
was taken up with resolving their feud and finally an accord 
was reached and Crawford and Glamis signalled the end of 
their feud by dining together at the chancellor's house. 100 
If 1585 had represented the resolution of a number of 
political difficulties in reconciliation, or at least in 
accommodation, new factions were appearing which would soon 
throw the state back into chaos. Maitland and Glamis were 
able to work together in an alliance which w~s largely 
acceptable to both men, even if Glamis did have his eye 
on his brother's old office of chancellor, but the 
rapidly growing influence of two other men smashed the 
frail stability of their relationship. The earls of Buntly 
and Bothwell, two of the most powerful magnates in the 
kingdom, and men of great ambition, political skill and 
98. C.B.P., i, p 215. 
99. C.B.P., i, p 211; R.P.C., vi, p 128. 
100. Historie, p 228; Moysie, Memoirs, p 63. 
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charisma, were by 1587 challenging Maitland and one another 
for primacy at the court and in the government. For both 
Mait1and and G1amis there loomed the possibility of going 
the way of Arran in the face of such powerful noble 
opposition and both had to carefully cultivate their friends 
and try to manipulate one another and the two earls to stay 
in the political arena. Being the great political survivor 
that he was, Mait1and did not allow 'the potential for mischief 
in the Crawford-G1amis feud to escape his attention. 
In the summer of 1588 the chancellor and treasurer were 
still working allies with Maitland being forced even more 
onto a defensive posture by the growth of Huntly's power 
in the chamber. A plot was uncovered in which Huntly, 
with the help of Crawford and others, had intended· to kill 
the chancellor and this convinced Maitland of the need to 
continue his friendship -with Glamis.101 However, Huntly 
had introduced to the court Alexander Lindsay, Crawford's 
younger brother, and like his patron, Lindsay was soon 
dazzling the court and especially the king. By September 
it was known that Huntly was hoping to acquire the guard 
for Lindsay, something which would further the earl's 
grand designs for controlling the king, and would have 
a particular satisfaction for Lindsay as he would be 
taking it from his brother's old enemy. Glamis tried 
to r'esist the move' and even arranged a short truce of 
101. C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 601. 
sorts between him and Lindsay, but Hunt1yts influence with 
the king was irresistable and on returning from a trip into' 
the country, he found that he had lost his office and that 
Lindsay had already replaced the guards with his own men.102 
Naturally Glamis was "heichlie movit" by the loss and made 
this point to the convention of the nobility then meeting. 
Quite rightly he argued that he had done nothing to deserve 
this disgrace and feelings were soon running high in EdinbUrgh. 
Both the master of Crawford had men in the town and the latter 
was helped even more by the addition ot Bothwell to his side. 
Bothwell became involved in some "braggingis" with Glamis 
which prompted the king to order the earl to remain in 
his lodgings that night, but as usual the earl disobeyed 
and he and the Lindsays took to the streets, march~ to 
the head of Blackfriar street and awaited the appearance 
of the Lyons and their friends. Fortunately, the king 
heard about it before any violence took place, and had the 
burgh authorities intervene and arrest both Bothwell and 
Glamis. The two men were brought before the council, 
Bothwel1 had an "unseemly" argument with the king and 
, 103 the two were warded for a few days. Shortly arterwards 
an attempt was made to placate G1amis with a girt in return 
for recognising Alexander Lindsayts captaincy of the guard, 
but he continued to be obstinate, saying that Lindsay was 
his }llortal enemy and in the end the king solved the problem 
102. C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 621, p 627, p 635, p 638. 
103. Moysie, Memoirs, p 7l;'C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 640. 
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by handing the guard to Huntly himself.104 Matters could 
not have turned out better for the Gbrdon earl had he 
planned it this way. 
However, Hunt1y did not enjoy the office for long and 
within months had lost the king's confidence in the badly 
staged Brig O'Dee conspiracy in which both Bothwell and 
Crawford also participated. Crawford was vaguely 
persuaded by Hunt1y's Counter-Reformation ideology and 
the appeal to his conservative noble instincts to defend 
the nobility from the machinations of low-born councillors 
like Naitland. More important for him though, was the 
opportunity to strike at Glamis just as Glamis had done 
against him and the regimes he had co-operated with in 
1582 and 1585. To Crawford's delight the rebels were 
. able to capture Glamis, attacking his house and burning 
it in the process. Glamis was now in extreme danger 
because "they will never keep him alive if it were but 
Crawford's feud with him", and ~n fact the earl argued 
fiercely for him to be put to death. However, the real 
leaders of the rebellion, Huntly and Erroll, were more 
calculating, having no feud with Glamis themselves. 
FUrthermore, it was already apparent that the rebel~on 
was failing to gather momentum and to leave the treasurer 
alive might have advantages. Angry at this, and with 
nothing more to be gained from his participation in the 
104. C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 647; Moysie, ~emoirs, p 71. 
rebellion, Crawford went hane in the huff. Within weeks 
Huntly was the king's prisoner along with Bothwell and 
Crawford and the rebellion was over. l05 
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Among the victors suspicion and division soon set in. 
Glamis paid ~is political debts to Huntly and began to 
defend him and Bothwell before the king, and it was very 
quickly being whispered that Glamis had e~en been a party 
to the rebellion all along. Now MBit1and began to worry 
lest Glamis was able to gather Huntly and Bothwell behind 
him and wrest the chancellorship away from him. He thus 
opposed G1amis's demands for Crawford's execution and 
hoped to get the Lindsays to rally around him in the 
defence of his position should it be threatened. Thus, 
while all three earls were found guilty of treason) they 
were protected by the chancellor and the treasurer and 
by the king's own reluctance to be too firm anyway, 
especially with Huntly. All three were freed without 
any punishment at all except for a few months in open 
106 
ward. 
This suspicion between the two leading government 
officials, and thei:!;" desperate need for magnate backing 
to hold onto their offices continued to be at the basis 
of much of their political dealing in the next few years. 
In Harch 1590 a libel was disoovered alleging that there 
,) 
105. a.S.P.Seot., x, p 36, p 38; Moysie, Memoirs, p 74-75, 
p 77. 
106. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 102. 
312. 
was a plot by Crawford and a number of other government 
officials to murder Glamis, but the latter's fear of 
~~itland grew so great that by 1591 he was willing to 
talk peace with both Crawford and his younger brother. 
Not surprisingly "It is much merveiled that Crawford and 
the V18ster of Glamis should be thus sodenly agreed". 
Rumour even had it that Glamis would. resign the treasurer~ 
ship to Alexander Lindsay, now lord SPlnie.107 Factionalism 
was running wild in the government and court and "The Council 
and state is distracted by these occassions; peace may be 
looked for in the morning, but the alarm sounded before 
ni.5ht.nI08 In one clash between the t\rlO, ~.aitland. insisted 
on forcing a matter through the session to help his nephew 
against Glarnis's father-in-law, a number of session judges 
absenting themselves so that he could get his way. In 
another dispute between Glamis and Cra\rlford over the town 
of Forfar, lI18itland. wrecked the king's attempts to have it 
settled by the session by assuring Crs\rIford of his backing 
whatever he did.109 The chancellor vas thus fanning the 
fires of the feud in a 10ca1i~y in order to maintain his 
own security at the king's side. Y~it1and had thus 
manoeuvred to "awake this sleping dogg to byte Glames", 
a far cry from what one would expect from the man \rIbo 
supposedly led "the attack on the overblown power of the 
107'. C.S.P .Scot. ,x, p 856-57, p 459. 
108. ibid., P 469. 
109. ibid., P 468jC.B.P., i, p 375-76. 
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aristocracy in the Scottish state".110 
By the end of 1591 Bothwell had 'fallen, Huntly was in 
alliance with }fuitland and Glamis could be safely jettisoned. 
Again his local difficulties were used against him. He was 
ordered to appear before the council with his nephew, the 
young lord Glamis, to assure Crawford, but refused. As a 
result of this, and the chancellor's further scheming 
against him he was deprived of his treasurership and place 
on the session, was put to the horn, arrested and imprisoned 
in B1ackness.ll1 The severity of this was comp1ete~y out 
of step with the treatment of other feuds at the time and 
clearly l.fBitland was exploiting his opportunity to ruin 
his rival. This open split between two "well affected" 
politicians at a time when Huntly was back at the -fore of 
.. the political stage worried the English and attempts were 
made to bring about a reconciliation. However, G1amis had 
his own scheme and as in 1590 decided to bury the hatchet 
with Crawford in order to make a recovery at court. Other 
noblemen were swift to offer their help in reconciling 
the two, but the chancellor heard of it, did what he could 
to sabotage a settlement of the feud and was even more 
determined to "'priche at' Glamis overthrow for his own 
safety",l12 ensuring that he remained in ward.113 -
110. C.B.P., i, p 375-76; Lee, John MBitland or Thirlstane, p 118. 
111~ C.S.P.Scot., x, p 590; C.B.P., i, p 383; Scots Peerage, viii, 
p 286 • 
. 112. Q.S.P.Scot., x, p 592. 
113. ibid., p 596. 
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Help for Glamis in fact came from an unexpected quarter 
in the person of lord Spynie. Spynie had now reached the 
heights of his popularity with the king, had quarrelled 
with his brother Crawford, and was himself vying with 
Maitland "Iho regarded him as yet another threat to his office: 
Like Glamis, Spynie was willing to forget about looal politics 
for the moment and agree with him. Following this he used 
his influence in the ohamber to bring Glamis back to oourt 
before Haitland knew anything about it. He then sucoeeded 
in bringing his brother to court and began negotiations 
between him and Glamis with a view to forming a faction 
together to oppose the chancellor. However, the hatred 
between Crawford and Glamis ran too deep for a reconoiliation, 
and with Haitland constantly applying his own pres~ure to 
. 114 Crawford, Spynie's projeot collapsed. His failure was 
not inevitable but there was little likelihood of him being 
able to persuade his kinsmen to drop their local political 
interests in order to further his career at court. Time 
and again court politicians had to learn that local 
interests predominated and that even the most powerfUl 
court factions had local interests which had to be token 
into account. 
The murder of the earl of MoraY' by Hunt1;y in another feud 
in February 1592 changed the entire politic~l alignment of the 
previous three years. The loss of HuntlY' and the clamour 
114. Q.J3.P.Scot., x, p 595, p 598, p 600, p 602, p 608, p 627. 
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against him forced 11aitland to come to an accommodation 
with Glamis while Crawford gravitated towards Huntly. Now 
Glamis and Spynie had no further need of one another and 
the old feud ,,,as re-opened. Both men remained well guarded 
wherever they, went and it was commented that "Ther w.as na 
gud lyking betwen the maister of Glames and my lord Spyny, 
chiefly for the fead betwen the houses of Crafford and 
Glames ll .115 A few months later Spynie himself had tumbled 
from grace, being accused of treason by colonel stewart, 
and while he was able to clear himself his image remained 
tarnished and his political influence evaporated. Glamia 
tried to exploit Spynie1s weakness at the height of the 
treason accusations by offering unacceptable terms but 
they were refused. Crawford mean\tlhile was back i~ An.:,aus 
drum~ing up local support against the Lyons should it 
become necessary to shake Glamis up in his own back 
116 yard. 
This time Maitland and Glamis's partnership held 
with the latter winning back all his ·old offices. In fact 
the more important time for this feud in its relation to 
court politics was over, Crawford being unable to again 
find a court politician who needed his backing. He was 
thus relegated to the backwoods except for a brief incursion 
back onto the stage in 1595 when he joined Mar against 
" 
115. C.S.P.Soot., x, p 653, p 671, p 650, p 768, P 752; 
Melvil1e, Memoirs, p 402. 
116. C.S.P. Scot., x, p 758, p 768. 
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Maitland and Glamis in the last real factional struggle of 
. 117 the Jacobean court. Glamis continued in his offices until 
1598 when he retired, having already been edged out of the 
leadership of his kindred by his nephew in 1595. Crawford 
died in November 1607 and Glamis followed him only three 
months later, but they died with the old hatreds still 
unburied.1l8 Fighting and killing between the two kindreds 
continued throughout the 1590 l s in spite of attempts by the 
cro~m to put an end to the feud and there is in fact no 
record of when they made their peace, lord G1amis even 
chosing to go abroad in 1602 rather than be reconciled with 
his family's old enemies.119 
The exploitation of politics for the sake of the feud and 
the infiltration of the feud into the life of politics were 
an integral part of the political life of both Crawford and 
Glamis. In the particular politics of this feud one can see 
117. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 151, p 159, p 169, P 509. 
118. Scots Peerage, viii, p 286; iii, p 31. 
119. There was an incident outside the Edinburgh to1bootb 
in 1595, C.S.P.,Scot., xi, p 517, p 519, p 525; struggle 
for power within the Lyon kindred, ~S'PtScot., xi,p 588, 
p 689; during 1596-99 there was further fighting and 
attempts by the crown to intervene, R.P.C., v, p 248, 
p 475, p 540, p 551; Q.S.P.Scot., xii, p 142, xiii, 
part 1, p 444, p 497, p 525; S.R.O. Haigh, N.R.A.,237/1, 
box c, 87 June/I 598 ; in 1600 one of lord Glamb' s men 
tried to kill Sir John Lindsay of Ba11inscho on ~inburgh 
High Stteet and when Glamis disowned him, the servant 
turned on his master and had a shot at him. Two weeks 
. later Glamis killed the man, Il.P.C" vi, p 69, P 91, 
p 239; C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 884, p 891; Pitcairn, 
Qrim~na1 Trials, ii, p 386; finally the last one hears of 
the feud is lord Glamls choslng exile in 1602, R.P.C., 
vi, p 311, p 367. 
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quite clearly the working of patronage and the creation of 
faction around the feud. Thus, Crawford, who was no politician 
of any great skill or significance, was still able to counter 
Glamis's far more sophisticated understanding of the court 
and the royal government because as a powerful local magnate • 
he was always, until after 1592, able to find someone at the 
court who needed his private power. Lennox, Arran, MBitland 
and even Glamis himself had all at one time bought his 
support by intervening in his feud with the Lyons family, 
and even more significant magnates, like Bothwell and HUntly, 
showed they were always grateful for additional men at 
their backs. The relationship between the local magnate 
and the court politician, be they a magnate themselves or 
simply a government official, was a symbiotic one in which 
the one helped the other at a local level and the other 
reciprocated the favour by turning up at court to overawe 
their partners' political enemies. In all this both 
Mai tland and Glamis were playing the same game as were 
Arran and Gowrie a decade earlier and there was clearly 
no divergence from this pattern by ehancellor MaitlaDd who 
has been unconvincingly cast in the role of a scourge of 
the nobility and of their feuds. 
This point is emphasised even more in M8itland's 
exploitation of the earl or Bothwell's local feud with 
lord Hume. Mai tland' s own personal feud with Bothwell 
is well known and dealt with elsewhere, but basically it 
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involved a clash over certain lands on the east march and 
a more serious confrontation for dominance of the court 
and the king ",hich dated from Both",ell' s failure to get 
the chancellorship for himself in 1585.120 The earl's feud 
",ith the Humes was closely entangled with Maitland from the • 
start, all three having claims to Coldingham priory "'hich 
was at the time in the hands of the Humes of Manderston.121 
On this specific issue and at the level of regional power; 
Both",ell and lord Hume and his kindred were thus keen 
competitors. In 1583 their rivalry broke out into an 
exchange of insults bet",een Bothwell and Manderston's son, 
David Hume, and the earl was only restrained from his 
122 usual sho", of violence by the king's personal intervention. 
A fe", days later he did give vent to his anger a~ attacked 
lord Hume and his company only a short distance from where 
the king was staying •. Both were briefly warded and caution 
was arranged, but a year later Bothwell caught up with 
David Hume, the actual possessor of Coldingbam, and two 
of his friends and "killed all three, but hewed DaVY' Hume, 
who was the Earl of Arran's man, all to pieces." Arran 
120. See Lee, lohn ~~itland of Thirlstane, for a fuller 
discussion of their rivalro1. Bothwell olearly expeoted 
to be made chancellor in 1585, C.B.P., i, P 211-12. 
The first serious breach between them came in 1587 
when a plot by Bothwell to murder Maitland was 
uncovered, C.S.P.Scot., ix, p 507; Gordon, ~erla~, 
p 213. Thereafter their relationship simply went 
from bad to worse. 
121. See Lee., ~ohn Maitland of ThirlstaD§, P 6O-6l.,and for 
Bothwell's claim, Donaldson, James V - Jame§ VII, p 191. 
122. C.S.P.Scot., Vi, p 658. 
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did not allow the matter to offend him unduly, but lord Hume 
was bent on revenge and in fact it was he who was warded. 
Arran having his own reasons for wanting to apply pressure 
t h' 123 o 1m. 
The 1585 coup brought some advancement for Bothwell and 
Hume who both came out in opposition to Arran. However, the 
ne'W government confirmed. Manders ton's rights to Coldingha1!l 
and another Hume, Sir John Hume of Coldenknowes, was appointed 
captain of Edinburgh castle in the face of Bothwell's lobbying 
for that position, the chancellorship and captaincy of the 
guard having already alluded him or being ,about to.124 In 
1586 a clash over leading the teinds of Coldingham was 
narrowly avoided, but then the king intervened and persuaded 
the Hum'es to give the property up to the earl, Maitland 
, having already resigned his interest in it. That same year 
Bothwell married his half-sister off to Sir John Hume and 
something like peace existed between the two families for 
the next few years.125 
However, just as the reconciliation between Glams and 
Crawford was followed by an'increasing rivel17 between 
Glamis and Maitland, so the same ooourred between Bothwell 
and the chancellor. Bothwell was regarded at the 'time as 
123. C.S.~.Scot., vi, p 666, p 675; vii, p 329-30; 
Calderwood, HistorY, iv, p 200. 
124. A.P.S~, iii, P )87; C.S.P.Scot., vii, p 203, p 206; 
C.B.P., i, p 211. 
125. C.S.P.Scot.,ix,p18j Q.B.P.i,p 231,p 559-60; S.R.O. 
R.D., 1136!27b. 
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something of IIlan udertaking man' as they term it here, but 
withall fickle, as no party is sure (of) him; feared on both 
sides, trusted on neither".126 In fact he threw in his lot 
with Huntly against Maitland, but as one has seen, the 1589 
rebellion collapsed. Bothwell's part in the rebellion was 
even more of a fiasco than Huntly's as his friends on the 
borders simply did not bother to join him, thus revealing 
serious doubts about his mastery of the south-east, and 
his surrender was all the more humiliating in that it was 
made to a William Hume, t.he lieutenant of the ~ard.127 
Unlike the others in the rebellion Bothwell was never 
properly pardoned and he came closest to a severe 
punishment, Hume of Manderston even offering to do the 
king's business for him and murder the earl in return 
128 . for getting his lands back. For the moment though, 
Maitland drew close to Bothwell to ward off the growing 
alliance between Glamis and Huntly. He in fact tried to 
bring Bothwell and Hume together to see if they could unite 
against the other faction, but lord Hume simply took 
advantage of the opportunity and attacked Bothwell on 
his way to the chancellor's house, chasing him and beating 
up one of his servants. Worse was expected "by reason 
of the youth and furious nature of both these lords, and 
both being well friended", and both, "especiallie the 
126.·Q.s.P.Scot., ix, P 677. 
127. ~.S.P.Scot., x, P 70. 
128. ibid., P 110. 
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Earl" having "bloudie bandes and turbulant sprites" .129 
In fact Bothwell's political recovery towards the end 
of 1589 had him once again thinking about the need to do 
something about his own local power and he thus arranged an 
accommodation with Hume. When the king left for Denmark 
Both\~ell was left as one of the chief men in control of the 
government and he and lord Hume came to an understanding 
about their zones of influence in the south-east.130 
This new found harmony continued to grow and by the spring 
of 1590 it was being said that they were "so well agreed 
betwixt them-selves as their late and earnest feede is 
turned into tender and familiar frendship".13 l It was now 
thought that Maitland would surely suffer from this alliance, 
and lord Hume in fact told Bothwell that it had been the 
chancellor who had put him up to his recent attacks against 
the earl. The two clearly resented Maitland's meddling in 
their affairs,132 and shortly after this Bothwell made his 
peace with Manderston, thus securing one of his localities. 
On his return, Maitland tried to stop the settlement being 
recorded, but the arbitration between the two continued, 
some of Bothwell's cut-throats received remissions and the 
129. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 146, p 148. 
130. ,B.P.C., iv, p 423., 
131. C.S.P.Scot., x, p 273, p 279; C.~, i, p 353. 
. not before another clash between them in Leith, 
. §.cot., x, p 846. 
" 
132. q.S.P.Scot.,x,p 285; Melville, ~emoirs, p 373. 
Though 
C.S.P • 
chancellor was powerless to prevent the feud being 
pacified.133 
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Thus when Bothwell fell from power in the summer of 1591 
there was no rush by the ,Humes to exploit it. Lord Hurne in 
fact remained so close to Bothwe11 that he was warded under 
suspicion of organising the earl's escape from Edinburgh 
castle. On his release he joined Bothwe11 on the borders, 
ignored government orders to prevent the earl from freely 
passing through the east march and gave up any pretence 
of friendship wit~ MSitland.134 Eventually Hume himself 
was denounced and as other border lairds began to desert 
the king, Hume gave in to pressure from his own lairds to 
seek peace with the king.135 Hume had done all he could, 
but he 'was a political realist and as Bothwel1 was again 
failing to get the borders to rally around him as Huntly 
could do in the north, he sought the king's pardon. On 
the 25th of August MBitland and Hume were reconciled by 
136 
a bond of friendship at the king's command. 
Having converted Hume from being an enemy of the 
regime to being its friend, the king and his chancellor 
soon saw the potential of opening the old feud with 
133. ~.P.Scot.,x,p 307, p 312, p 365, P 411, p 413, p 494; 
, S.R.O., Bruce of Earlshall MUniments, G.D. 247/180/1. 
134. C.S.P.Scot.,x, p 536, p ·546, p 548, p 550; E.P.C., iv, 
p 649; h1bf:.., i, p 381. 
135. C.S.P.Scot., x~ p 554-55; ~.P.C~, iv, p 662, p 668. 
136. S.R.O., Lauderdale }-luniments, N .R.A. 832/78. 
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Bothwell as a means to making Hume a tool of the crown. 
A spur to this intent was given by one of Bothwe1l's friends, 
..Tames Douglas of Spott, who murdered Georg Hume of spott, the 
uncle of one of Manderston's younger sons, Sir George Hume, 
a rising star in the chamber.137 Shortly afterwards, Bothwel1 
raided Ho1yrood palace, partly with a view to killing Maitland, 
"whome he deidlie haittit". The ra.id failed, many of the 
earl's men were taken and hung and the Humes were tied even 
more closely to the king and Maitland when Sir George Hume 
was gifted Co1dingham, recently forfeited from 'Bothwe1l. 
Lord Hume himself later acquired the property and his 
willingness to lead companies of horse in the chase for 
Bothwell was utterly secured when he was allowed to 
intrude himself on the earl's other possessions on the 
east march.138 
The successful coup by Bothwe1l and the other Stewart 
lords in the summer of 1593 brought a temporary reversal 
of the Humes fortune. Co1dingham and all Bothwell l s other 
lands were returned to him, but he complained that IIhe 
could not get presence of his ~miestie, nor speik of him, 
for the Homes, quho were courtiers with the King, and' 
137. Spottiswoode, History, ii, p 417-19; R.~~, iv, 
p 677; C.S.P.Scot., x, p 572, p 575, p 584; 
Historie, p 243. There was some suspicion about 
this killing having been committed by other Humes. 
See also C.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 659. 
138. Moysie, Memoirs, p 87; Historie, p 243; Q.S.P.Scot., 
x, p 741, p 781, xi, p 19, p 82; C.B.P., i, P 399. 
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enemies of the said Earle of Bothuell", and that Sir 
3eorge Hume was still seeking revenge for the killing of 
his brother even though the feud had been properly settled 
by him and the Humes. 139 Gradually, the Humes, MBit1and 
and the Hamiltons made their recovery at court, and with 
the desertion of Lennox and the appointment of Alexander Hume 
as provost of Edinburgh, Bothwell had to flee the burgh and 
again take to hiding. l40 
Though not yet finished, Bothwel1 was now a desperate 
man. He challenged lord Hume to a duel, but the latter 
was wise to avoid such a means of settling their feud, 
Bothwe11's reputation for combat being well established. l41 
The earl also made another even more direct assault on the 
king in' the spring of 1594 when he led an attack on Edinburgh. 
The king put lord Hume in command of his forces, having 
suspended an act of excommunication against him so that he 
might continue to protect him, and while Bothwe1l's men 
actually inflicted a defeat on Hume and the royal vanguard, 
he had to retire before much larger forces. l42 Lord Hume 
was then involved in prising the laird of Johnstone away 
from Bothwell and in plotting to murder Douglas of spott 
while being rewarded by even more Bothwe11 lands.l43 The 
139. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 159-60; C.B.P.,i,p 488; Birrel, 
"Diary", p 30. 
140. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 170, p 188; C.B.P., i, p 498, p 492. 
141. C.C.P.Scot., xi, p 188 • 
. 142. ibid., p 227, p 304; C.B.P., i, p 524-25, p 525-27; 
Spottiswoode, tlistory, ii, p 448. 
143. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 284, P 301, p 369; ~.P.C., v, p 137. 
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earl mean",hile tried to capture Sir George Hume, his "capital 
enemi', and to make Naitland and lord Hume the butt of his 
propaganda war,144 but to little effect, and another of the 
r1auderston Humes captured Bothwell's brother and had him 
brought to Edinburgh for execution,while shortly afterwards 
this same William Hume killed another of Bothwell's servants 
in Dunfermline.145 By 1596 Bothwell himself was "in a 
miserable plight", was unable to protect his friends who 
were being ruined and killed by their enemies, and was 
forced to flee the country, never to return.146 
In this feud not only chancellor MBitland but the king 
himself cleverly exploited a local feud for political gain, 
and in fact revived a feud which had been settled by the 
principals of both sides. There WBS, of cours~nothing 
unusual in royal policy being conducted in this way, the 
same principles were applied to the pacification of the 
north-west of Scotland at the end of the 1620's, Caithness. 
being used to crush Orkney and Sutherland in turn bringing 
Caithness to heel. The greatest ruler of Europe, Philip 11, 
similarly defeated the duke of Vil1aherosa by manipulating 
144. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 439, p 444. 
145. ibid., p 536, p 541. 
146. Spottiswoode, Historx, ii, p 461. In 1602 the beginnings 
of a reconciliation took place between lord Hume and 
Bothwell's family but this was not completed until 
1620-21 when his son was given back Co1dingham. By 
this time Bothwe11 had died penniless in Naples. 
Q.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 2, p 1029, P 1107; Helrose, 
i, p 370-72; Spottiswoooo, History, ii, p 461; 
Lee, John MBitland of Thirlstane, p 300. 
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his feud ~ith the count of Chinchon, the treasurer-general 
of Aragon.147 Bothwell's defeat was no different from that· 
of the earl of Douglas in the mid fifteenth century. What of 
course made it puzzling is that Jarnes VI government ~as at 
the same time stumbling towards a policy of eradicating 
feuds and the king himself claimed to hate them vehemently. 
w~ere political survival ~as at risk·though, he ~as 
willing to let expediency override principle, and, as has < 
already been suggested, there was even a hint of blood-
feud between Bothwell and the king. Like other men the 
king was capable of opposing feuds and conducting them 
at the same time. 
What these feuds do show very closely is the far greater 
significance of local affairs in the thinking and the 
organising of court politicians. The locality remained 
for most men the basis of their power and hence their 
political friends and enemies ~ere largely determined by 
local affairs. When the great men o~ the court clashed 
it was only to be expected that they would try to hurt 
one another not only by ~hispering in the ears of the king, 
but by trying to strike at their enemy's power base in 
the localities, far away from the more refined intrigue 
of the court. This is what happened in the last great 
political feud of the Scottish royal court. 
147. Lynch, Spain Under the Hapsburgs, vol ii, p 359. 
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In the summer of 1595 the king took the young prince Henry 
away from the custody of the queen and put him in that of hi~ 
lifelong friend the earl of Mar. Immediately the queen became 
Mar's bitter enemy and quickly found a ready ally in the 
ailing chancellor who had for some time been looking over 
his shoulder at V~r's growth of influence with the king.l48 
The court, which had only just got over the prolonged feuds 
between Bothwe11, Hunt1y and the chancellor, was thus once. 
again riven into two broad factions for or against the queen 
and Mait1and. So tense did relations become that it was 
thought that "the feud is likely to be quickened with blood 
and to the trouble of the country".149 However, Maitland 
remained the past-master of court machinations and out-
matched Mar in an investigation into financial incompetence 
and corruption. He then backed the queen in a demand that 
Mar give up the prince and the captaincy of Edinburgh castle, 
but this time he angered the king who stepped in and forced 
the two men to come to what was no more than a superficial 
reconciliation since both the chancellor and the queen were 
still determined to bring Mar down. l50 
If Mar could not be damaged at court where the king 
had so much confidence in him then his enemies thought that 
148. For a wider discussion of the origins of this see Lee, 
~ohn Maitland of Thirlstane, p 284ff. However, t1ar had 
been tipped to succeed Maitland as early as 1592 and a 
. year later he was said to have been negotiating to 
bring back Arran, C.B.P., i, P 406, p 469. 
149. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 488. 
150. ibid., P 545, p 567, p 550. 
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he might be just as effectively neutralised by entangling 
him in local political difficulties •. A feud between two 
of Mar's dependants offered them the opportunity they were 
looking for. Apparently two men, one a Bruce and the other 
a Forrester, loved the same woman and their rivalry was soon • 
dividing the locality around Stirling "as the ane preassit 
to prevayle above the uther, the factioun of thir two drew 
freyndis to parteis and factions" .151 In April 1595 there" 
was a dangerous brawl in Stirling when the sons of Forrester 
of Garden attacked a company of Bruces and Livingstons 
leaving a friend of Livingston of Dunipace and a number of 
townsmen hurt. Mar's own problems at court were probably 
responsible for his failure to quell this rupture among 
his followers, but on the 24th of June one of the Forresters 
was ambushed on the road between Stirling and Edinburgh by 
Dunipace, Bruce of Airth and "the clanni t men" of his 
kindred. The victim was a baillie of the burgh of Stirling 
and one of Mar's most trusted servants and almost immediately 
the entire country round about was thrown into an uproar.152 
It was not long before the rumours were flying even 
further afield. It was being said that Dunipace and Bruce 
had been put up to the murder by the queen, Mai tland and 
Glamis and that the killing had "set all on fire". Even a 
151. Spottiswoode's less romantic account says that the Bruces 
"and Livingstons were jealous of one of the Forrester's 
influence with Mar, HistorY, ii, p 465 • 
. 152. Histori~, p 346-47; a.s.p.scot., xi, p 575, p 584, 
p 624, p 625, p 637. 
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month before the killing it had been noticed that Dunipace, 
who had been employed by Mar to work against Mait1and, was 
showing signs of drifting from his side over the earl's 
failure to help him against the Forresters. Mar himself 
certainly had no doubt that the chancellor was behind yet 
another killing, aiming to separnte him from the 
Livingstons and Bruces and thus break up his power base. 
The court buzzed with excitement at the prospect of a 
"bloody end" to it all and it was recorded that "all sides 
are busy packing up all their small feuds for their 
advantagell .153 
Mar was without doubt one of king James's less violent 
noblemen but he was determined to have revenge for this 
killing~ He called a meeting of his friends and in all 
Lennox, Argyll, Morton and some thirty barons attended him 
and promised to hazard nlife, land, and all", though only 
if Mar sought to have justice by law and not by private 
revenge. There was an understandable reluctance to escalate 
a blood-feud with the Livingstons and Bruces and with the 
Elphingstones who had now joined them since these men were 
all traditionally dependant on Mar.154 The latter also made 
arrangements for the carrying of Forrester's corpse through 
the lands of his enemies, and while fears were expressed 
that the procession might be opposed and end in bloodshed, 
nothing happened and it was a propaganda triumph for Mar 
153. Q.S.P.Scot., xi, p 584, p 625, p 627. 
154. ibid., p 630. 
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and his friends. Still, it was not the end and men expected 
IIsum certayne revenge saIl ensew theruponll .155 
Winning a publicity battle was one thing, getting justice 
was quite another, and Mar was to find difficulty in bringing 
the murder to court for judgement. }witland was, of course, 
quite satisfied with the disarray into which Marts followers 
had fallen and when some neutral men tried to bring him to 
agreement with the earl, he simply asked "what should need 
agreement when there is no feud", and failed to appear at the 
meeting.156 Meanwhile Dunipace had be~n charged to appear 
before the justice on the 24th of August, but powerful court 
interests were rapidly "gathering behind him thus increasing 
the suspicion that he had been at least partly working in 
concert "with a party there before the slaughter. He and 
his friends thus found themselves with the protection of 
his own chief, lord Livingston, and lords Elphingstone, 
Fleming and Hume as well as the powerful border lairds of 
Buccleuch and Cessford. Mar was not impressed though and 
was said to have prepared some two thousand gentlemen to 
accompa~ him to Edinburgh on the day of the trial. Further-
more, while the chancellor and the queen might be ranged 
against him, he had the backing of the burgh of Edinburgh 
itself, the ministry and the king in a feud in which every 
one appeared to be taking sides.157 
155. C.S.P.Scot., xi, p 631, P 636-37; Historie,"p 346-47. 
One rumour had it that Mar had sworn never to change 
his clothing until he had revenge. 
156. O.S.P.Scot., xi, P 641. 
157. ibid., p 654. 
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Mar's enemies' principal tactics were obstruction and 
they did all they could to prevent the case coming to trial. 
Some sort of mediation was started up with a view to getting 
him to settle for less than. the lives of Forrester's killers 
and the lJhole trutp of the killing. In mid August he was 
being offered the banishment of the killers in return for 
his assurance of the rest of their kinsmen and there was 
even talk of a .settlement between }~r and the now dying 
chancellor, but nothing came of the latter.15S On the local 
feud Mar was still willing to listen and lords Livingston, 
Fleming and Elphingstone, with Airth and DUnipace,increased 
their offer to one of homage or honours to }fur and Forrester 
of Garden and the payment of a thousand marks to the wife 
and children of the dead man. The master of Elphingstone 
visited ~mr to discuss the terms, but found the earl 
suspicious of his part in what he was sure was a plot against 
him so that he left "sore frome my hairt". Mar had also 
brought up the killing of another of his servants for which 
more assythment had been offered. Lord Livingston sent Mar 
a declaration swearing to his innocence, offering to submit 
the matter to a decreet if the earl remained unsatisfied 
and even agreed to allow a~ of his friends or dependants 
to face trial without trying to protect them if Mar would 
agree the same principle for his followers. Dunipace also 
wrote to him declaring his innocence and agreeing to stand 
158. C.S.P.Scot" xi, p 579, p 690. 
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trial as long as lvfar himself was not the pursuer and offering 
to go into ward, exile or make \~hatever reparation Mar wanted 
to restore the peace. By October more banishments were being 
offered and the assythment on offer had doubled to two thousand 
marks.159 Thus in spite of their court backers the Bruces and 
Livingstons felt ill at ease having to face Har in the locality 
and were making fairly generous offers to satisfy him. 
Hm.,lever, Mar was somthing of a stickler for his word am 
was determined to have justice in the courts and to know the 
truth of the murder. 
Marls insistence on a legal prosecution seems unreasonable 
given l-Ihat is known about private settlements, but Nar did not 
want a settlement he wanted revenge, and the justice courts 
offered the best opportunity for that. A warrant ~as issued 
for the arrest of five of the murderers and the trial was 
set for December. l60 The government was now faced with the 
prospect of a violent clash in Edinburgh because both sides 
were determined to appear in force and ensure that justice 
was done. Both were forbidden from bringing large numbers 
of attendants with them, the session was given a holiday so 
that as few people as possible had an excuse for coming 
. 161 to Edinburgh and the burgh prepared for the worst. 
Mait1and had meanwhile died, and it remained for the queen 
159. C.S.P.Scot.,xii, p 11, P 33; R.P.C., v, p 303; Report 
·of the Historical Hanuscripts Com.r::ission on the It.anus-
cripts of the Earl of Mar and Kellie,(London,1904),p 43. 
160. H.M.C •• l<lar and Kellie, p 44. 
161. C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 79, p 88; R.P.C., v, p 242. 
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to champion Dunipace and his friends. She asked Mar to 
postpone the trial, but he refused as "it touches him so far 
in honour that he cannot satisfy her request".162 As one 
has already seen, honour ~as a touchy subject ~ith }~r, 
even moreso than with most of his contemporaries. With the· 
trial set to go ahead both sides turned up ~ith more men-
than they had been allowed and a show-down in the streets 
became more and more likely. However, Anne of Denmark had 
-not finished ~ith her lobbying yet and ordered Mar to postpone 
the trial and submit the feud to her, and ~hen he again refused 
she ~ent to the king and with remarkable determination 
threatened to convene her o~n friends in Dunipace's defence 
if he did not intervene. Faced with this the king agreed, 
and on-the day of the trial, with the whole town standing in 
arms, the tolbooth heavily guarded and both sides confined 
to their cramped lodgings, the king sent for }~r and persuaded 
him to agree to a postponement of the trial to the next local 
justice ayre if mediation had not brought about a private 
163 
settlement by then. That same day the privy council 
ordered both sides to come in during February 1596 and 
settle their feud before them, arrangements ~ere taken to 
de-escalate the situation in Edinburgh and assurances 
were taken.164 For the moment the crisis had passed. 
162. C.S.P.S~, xii,p 92. 
16). ibid., P 95-96, p 97, p 99-100. 
164. ibid.; R.P.C., v, p 248. 
334. 
In effect ~~r had been turned from his initial desire 
for revenge in the blood-feud to revenge through formal 
legal justice and was now being persuaded to settle the 
matter within the context of the feud by assythment. Through-
out one can see that attitudes to the courts were not what 
one would necessarily expect: Mar wanted them to give him 
revenge, the other side expected them to be unfair and 
hence their great desire to be there in strength. However', 
a feud of this proportion was not so easily dismissed and 
an observer wrote, "still I fear this matter of 'my Lord Mar 
(will) work more mischief for though the day of law be 
continued yet hatred diminishes nothing on eother side, 
which (being so near neighbours) is feBrful".165 The same 
commentator, a client of Har's, also felt that his patron 
had been outflanked by the queen, and that liThe Queen will 
rule all and I fear l·far go down". The earl certainly went 
home in a black mood. 166 
Back in his locality Mar's position was still strong. 
There was further fighting in Stirling when lord Livingston 
and the earl of Nontrose met there to discuss further plans 
and were opposed by, Marts people who dominated the burgh.167 
FUrthermore, Stirling presbytery was angry that the trial 
had been postponed, "conceiving that justice was by that 
new puting off of that day illuded at the least", and .they 
165. ~~P.S~ot.1 xii, p.lOO. 
166. ibid. 
167. ibid., P 101. 
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began the process of excommunication against Dunipace and 
Bruce of Airth' s son though they \.,rere stopped from going 
the whole way by the king who wished them to consult with 
th8ir colleagues elsewhere to buy him more time.168 However, 
the king himself was now becoming unpopular in the Stirling 
locality and one of his officers was attacked in the burgh 
169 without Mar doing anything to apprehend the culprits. 
This incident prompted the king to try and take a firmer 
hand with Mar and he persuaded him, with some effort, to 
assure lord Livingston, Bruce of Airth and their kinsmen. l70 
In spite of this }~r continued to relentlessly hunt the 
murderers and to make life in the locality difficult for 
friends of theirs for years to come.17l 
Outside 9f his locality }~r's position was strengthened 
when he and the queen were able to sink their differences, 
but his enemies soon found new protectors in James Elphingstone, 
. 172 
appointed as the king's secretary in 1598. More importantly 
the king himself was becoming increasingly less tolerant of 
the feuds of his noblemen, and Mar began to feel the pressure 
which he felt was pushing him into a settlement "against his 
honour". Mar let his anger be widely known, thus prompting 
168. Q~S.P.Scot., xii, p 114. 
169. ibid., p 123. 
170. ibid., P 136, P 163; E.P.C., v, p 288; R.~.C.!Mat_and 
!elli~, p 45. 
171. 1l.P.C., v, p 303; a.III.C.! V~anQ.J~elli~, p 46-47. 
172. C.S.P.Scot., xii, p 240, P 282. 
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the comment that the king was being'''care1ess ll in offending 
one of his If undoubted best subj ects" .173 However, James was 
determined this time and had set himself the task of putting 
to rest the feuds of the men he most needed to govern the 
kingdom, but "albeit he took great pains and used many 
devius to reconcile them, he could not at this time unless 
he should have used his authority which he forbears hoping 
yet to agree them by this device.1I174 In" fact his authority 
made no difference, both sides find~ng reasons for avoiding 
his orders and even the prospect of being appointed chancellor, 
an office which had been lying vacant since Maitland's death 
in 1596, did not tempt Mar to give in.175 Finally, the king 
could wait no longer and though Mar had been his first choice 
for the position, he passed him over and appointed Montrose 
to the chancellorship, he having concluded his feuds with 
." 176 the Sendi1ands family as the king wished. A few months 
later the king was in fact able to end the feud in a 
h f k 1 t · 177 settlement whic was as ar as one .nows a 8S 1ng one. 
173. Q.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 1, p 214, P 217, p 220; 
Q~, ii, P 538. 
174. Q.&.:.P .Scot., xiii, part 1, p 242. 
175. ibid., p 278, P 292, P 362, p 369. 
176. B.P.C., v, p 516. 
177. p.S.P.Scot., xiii, part 1, p 375, p395, p404, p419, 
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the_Histor~ca1J~~~i2ts ~ommi~sion~ Various 
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This feud is perhaps less obviously political in the 
sense of court politics than other feuds discussed above, 
but its relevance to that world was still important. The 
feud was at one level between Mar, a local magnate of 
medium power, and a number of men who were normally his 
friends and dependants, but its prominence in the records 
shows that contemporaries did not see it simply at that 
local level. Whether Maitland. did forment a feud in 
Stirlingshire or not, Mar thought that he had, and the 
feud thus became bound up with the struggle at court 
between the earl and the chancellor with his ally the 
queen. At the very least Mar's court enemies saw their 
opportunity to side-track Mar into local problems, weaken 
his clientage and strengthen their own at his exp·ense. 
On the whole it worked, in that while Mar remained in 
control of his locality, he lost ground at court and was 
almost certainly deprived of the chancellorship because 
of his attitude to the feud. In the Crawford-3lamis feud 
one finds men using court politics to continue their local 
struggle and here one has the reverse. The point is not 
so much that one has local feuds intruding on the life of 
the court, and the government and factionalism at the 
centre creating fissures in local society, as that the two, 
the locality and the centre, were so closely interwoven 
that one cannot really understand the politics of the o~ 
without the other, and i~ particular one can make little 
sense of court politics without looking at the localities. 
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With an understanding of local divisions, \o1hich \o1ere as one 
has seen, over real issues, the apparent faction for factions 
sake begins to make sense. Court politicians and magnates 
who spent a lot of their time at court \o1ere not cut off from 
the localities, they had to know about them and understand 
them if they \o1ere to survive in that intensely competitive 
environment. They did not stand aloof from \o1hat went on in 
the feuds or look \o1ith profound distaste at the disorders' 
of local society, vowing to impose "absolutism" on them. 
To survive they had to work within the world of'the feud, 
exploiting it for their own well being and that of their 
kinsmen, local dependants and courtly clients. 
This interrelationship between locality and court was 
also highly important in managing Scottish politic's. The 
Huntly-Ste\o1art feud, \o1hich is discussed in the following 
chapter, is the best example of this, but it was relevant 
to most of the feuds of the magnates. It was Morton's 
intervention in the local pO\o1er bases of Argyll and Atholl 
which really brought them to the point of rebellion, it 
was Arran's intervention in the politics of the south-\o1est 
\o1hich precipitated his fall, it was by undermining his 
local pO\o1er and exploiting his local feuds that Bothwell 
was smashed, it was by stirring up trouble in his own back-
yard that Mar's rivals checked his progress. There were 
very few men \-1hose power did not rest to some extent on 
their grip of a locality or a number of them and even great 
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court brokers and politicians like Arran, MBitland and Glamis 
became entangled in local issues. Even at the very centre 
of power - a doubtful concept anyway in this period - alliances 
and factions were being created around divisions which began 
in the localities, and men's political careers were being 
made and broken through the exploitation of their local feuds. 
It is doubtful if the sixteenth century would have understood 
our obsession with the centre as the overriding concern of 
political life. For them the centre was very often nothing 
more than the source of more power which they would exercise 
in their localities, and too often one tends to find the 
politics of this period discussed from the point of view 
of a court cut off from localities which functioned as 
nothing more than sources of revenue and breeding .grounds 
of lawlessness and rebellion. 
Feud was an integral part of Scottish political life 
in the sixteenth century. At times the practice of politics 
and the pursuit of feud were one and the same thing. What-
ever may have been thought about religious change, foreign 
policy or royal legislation, and whatever "parties" may 
have formed around such nebulous concepts, the reality of 
kin obligations and the blood-feud was more tangible and 
, 
more irirluential in shaping and defining the political 
relationships of a majority of politically aware men. 
Political life was charf$ed with the obligations of "kindness" 
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to friends and blood debts to enemies; that was its dynamic. 
Within this frame of reference court managers like Arran and 
Maitland, and great magnates like Huntly and Bothwel1 could 
operate, exploiting the enmities of their rivals, encouraging 
their feuds, cultivating friendships with their enemies and • 
spinning webs of kinship, dependency and clientage. Those 
who understood this best succeeded most, and thus chancellor 
Maitland, the supposed hammer of the nobility, was in fact 
the most astute manipUlator of noble politics of his time, 
exploiting his enemies' feuds with complete self-interest 
178 
and cynicism. Below the level of what is all too often 
considered the politics of this period there was thus an 
arena of activity which has scarcely been looked at. The 
collapse of the !4orton regency, the Ruthven Raiders, the 
fall of Arran, the career of ~fuitland and Bothwell, 
Huntly's rebellions, and all the major and minor ups and 
downs of political life during the last years of the 
Scottish court must be understood within the context of 
the feud. It would of course be wrong to simply write 
the politics of the period from the perspective of the 
feud and fail to take account of other factors, but it 
is time that these feuds were brought to the centre of 
the stage where they belong and not left to be considered 
-
as side-shows, as the a~tics of an immature and brutal 
178. A point which would have surprised no-one had Lee not 
attempted to see in Maitland an Eltonian Cromwell, 
but even the latter's image has been somewhat shaken 
recently, e.g. Starkey, "From Feud to Faction", p 20. 
political class. 
Yet if politics could be influenced, determined and even 
defined as feud it was also true that political competition 
initiated feuds and political success or failure could shape 
their course. Thus, in the latter case the power of the state 
could be used as an instrument to be wielded in private 
interests. Clearly this was one reason for seeking power 
at court and in the government. Thus the Hamiltons were 
victimised by the government because of Morton's own feud 
with them, and in the Crawford-Glamis feud one cou1~ clearly 
see the fortunes of life on the wider political stage being 
reflected in their private feud. Similarly, in the Gordon-
Forbes feud local politics were continually affected by the 
goings on in Edinburgh and Stirling. Even the civil war had 
had its public issues and its private ones. Yet, as Arran 
discovered, it was not only in war that one could inherit 
a feud, for while the executions he carried out were in the 
king's name, the families of his victims exacted their own 
private revenge on him, and the Ruthvens even tried to take 
revenge on the king himself. Those who lacked Arran's 
mettle, or alternatively had more sense, did their best to 
avoid these excesses, frustrating both foreign observers 
and at times the king with the practice of knocking a 
political opponent down but leaving him to crawl home 
rather than risk a blood-feud. Only when men were already 
at feud, as Crawford was with Glamis, did one hear the 
cries for blood. Killing a man in a feud was one thing, 
but killing him for the sake of the king and thus incurring 
the wrath of his kinsmen was quite another and to be shunned. 
It was a complication Scottish politicians had to live with, 
making the formal side of their politics less bloody than 
elsewhere, but concealing an underworld of political violence 
which was very bloody indeed. 
Scottish politics was not simply about feuding and 
about local issues; politics is rarely so simple that it 
can be so neatly classified or defined. However it was 
not simply an endless timetable of the rise and fall of 
favourites or a catalogue of baronial strife which had no 
deep significance. Scottish politics were social in nature, 
that is they were about relationships, relationships of 
co-operation - alliances and friendships - and conflict -
blood-feud. This does not mean that one can dismiss it as 
a darker age than our own, when intrigue, corruption and 
violence characterise it in our eyes as somehow less moral 
and worthy of study than the politics of party and of ideals. 
The social content of Scottish politics gave it is own 
ideal, that of the kin and of the blood-feud and on this 
ideoiogical base the faction evolved. This could be a 
loose collection of a number of families and lords with 
the minimum of cohesion and discipline,but they could 
equally be, especially where one kindred was involved or 
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where the lord was a very good manager of his affairs, bound 
together even more tightly than any modern political party. 
Political life was thus to a considernble extent sustained 
by the feud giving it its competitiveness and its violence, 
and also introducing into it its cohesion and co-operation. 
Nor did the feud lose from the relationship, feeding as it 
did on the hostile words and deeds men so often employ in 
their politics. 
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